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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Allegations of vote rigging during the 2016 presidential election cycle – from both the Left
and Right – have prompted concerns regarding citizens’ continued confidence in our nation’s
governing institutions. While predominately focused on electoral apparatuses and formal
governmental institutions (e.g. Congress, the presidency, and judiciary), it is not difficult
fathoming how the U.S. Constitution itself may also face legitimacy concerns if citizens believe
our political system no longer, at large, represents or works for us. While institutional loyalty 1
among citizens is generally immune to these short-term accusations (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a;
Gibson and Caldeira 2011), recent scholarship on citizen support for the nation’s courts indicates
that negative information may harm long-term institutional loyalty (see, e.g., LaRowe and
Hoekstra 2014). 2 Consequently, accusations assaulting the integrity of our nation’s electoral
institutions, if expanded, could signal a troubling development in citizens’ larger institutional
loyalties, shaking the very foundations of our sociopolitical system. Our federal Constitution and
(albeit to a lesser extent) state charters are integral components of that foundation.
“If the United States has a sacred text,” opined Sanford Levinson (2018), “it’s the
Constitution. Americans are taught, from an early age, to venerate the 231-year-old document,
which occupies what can only be described as a shrine at the National Archives.” Scholars of
constitutional veneration note that popular support, or belief, in the Constitution forms the basis
of an institutional stability (Hunsicker 2012), avoiding fundamental punctuations that could affect

I use institutional loyalty, institutional support, institutional legitimacy, and diffuse support interchangeably, as is
common in legitimacy theory studies (see below and also Chapter 2).
2
See also Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) for a similar discussion on Congress’s legitimacy and negative public
attitudes.
1
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the continuity of government. Public support for the federal Constitution is indeed widespread,
with state constitutional charters enjoying similar, albeit less extensive, support. On average,
Americans rate their federal Constitution a “7.8 out of 10, while [their] state constitutions earn a
somewhat lower rating of 6.7” (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016, 116; see also Zink and Dawes
2016). Such support is necessary, argued James Madison, in maintaining a constitution’s
legitimacy; popular support for the laws ensures continued obedience to them. Constitutions
with widespread societal support are more resilient and likely to endure, helping citizens
overcome coordination and enforcement problems related to constitutional practice (Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Melton 2009). Yet, critics have noted that blind support, or excessive veneration,
can have negative consequences, including saddling a political community with suboptimal
institutions. Support must be balanced with the necessity of “periodic repairs,” allowing each
generation to review the prior’s work (Jefferson 1984, 1402). In modern parlance, critics
advocate for periodic constitutional conventions, permitting constitutional revisions irrespective
of tradition or presumed legal permanence.
I explore this relationship between constitutional loyalty and periodic conventions,
against a larger political environment where institutional support generally is under stress.
Existing scholarship on constitutional support, while limited, has noted several factors (e.g.
demographic attributes, sociopolitical attitudes, and constitutional knowledge) that have a role
in generating support for constitutional charters. However, this literature has focused primarily
on a constitution’s specific support, or an individual’s current satisfaction with the charter’s
outputs, provisions, and/or performance. Little research has explored the factors responsible in
generating feelings of constitutional loyalty, or what Easton (1965) and other legitimacy scholars
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call diffuse support (see below). Moreover, emphasis is placed on the federal Constitution,
although recent studies examine support for state charters. The literature on periodic
conventions has enjoyed greater attention, especially from legal scholars. In particular, legal
scholars have debated the merits of periodic conventions, with consensus divided: some posit
that conventions would damage constitutional support by violating the law’s stability, an echo of
Aristotle’s argument that “habit breeds obedience;” others note that conventions may bolster
support since past conventions signal to succeeding generations that the constitution was either
accepted or rejected “deliberately rather than fatalistically” (Brennan 2017, 941).
It is this latter contention upon which this dissertation is primarily focused: Is
constitutional loyalty reinforced or undermined by knowledge that the document is and has been
susceptible to change? Put another way, does the existential threat that periodic conventions
represent towards constitutions influence a person’s constitutional loyalty? To operationalize
this question, I explore a real-world example: Does an individual’s Michigan state constitutional
loyalty change given the knowledge that the document can be scrapped every 16 years? How
does one’s support change knowing prior periodic convention referenda were rejected
(approved) by voters? These questions address a constitution’s diffuse support, or its loyalty,
rather than the charter’s specific support (or approval). As such, the underlying research can
further develop the literature on constitutional support by incorporating measures of diffuse
support, exploring its covariates, while also providing a critical test of periodic conventions and
how these exercises influence an individual’s support of constitutional charters. It could be that
awareness of periodic conventions influences one’s specific support but her diffuse support
remains unaffected. My dissertation explores these inquiries.
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Why This Matters
From a practical standpoint, constitutional loyalty is normatively important for the
nation’s (or a state’s) civic health. Understanding how constitutional support is generated has
piqued the interest of scholars, politicians, and ordinary citizens alike. This dissertation adds to
the discussion; do periodic conventions weaken the institutional loyalty of constitutions, or do
they encourage citizen deliberation on an important political issue? This information is useful for
proponents and opponents of periodic conventions when they appear on ballots, especially in
how they prime the issue for voters. For instance, if periodic conventions reinforce status quo
biases, then opponents need only highlight how past conventions have been defeated. The role
of periodic conventions affecting constitutional support is even more important at the state level
given the weaker status quo biases exhibited (Zink and Dawes 2016). Relatedly, there is much to
be gained by having a better grasp of what encourages greater levels of citizen specific and, more
importantly, diffuse support. This is especially true given that institutional support “allows
political institutions…to persist and retain their authority even when they must cope with stress
resulting from their policy discord with the public” (Cann and Yates 2008, 300). Constitutional
approval and loyalty are similarly important.
Using Michigan’s experience with periodic conventions affords some larger, practical
lessons, too. Periodic conventions are a means for the people to review their fundamental
charters, to consciously reevaluate whether the present constitutional configuration meets their
needs and expectations. Yet, if the priming exercise here works, it could be that periodic
conventions have an unintended consequence: they reinforce the present constitution’s
entrenchment. This raises questions about the efficaciousness of periodic conventions.

5

Moreover, using Michigan affords my research a means of mundane realism (see Chapter 3 for
an elaboration) using an actual, and relatively recent, political event. This permits subjects to
make judgments not only on a past political event. Information gleaned here may help to better
inform proponents, opponents, and voters themselves during the next convention ballot
question (scheduled for November 2026).
Academically, this research extends and adds to several literatures. Extant research on
constitutional support and attitudes is relatively small and novel but is complimented by a much
more established research program in legitimacy theory and political support for institutions.
Indeed, institutional legitimacy is a concept “central to political science” (Tanenhaus and Murphy
1981, 24). While these studies suggest several factors that influence an individual’s specific
support, none incorporate a constitution’s susceptibility to change into their modeling – and
none directly aim to explore a constitution’s diffuse support (loyalty). Legal scholars and political
theorists, meantime, have debated the merits of periodic conventions and explored their internal
organizations, initiating referenda, and outputs, but there have been no empirical studies
examining the law’s (or a constitution’s) susceptibility to change and how that awareness
influences individuals’ support (for a discussion, see Brennan 2017). This dissertation seeks to fill
the gaps.
Overview of the Literature & Theory
Institutional Legitimacy: Specific versus Diffuse Support
When examining institutional support, the predominant theoretical framework in
political science is David Easton’s (1965) legitimacy theory. For Easton, institutional legitimacy (or
support) is based on the idea that citizens accept the moral authority of institutions to make
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decisions for society at-large. Such support, moreover, is likely to be a “[strong] inner conviction”
(Easton 1965, 278), explaining why citizens may disagree with specific policy outputs of
institutions yet still “accept the validity of the policy decisions because of their deep-seated
beliefs regarding the uprightness of the institution” (Cann and Yates 2008, 303). This diffuse
support, or institutional loyalty, is the core of legitimacy theory, and differs from what scholars
call specific support, or job approval (Baird 2001; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; LaRowe and Hoekstra
2014). Unlike specific support that tends to be rational, short-term, and tied with specific policy
outputs (e.g. particular constitutional amendments or proposals), diffuse support is more durable
and connotes a preference to avoid fundamental changes (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson,
Caldeira, and Spence 2003a; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a).
It is important to understand the conceptual dichotomy between specific and diffuse
support. Easton (1965; see also Easton 1975) describes specific support as consisting of attitudes
towards an institution based upon whether particular demands, policies, or actions are fulfilled.
Diffuse support, conversely, is the “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps
members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they
see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965, 273). Studies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
(SCOTUS) public support provide convenient examples of the distinction between specific and
diffuse support. Specific support for SCOTUS is based on one’s agreement with its rulings
(Franklin and Kosaki 1989), although it may fluctuate due to short-term factors, including:
support for other institutions (Caldeira 1987); opinions on how the Court is conducting its
business (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995); and/or controversy over the nomination process and
nominees (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Hoekstra and LaRowe 2013). Alternatively, diffuse support
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is one’s support for the Court’s role in the political system, normally expressed by a person’s
unwillingness to make fundamental changes to the Court’s functional/structural role. For
example, Gibson, Caldeira, and colleagues (see, e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson et al.,
2003a; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003b; Gibson and Caldeira 1992; and Gibson and Caldeira
2009a) have developed a widely used measurement index asking respondents how willing they
are to change the Court’s jurisdiction, do away with the Court itself, believe the Court gets too
mixed up with politics, and how trustful they are of the Court. Whereas specific support is often
ephemeral and context-dependent, scholars view diffuse support as a more durable orientation
toward the Court’s institutional role; people often do disagree with the Court on particular
rulings, but they nonetheless still express a strong institutional loyalty (Gibson, Caldeira, and
Baird 1998).
While somewhat semantical, scholars refer to specific support as simply support,
satisfaction, and/or approval, while labeling institutional legitimacy, institutional loyalty, and/or
institutional support as diffuse support. I follow this nomenclature in my conceptualization of
constitutional support. Feelings on a constitution can be conceptually divided into constitutional
approval (specific support) and constitutional loyalty (diffuse support). 3 Questions asking for
thermometer ratings on constitutions, approval of specific constitutional provisions, and/or
satisfaction with the current constitution or its performance (all of which are ubiquitous in
general surveys on constitutions; see Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016, 120) are better
described as tapping into a person’s specific rather than diffuse support. Queries ascertaining a
willingness (or not) to modify the document fundamentally (e.g. replace it) are analogous to the

3

Note that this conceptualization refers to an individual’s feelings on the constitution’s legitimacy, as defined here.
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diffuse support index used by judicial scholars. It is likely that periodic and more general
constitutional conventions tap into an individual’s diffuse support, or constitutional loyalty, more
than her specific support given the substance.
Periodic Conventions & Constitutional Loyalty: A Theory
Various articles exist on state and federal constitutional development related to periodic
conventions, including descriptive statistics on popular constitutional support (see, e.g.,
Benjamin 2002; Dinan 2009; Dinan 2010; Grad and Williams 2006; May 1987; and Tarr 2016). The
periodic convention literature is heavily focused on examining formational institutional
properties of conventions; reasons for calling conventions; intra-convention process politics; and
mechanisms of constitutional amendment/ratification resultant from conventions (for a review,
see Snider 2017, 258). 4 Unfortunately, these works do not address the role of periodic
conventions in constitutional approval and loyalty.
However, the debate between James Madison and Thomas Jefferson concerning the
efficacy of periodic conventions provides some insight into the role these conventions may play
influencing constitutional approval and loyalty. Madison, writing in Federalist 49, feared that
“frequent appeals” (e.g. periodic conventions) to the people would “deprive the government [or
constitution] of the veneration that time bestows upon everything” (Madison [1788] 1961, 311),
ultimately reducing constitutional support by negating its semi-permeance. Jefferson, meantime,
advocated for periodic conventions as a means for succeeding generations to conduct “periodic
repairs” and consciously reevaluate the status quo every generation (or every 19 years by his
calculation). Thus, by holding periodic conventions to scrutinize the Constitution, Jefferson

4

This literature is more extensively reviewed in Chapter 2.
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believed future generations can give explicit consent by affirmatively endorsing the status quo,
revising the social contract, and/or redressing suboptimal institutions (Brennan 2017; Levinson
2012).
From this debate, two mechanisms are uncovered that may help generate constitutional
support. The first concerns the idea that habit breeds obedience, generating both constitutional
approval and loyalty. Constitutional support becomes self-reinforcing: the longer a charter goes
without being replaced or changed, the more likely any proposed change will be rejected (Zink
and Dawes 2016). This is often termed Aristotelian support since Aristotle argued that the law’s
strength lies in the habitual obedience it inspires within citizens. A second mechanism concerns
a constitution’s susceptibility to change; does knowing that the document has a sunset provision
matter in hardening or weakening habitual obedience? Ironically, and despite his opposition to
periodic conventions, Madison’s Federalist 49 provides some rationale for periodic conventions
strengthening constitutional support rather than weakening it: “The reason of man, like man
himself, is timid and caution when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion
to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ancient
as well as numerous, they are known to have a double effect” (emphasis in original; Madison
[1788] 1961, 311-312). Rather than reducing loyalty, periodic conventions “might have
encouraged Americans to see the Constitution as something not to be respected not only
because of its origin in 1787 but also because of its endorsement by later generations” (Brennan
2017, 940).
Scholars have found indirect evidence for both mechanisms. Options framed as the
“status quo,” for example, are more likely to be chosen by individuals than when no default point
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is specified (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Moreover,
individuals assume that the status quo is preferable because it exists, a tendency that grows
stronger the longer the status quo remains in place (Eidelman et al., 2010; Eidelman and Crandall
2014). In this same vein, individuals prefer to avoid current losses over seeking unrealized gains
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991), while also being more susceptible to frames that
emphasize risks (Eckles and Schaffner 2011). Consequently, periodic conventions may, much to
Jefferson’s chagrin, encourage further support for the current constitution given the inherent
risks associated with replacing it (however accurate or realized those risks may be). The question
remains, though, if Madison’s contention is accurate: does telling the public that prior
conventions were rejected induce greater constitutional loyalty?
Existing Research & Shortcomings
The research on constitutional support is relatively sparse and novel, with a focus on
constitutional approval rather than constitutional loyalty. To date, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg
(2016) is the only work that comprehensively analyses factors generating constitutional approval.
A couple of others works (Blake and Levinson 2016 and Zink and Dawes 2016), though, do provide
some insight into constitutional loyalty, albeit under the guise of examining constitutional
veneration. 5 Collectively, these studies explore two broad themes: (1) whether a constitutional
status quo bias exists and (2) what factors generate or influence constitutional approval (specific
support). Public attitudes toward both the federal and state constitutions tend to be positive,
with the federal charter enjoying greater approval than state constitutions (Stephanopoulos and
Versteeg 2016; Zink and Dawes 2016). Zink and Dawes (2016) attribute this finding to the lower

5

See Chapter 2 for an elaboration.
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status quo bias that exists at the state level, finding that a strong degree of constitutional
attachment, or existence bias, exists in Americans despite their ideological, political/policy
preferences, risk orientations, and constitutional knowledge.
Scholars have also found that other factors figure prominently in generating
constitutional support. Blake and Levinson (2016) find that one’s legal consciousness (e.g. their
preferred mode of constitutional interpretation) shapes constitutional attitudes and support; in
examining support for a federal constitutional convention, the authors find that convention
support is linked to how one evaluates her legal standing relative the constitutional status quo
bias. Put another way, those who find that the Constitution offers them full political citizenship
and engagement opportunities are less likely to support a convention; those who feel the process
is “broken” are more likely to favor change. Similarly, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) find
that constitutional approval is heavily linked with an individual’s constitutional knowledge and
feelings on other governmental institutions, but not one’s demography or partisanship/ideology
(although race and age were exceptions; see Chapter 2 for more information). Importantly,
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) also examine non-substantive factors of a constitution
(including its age, length, and amendment rate), factors that arguably encourage obedience; they
find no relationship, though, with constitutional approval. More likely, though, is that these
factors (especially a constitution’s age) become salient when invoked (e.g. framing/priming).
While I review these works more extensively in Chapter 2, I do note three collective
shortcomings here. First, the implicit assumption within these works is that a constitutional
status quo bias exists, and studies have sought to examine what factors promote that bias or
support. This is arguably related to the Aristotelian mechanism of support above: habit breeds
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obedience. Little research has explored how knowledge that a constitution can be fundamentally
changed influences this habit. Zink and Dawes (2016), however, do find that framing a policy
change as a constitutional amendment rather than a statutory modification invokes greater
opposition. However, they do not address wholescale constitutional replacement. Blake and
Levinson (2016) are closer to the mark examining federal constitutional convention support, but
their study is geared more towards constitutional interpretation rather than determining if a
person’s constitutional loyalty was affected.
Second, the federal Constitution, with a history of not having periodic conventions, is
arguably ill-suited for testing these inquiries. State constitutions are, with only nine states having
had just one constitutional convention (Levinson 2012, 342-343). Despite this history, there has
been a steep decline in state constitutional conventions being held and supported at the ballot
box by voters (Snider 2017). This context suggests a fertile ground to assess the impact of periodic
conventions on constitutional approval and loyalty, complimented by the fact that 14 states ask
voters whether they would like to hold a constitutional convention at set intervals (see Chapter
2 for further information).
Finally, there is a focus on specific support, or assessment of constitutional approval and
satisfaction. This dissertation’s focus, meantime, is aiming at approximating diffuse support
(constitutional loyalty) more than constitutional approval. Given the knowledge that a
constitution could be fundamentally changed and was/was not, how do feelings on its legitimacy
vary (if at all)? Conceptualized this way, Blake and Levinson’s (2016) analysis is closer to
measuring constitutional loyalty,6 while Zink and Dawes (2016) demonstrate how the same policy

6

Albeit support for a federal constitutional convention.
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framed as a constitutional amendment enjoys less support than when characterized statutorily.
Neither, however, discuss a constitution’s prior susceptibility to change (e.g. being informed that
prior conventions were rejected), with Blake and Levinson (2016) suggesting individuals are
making a contextualized, short-term assessment, viz. how is the constitution at present doing?
Measuring constitutional loyalty requires not only a more appropriate question battery but also
a different prime: If people are aware of the consequences of a convention, how does their
constitutional loyalty (and, to a lesser extent, approval) vary?
Research Design & Methodology
To explore these questions, I use a between-subjects survey experiment administered to
Wayne State University undergraduates. Students were asked to participate in an anonymous
survey exploring their knowledge and feelings towards the federal and Michigan state
constitutions. Participants were first given a pre-test measuring their demographic
characteristics (e.g. age, race, and socioeconomic status), sociopolitical variables (e.g. ideology,
partisanship, and political orientations), and initial specific and diffuse support for the federal
and Michigan state constitutions. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions. Depending on condition (i.e. treatment) assigned, subjects
encountered varying information concerning Michigan’s 2010 periodic convention and its
abilities (specifically to replace the Michigan constitution) via a mock newspaper article. After
reading the experimental vignette (i.e. the newspaper article), subjects completed a post-test
with three tasks: (1) two questions on how likely they are to support a constitutional convention
at the federal and state levels; (2) two short question batteries on federal and Michigan state
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constitutional knowledge; and (3) complete, again, the specific and diffuse support question
batteries from the pre-test.
While I elaborate on my methodology and operationalization in Chapter 3, I provide a
summary of my treatments here given their central importance. The treatments explore how
additional information about periodic conventions influence subjects’ constitutional loyalties,
including whether the inclusion of a prime (i.e. prior conventions were rejected/approved)
modifies results. These primes help to test for the second mechanism noted above: does prior
knowledge about the constitution’s susceptibility to change condition constitutional loyalty?
Subjects assigned to the “control” received a “plain” article on the 2010 convention question. 7
The article did not frame, prime, or otherwise emphasize features of a periodic convention
(specifically that it can wholescale replace the present charter) and balances discussion by
providing an affirmative and negative position on holding the convention.
The remaining treatments were based on altered articles: Subjects assigned to the “more
information” group read the control article but with an added paragraph describing how a seated
convention could fundamentally alter or replace the current constitution. This treatment
effectively measures whether a constitutional status quo bias exists by inducing the subject to
consider replacing the charter (see also Zink and Dawes 2016). The remaining treatments explore
whether Madison’s contention in Federalist 49 is correct – or, rather, if a prime matters. The
“negative prime” treatment presents subjects with the article found in the “more information”
group but with another added paragraph highlighting how past convention referenda were

For a discussion about how I constructed these mock articles, including source material, see relevant discussion in
Chapter 3.

7
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rejected by voters. Conversely, the “positive prime” article emphasizes a series of past referenda
that were approved by voters, suggesting that the public in the past has been critical of the state’s
constitution, albeit earlier versions. Knowledge that voters have voted to fundamentally review
the state constitution may work against the charter’s institutional loyalty.
Importantly, these treatments inquire about the Michigan state constitution. Assessing
subjects on Michigan constitutional loyalty is prudent given: (1) subjects are attending a Michigan
public university; (2) subjects are likelier to have a greater understanding of the Michigan periodic
convention mechanism as well as the Michigan constitution; and (3) Michigan is one of 14 states
that use periodic conventions in their constitutional practice, providing a degree of mundane
realism that reduces the need for artificiality. As a result, the experiment can speak more
generally to other states using periodic conventions and to states (or nations) that are
considering them.
Finally, this design mitigates against many threats to internal and external validity.
Random assignment to the treatment conditions ensures roughly equivalent groups, while
changes in the general environment should be balanced among both control and treatment
groups (Campbell and Stanley 1963). Moreover, the between-subjects design makes it difficult
for a subject to infer experimenter intent, given that: (1) the subject is unaware of which
condition he was placed within and (2) the blurring line between the experimental sections and
the non-randomized material all respondents encounter (Mummolo and Peterson 2017). While
the sampling of college students may threaten the study’s external validity (see Sears 1986), this
threat is less concerning for research dealing in framing and priming effects (Druckman and Kam
2011; Druckman and Nelson 2003). Given the dissertation’s focus on priming subjects to be
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aware of the Michigan constitution’s susceptibility to change, it would appear that the use of a
college student sample is not necessarily a knock against external validity. Indeed, there is
nothing in the larger literatures on institutional or constitutional support suggesting that college
students differ systemically in how they respond to primes (for further elaboration, see relevant
discussions in Chapter 3), while the experiment controls (albeit post-hoc) for various confounders
that may explain differences in how constitutional loyalty is generated (i.e. the pre-test
questions).
Chapter Outline
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 surveys the relevant
literatures on legitimacy theory, constitutional support, and periodic conventions. I relate these
works to my theory and present study, noting my hypotheses and how my findings contribute to
existing scholarship. Chapter 3 lays out my study’s methodology. My experimental design,
variable operationalizations, subject recruitment, and finally notes on reliability, validity, and
objectivity are thoroughly discussed. Empirical findings, analyses, and implications are detailed
in the next three chapters. Chapter 4 engages in an exploratory analysis regarding predictors of
constitutional loyalty using both descriptive and regression techniques. Chapter 5 turns to the
experimental results, evaluating the bulk of my hypothetical expectations and discussing the
substantive implications. Chapter 6 concludes my empirical analysis by exploring the relationship
between constitutional knowledge and constitutional support, offering an improved
measurement scheme. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive discussion about my study’s
implications and “big picture” ramifications, especially in an era of hyperpartisanship and low
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constitutional understanding. Here, I also discuss future avenues of research and address
unanswered questions.
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CHAPTER 2 – CONSTITUTIONAL LOYALY: IMPORTANT TO THE FOUNDERS BUT IGNORED BY
THE DISCIPLINE
Extant research on constitutional support and attitudes is relatively small and novel, but
these existing works are complimented by a more established research program in legitimacy
theory and political support for institutions. Other scholars, meantime, have debated the merits
of periodic conventions and explored their internal organizations, initiating referenda (and voter
support of them), and convention outputs. In this chapter, I provide an overview of this literature
and how it relates to my present study. First, I explore the theoretical background of institutional
support, extending this basis to public support for constitutions. Next, I examine the relationship
between periodic conventions and constitutional loyalty using the recurring debate over
constitutional veneration and change. I also provide a detailed account of what prior, seminal
works on constitutional support and periodic conventions have found. Finally, I relate these
works and theory to my present study, noting my hypothetical expectations that will guide my
inquiry.
Institutional Support & Legitimacy Theory
Institutional legitimacy is a concept “central to political science” (Tanenhaus and Murphy
1981, 24), and a topic with which congressional, presidential, and court scholars have long been
fascinated. Legitimacy refers to the “belief that a rule, institutions, or leader has a right to
govern,” an individual’s judgment and feelings about the rightfulness of the institution’s
command over its subject (Hurd 2007), commonly (and broadly) referred to as political support.
When examining political and institutional support, the predominant theoretical framework in
political science is David Easton’s (1965) legitimacy theory. Easton envisions political support as
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an input into the larger political system, alongside sociopolitical and policy demands. The system
processes these demands and support in a manner that is not specified by Easton, but the
system’s outputs are predicated on these demands and support. Subsequent outputs, in turn,
affect future demands and support, generating a feedback loop. While some scholars (e.g.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) argue that support is better conceptualized not as an input but
a trait that conditions how inputs are handled, for our purposes Easton’s conceptualization is
fine: we are more concerned with exploring what generates public support for constitutions and
how this support can be influenced, not necessarily how it plays in the larger political system.1
For Easton, institutional legitimacy is based on the idea that citizens accept the moral
authority of institutions to make decisions for society at-large. Citizens’ sense of legitimacy is
contingent upon such authorities conforming to citizens’ “own sense of what is right and proper
in the political sphere” (Easton 1965, 278). Such support, moreover, is likely to be a “stronger
inner conviction” (Easton 1965, 278), explaining why citizens may disagree with specific policy
outputs of institutions yet still “accept the validity of the policy decisions because of their deepseated beliefs regarding the uprightness of the institution” (Cann and Yates 2008, 303). This
diffuse support, or institutional loyalty, is the core of legitimacy theory, and differs from what
scholars call specific support, or job approval (Baird 2001; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; LaRowe and
Hoekstra 2014). Unlike specific support that tends to be rational, short-term, and tied with
specific policy outputs (e.g. specific constitutional amendments or proposals), diffuse support is

Although these implications are important. Constitutional support is undoubtedly an important ingredient in
political stability, good governance, and the political system’s larger legitimacy (see Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton
2009).

1
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more durable and connotes a preference to avoid fundamental changes (Caldeira and Gibson
1992; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003a; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a).
Specific versus Diffuse Support
Understanding the conceptual dichotomy between specific and diffuse support can be
distilled from studies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s (SCOTUS) public support. The SCOTUS’s
specific support is usually based on one’s agreement with its rulings (Franklin and Kosaki 1989),
although it can fluctuate due to other short-term factors, including: support for other institutions
(Caldeira 1987); opinions on how the Court is conducting its business (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
1995); and/or controversy over the nomination process and nominees (Gibson and Caldeira
2009a; Hoekstra and LaRowe 2013). Alternatively, diffuse support is one’s support for the Court’s
role in the political system – normally expressed by a person’s unwillingness to make
fundamental changes to the Court’s functional role. For example, Gibson, Caldeira, and
colleagues (see, e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003a and 2003b;
Gibson and Caldeira 1992; and Gibson and Caldeira 2009a) have developed a widely used
measurement index that asks respondents how willing they are to change the Court’s jurisdiction,
do away with the Court itself, believe the Court gets too mixed up with politics, and how trustful
they are of the Court. Whereas specific support is often ephemeral and context-dependent,
scholars view diffuse support as a more durable orientation toward the Court’s institutional role;
people often do disagree with the Court on specific rulings, but they nonetheless still express a
strong institutional loyalty (Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998).
However, the distinction between specific and diffuse support does not enjoy universal
backing. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 13) provide a trenchant critique:
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What Easton calls diffuse support is closer to traditional notions of support, reaching
deeper than the superficial and ephemeral reactions to particular outputs. Yet… [specific
and diffuse] support… [are] not immutable since [they] can be affected by particular
outputs, scandals, and conditions…. Support of any kind is by definition more than
reactions to any single output or action. Rather it is the combination of personal
predispositions and remembered events. (internal citations omitted)
Despite these theoretical concerns, some judicial scholars have found that specific and diffuse
support are empirically independent of one another (see Gibson and Caldeira 1992). 2 While
specific support may, indeed, be “superficial and ephemeral reactions to particular outputs”
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 13), it is still telling that people are capable of reacting one way
towards an institution’s outputs and quite another way to the institution’s overall legitimacy.
While somewhat semantical, scholars (predominantly Gibson et al.) have begun referring to
specific support as simply support, satisfaction, and/or approval, while labeling institutional
legitimacy, institutional loyalty, and/or institutional support as diffuse support.
I follow this nomenclature in my conceptualization. Feelings on constitutions can be
conceptually divided into constitutional approval (specific support) and constitutional loyalty
(diffuse support). 3 Questions asking for thermometer (likeability) ratings on constitutions,
approval of specific constitutional provisions, and/or satisfaction with the constitution’s current
performance – all of which are ubiquitous in the literature – are better described as tapping into
a person’s specific rather than diffuse support. As Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016, 120)
argue:
When people are asked how strongly they approve of their constitution, they are
prompted to consider and then rate their current views of the document. They are not
Some scholars argue that it is too difficult to effectively disentangle the two concepts empirically-speaking (see,
e.g., Davidson and Parker 1972).
3
Note that this conceptualization refers to an individual’s feelings and attitudes towards a constitution’s legitimacy
or their loyalty to it, as defined here.
2
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induced to reflect on whether they still would adhere to its commands if they thought
them unjust, or whether they would like to scrap it and start afresh. Constitutional
approval, like equivalent questions about judicial, legislative, and executive branch
approval, thus taps people’s opinions on constitutional performance. It does not capture
their feelings on constitutional legitimacy. (emphasis in the original)
Questions ascertaining a willingness (or not) to modify the document fundamentally (i.e. start
anew) are analogues to the diffuse support index used by judicial scholars measuring the
SCOTUS’s institutional loyalty. It is likely that periodic and more general constitutional convention
calls tap into an individual’s diffuse support more than her specific support given the substance.
An analogy helps to clarify the conceptual distinction between specific and diffuse
support. Marital relationships include both specific and diffuse support elements. Specific
support refers to a partner’s current feelings toward her spouse, which are context dependent
and will likely wax and wane depending on the spouse’s outputs (e.g. forgetting to take the
garbage out). However, marital diffuse support is the long-term commitment to the institution
of marriage; while she may express dissatisfaction that he has not taken the garbage out, she
nonetheless remains committed to the marriage (as an institution). This explains the distinction
between momentarily disagreements between spouses (specific support) and the underlying
marital commitment (diffuse support). However, continual quarrels (i.e. low specific support)
may generate a decline in diffuse support (and, ultimately, a fundamental change in the
underlying institution – or marriage). Connecting this analogy with constitutional approval and
loyalty, one sees how the spouses’ current feelings toward each other are analogous to
constitutional approval; how much one currently “likes” the constitution is a specific, timedependent appraisal. Meantime, the underlying belief in marriage is similar to a person’s
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underlying commitment to the constitution (or the governmental system it creates) – which we
term constitutional loyalty.
Periodic Conventions & Constitutional Loyalty
Studying Periodic Conventions
Various articles exist on state and federal constitutional development related to periodic
constitutional conventions (“periodic conventions”) and descriptive statistics on popular support
for constitutions (see, e.g., Benjamin 2001; Dinan 2009 and 2010; Grad and Williams 2006; May
1987; and Tarr 2016). The periodic convention literature is heavily focused on examining
formational institutional properties of conventions; reasons for calling conventions; intraconvention process politics; and mechanisms of constitutional amendment/ratification resultant
from convention work (for a review, see Snider 2017). Unfortunately, these works do not address
the role of periodic conventions in constitutional approval and loyalty.
While I do not comprehensively review these works here, I do discuss some pertinent
themes. First, given the lack of federal experience, research on periodic conventions is almost
exclusively on state constitutions. Indeed, the state experience in America provides evidence that
Americans are quite willing (if not downright eager) to replace their charters. As Dinan notes
(2009; see also Tarr 2016), there have been over 230 state constitutional conventions since 1776,
translating into an average of five per state (see Snider 2015). Many of these conventions did not
just recommend various amendments to their current state’s charter; many wholescale replaced
the document with a new constitution. Since World War II, moreover, a majority of states have
replaced their constitutions through conventions (Grad and Williams 2006), with Louisiana being
the most recent in 1992. It is hard to argue, then, that there exists a general “disposition to
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‘venerate’ all constitutions or believe that they are impervious to change, including change
through conventions,” (Blake and Levinson 2016, 3) at least where state charters are concerned.
At least among state legislatures, a willingness to countenance constitutional conventions at the
federal level is also apparent given that over 28 states have approved resolutions calling for an
Article V convention (Blake and Levinson 2016).
However, in the modern era there has been a marked decline in state periodic
conventions held relative to the nineteenth century. While the 1960s and 70s saw a burst of
convention activity (20 states held constitutional conventions), since the 1980s not a single
periodic convention referendum has been approved by voters. The trend is especially apparent
between 2008 and 2012: in four short years, ten convention referenda were soundly rejected by
voters, with 2010 representing a historical high when four were shot down (Snider 2015).
Meantime, the median age of state constitutions has increased from 96 years in 1994 (Lutz 1995)
to over 110 years today (Levinson 2012, 335). Scholarship on the decline of periodic conventions 4
broadly argues that conventions are used as a “modernizing” tool by elected officials and political
elites (Benjamin 2001; Dinan 2010; Kogan 2010), although others (Snider 2017) assert the
convention as a means of the people circumventing the state legislature’s agenda control (and
gatekeeping power) regarding constitutional revision. In short, the decline can arguably be
attributed to opponents’ emphasis on “runaway” conventions that could harm the underlying
constitutional system of government (or legislators’ unwillingness to permit unrestrained

Some scholarship argues that the recent decline in periodic conventions is simply a “valley” within a long-term
pattern of peaks and valleys (see, e.g., Adrian 1967; Dinan 2000; and Tarr 2014).
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conventions that may limit the legislature’s institutional powers) while tapping into Americans’
general proclivity to avoid fundamental constitutional revisions (see below).
Another relevant theme concerns the interconnected structural factors that have led to
a decline in periodic conventions. One factor is legislature hostility, particularly given legislators
with long-term career goals of entrenching the legislature’s power vis-à-vis the other branches
and people (Sturm 1970). A second factor concerns the growth of what Snider (2017) terms
“constitutional sclerosis.” This results from increased interest group opposition to constitutional
change generally, given that interest groups use state constitutions as a “safety vault” for
entrenching favorable laws (Irvine and Kresky 1962; see also Olson 1982 for the background
theory). Periodic conventions become threats to cracking open these “vaults,” and special
interests work tirelessly to convince voters to not approve the referenda (using various
techniques, including the notion that a “runaway” convention may “gut” the constitution). A
third, and related, factor concerns the public’s ignorance on periodic conventions, allowing for
manipulation by legislative and political elites. Not surprising, researchers (Thomas 1968 and
Snider 2017) have found that voters turn to familiar cues to determine their vote choice on
periodic conventions. Michigan and New York (both states with long histories of periodic
conventions) provide two prominent examples: During the 1960s series of convention referenda,
Michigan voters’ partisanship was the deciding factor in determining support (Thomas 1968),
while legislative advertising highlighting risks and associated “dangers” of constitutional
conventions carried greater weight with New York voters than more positive messages (Snider
2017).
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Madison and Jefferson: Debating the Merits of Periodic Conventions
As the previous section illustrates, periodic convention scholars have directed their
energies towards explaining the decline of periodic conventions, with structural factors being
predominant. However, an interesting question emerges: Do efforts to frustrate convention
referenda influence voters’ underlying constitutional support? While the scholarship reviewed
above asserts that voters are responding to interest group and other political cues, a question
remains whether these cues are tapping into a more fundamental propensity within voters (e.g.
their constitutional loyalty). Perhaps periodic conventions are soundly defeated because voters
do recognize they represent an existential threat to the charter’s integrity. Then again, perhaps
voters are merely following their partisanship, with their underlying constitutional attitudes
having little impact on their vote choice.
Similar questions and concerns over federal periodic conventions vexed James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson during the Second Founding. Their debate provides some insight into the
role periodic conventions may play influencing constitutional approval and loyalty. Madison,
writing in Federalist 49, feared that “frequent appeals” to the people would “deprive the
government [or constitution] of the veneration that time bestows upon everything” (Madison
[1788] 1961, 311), ultimately reducing constitutional loyalty and approval by negating its semipermanence. This theme is not unlike Aristotle’s notion that the law’s strength lies in the habit
of obedience it inspires within citizens; instability, or questioning, of its permeance weakens the
very notion of law itself (see Politics, Book II, section 8). Other scholars have echoed this
sentiment (see, e.g., Elkins et al., 2009; Holmes 1995; and Strauss 2010), but Madison and his
proponents did not favor excessive veneration or blind support; amendments addressing a
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charter’s deficient aspects should be entertained and considered (Bailey 2012), but a citizenry
“high” on the status quo may be unable to do so (see also Hunsicker 2012, 55-58).
Conversely, Jefferson advocated for periodic conventions as a means for succeeding
generations to conduct “periodic repairs” and consciously reevaluate the status quo every
generation (or every 19 years by his calculation). 5 Thus, by holding periodic conventions to
scrutinize the constitution, Jefferson believed that future generations can give explicit consent
by affirmatively endorsing the status quo or revising the social contract (Brennan 2017). 6 Besides
renewing the social contract, periodic conventions permit an opportunity to redress suboptimal
institutions; as Levinson (2012) notes, an overabundance of loyalty towards a constitution can
make a people complicit in its own political dysfunction.
From this debate, there are two mechanisms that may help generate constitutional
support. The first concerns the idea that habit breeds obedience, generating both constitutional
satisfaction and loyalty. Scholars have found indirect evidence of this mechanism in the research
on status quo bias. Options framed as the “status quo” are more likely to be chosen by individuals
than when no default point is specified (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Tversky and Kahneman
1991). Moreover, individuals tend to associate the existence of a status quo with normative
“goodness;” persons assume that the status quo is preferable because it exists, a tendency that
grows stronger the longer the status quo remains in place (Eidelman, Pattershall, and Crandall
2010; Eidelman and Crandall 2014). By extension, constitutional support becomes selfreinforcing: the longer the charter goes without being replaced or changed, the more likely any

Ironically, Elkins et al. (2009) find that the average lifespan of a constitution (albeit it national charters) is 16
years, making the U.S. Constitution a significant exception.
6
Rousseau (1994) makes a similar argument in the Social Contract (188-190).
5
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proposed change will be rejected outright without any appeal to the merits (Zink and Dawes
2015).
An alternative mechanism concerns a constitution’s susceptibility to change; does
knowing the document has a sunset provision matter in hardening or weakening habitual
obedience? Ironically, and despite his opposition, Madison’s Federalist 49 provides some
rationale for periodic conventions strengthening constitutional support rather than weakening
it:
The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and caution when left alone, and acquires
firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When
the examples which fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous, they are known to
have a double effect. (emphasis original; Madison [1788] 1961, 311-312).
Rather than reducing loyalty, periodic conventions “might have encouraged Americans to see the
Constitution as something not to be respected not only because of its origin in 1787 but also
because of its endorsement by later generations” (Brennan 2017, 940). Again, there is indirect
evidence to suggest this may be the case from the status quo and risk aversion literatures:
Framing the current constitution as the reference point leads individuals to forgo evaluating
alternatives on the merits (see Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), causing convention referenda
to reinforce existing constitutional support. In this same vein, individuals prefer to avoid current
losses over seeking unrealized gains (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). Risk-averse persons,
therefore, are likely to favor alternatives that exhibit characteristics associated with the status
quo (Kam and Simas 2012), while also being more susceptible to frames that emphasize risks
(Eckles and Schaffner 2011). Consequently, periodic conventions may, much to Jefferson’s
chagrin, encourage further support for current constitutions given the inherent risks associated
with replacing them (however accurate or realized those risks may be).
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Extant Studies: What Generates Constitutional Approval? Loyalty?
However, there is a dearth of direct empirical studies on constitutional approval and
loyalty, with most works focused on examining the former. To date, Stephanopoulos and
Versteeg (2016) is the only study that directly analyses factors that generate constitutional
approval. A couple of other works (Blake and Levinson 2016; Zink and Dawes 2016), though, do
provide some insight into constitutional loyalty, albeit under the guise of examining
constitutional veneration. 7 Collectively, these studies explore two broad themes: (1) whether a
constitutional status quo bias exists and (2) what factors generate or influence specific
constitutional support. Generally, these works present several common themes but also
important differences. Public attitudes toward both the federal and state constitutions tend to
be positive, with the federal charter enjoying greater approval than state constitutions
(Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016; Zink and Dawes 2016). Zink and Dawes (2016) attribute this
finding to the lower status quo bias that exists at the state level. In particular, these authors’
survey experiments found that a strong degree of constitutional attachment, or existence bias,
exists in Americans despite their ideological, political/policy preferences, risk orientations, and
constitutional knowledge.
Meantime, other scholars have found that additional factors figure prominently in
generating constitutional opinions. Blake and Levinson (2016) find that one’s legal consciousness
shapes constitutional attitudes and support; in examining support for a federal constitutional
convention, the authors find that one’s willingness to support a convention is linked to how one

For these studies, support for holding a constitutional convention and/or amending the present charter is
synonymous with low veneration. It is likely, though, that what these studies attribute as veneration is a measure
approximating diffuse support.
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evaluates her legal standing relative the constitutional status quo. Put another way, those who
find that the Constitution offers them full political citizenship and engagement opportunities are
less likely to support a convention; those who feel the process is “broken” (or biased against
them) are more likely to favor change. Thus, the constitutional bias exhibited by Zink and Dawes’s
(2016) subjects is contingent on an individual’s participative and efficacy orientations. 8 Similarly,
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) find that constitutional support is heavily linked with an
individual’s constitutional knowledge but not one’s demography, partisan beliefs, 9 or
sociopolitical attributes. However, two demographic variables did exhibit a significant impact:
The older an individual, the stronger one’s constitutional approval. Race also mattered: African
Americans (and other racial/ethnic minorities, albeit to a lesser extent) correlated with lower
levels of constitutional approval. These findings, however, mirror Blake and Levinson’s (2016)
insights: if one considers themselves a “loser” under the current constitutional regime, then they
are less likely to express satisfaction with the document as is. 10
Two other findings deserve further elucidation: First, the relationship between
constitutional knowledge (or familiarity) and constitutional approval is a qualified one. Using a
self-reported measure of constitutional familiarity, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) found
those expressing greater knowledge of the federal Constitution rated the document significantly

This sentiment could also be interpreted to convey whether an individual finds the Constitution “just,” another
component of diffuse support – further suggesting that rather than measuring constitutional veneration, these
studies are capturing constitutional loyalty.
9
Blake and Levinson (2016) note that partisanship mattered regarding a respondent’s propensity for supporting a
federal constitutional convention (i.e. Republicans and conservatives were less likely to support than Democrats
and liberals). This finding may suggest that partisanship does matter in generating constitutional loyalty; I address
this more in Chapter 4.
10
Gibson and Caldeira (1992) find a similar tend among African Americans and diffuse support for the SCOTUS
given the institution’s historical role in discrimination against blacks.
8
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higher than low-knowledge persons. The same relationship held for state constitutional approval.
However, respondents were not assessed on actual constitutional knowledge, while highknowledge persons fared no better on the survey’s reading comprehension quizzes than lowknowledge respondents. These findings offer only tentative evidence, therefore, of a relationship
between constitutional knowledge and support. Second, Blake and Levinson (2016) explore
whether support (albeit specific support) for the Constitution’s created governmental institutions
influences one’s support for holding a federal constitutional convention. From a descriptive
standpoint, they find that higher approval ratings for the president, Congress, and the SCOTUS
correspond with a lower likelihood of supporting a constitutional convention. Therefore, Blake
and Levinson’s findings suggest a positive relationship between institutional attitudes and
constitutional loyalty, raising interesting questions regarding how a constitution may be
evaluated more by what its created institutions do rather than on the charter’s own merits.
Finally, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) examine non-substantive factors of a
constitution that arguably proxy features that encourage obedience. The charter’s age (in years),
length (in words), and amendment rate (in number of amendments) were all regressed on an
individual’s level of constitutional approval, yielding null findings. These results are interesting
and offer a basis for further research: an older constitution, for example, arguably should be
more entrenched than a younger one. If habit breeds obedience, then older constitutions should
elicit stronger approval and loyalty. However, a constitution’s age does not appear to matter, or
at least becomes insignificant in the face of other factors. More likely, though, is the fact that
these non-substantive factors enter the equation elsewhere or become salient when invoked
(Zink and Dawes 2016).
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Shortcomings
Several shortcomings can be noted of these works. First, all three examine the Aristotelian
mechanism of institutional support: habit breeds obedience. Indeed, the implicit assumption has
been that a constitutional bias exists, and studies have sought to examine what factors promote
that bias or support. Little research has attempted to ascertain how knowledge that a
constitution can be fundamentally changed influences this habit. Zink and Dawes (2016),
however, do find that framing a policy change as a constitutional amendment rather than a
statutory modification invokes greater opposition. However, this is on a specific policy or feature
of a constitution; it does not address wholescale constitutional replacement, arguably the
existential threat represented by periodic conventions. Blake and Levinson (2016) get closer to
this question, though, by examining support for a federal constitutional convention; they find
that one in three Americans support holding a convention, suggesting that constitutional support
is low for these individuals. However, they also find that some respondents indicated that the
Constitution had “held up well” yet still favored holding a convention. This questioning is closer
to the mark (i.e. measuring both specific and diffuse support), but it still falls short: as Blake and
Levinson (2016) found, support for a federal constitutional convention was contingent on how
one viewed themselves in relation to the extant constitutional order, a contextual appraisal. The
poll’s questioning was also geared more towards constitutional interpretation rather than
constitutional endurance, suggesting the influence of a prime.
Second, the federal Constitution is arguably ill-suited for addressing questions about
periodic conventions influence on constitutional loyalty and approval. State constitutions are
more amendable. As reviewed above, the states “have held 233 constitutional conventions,
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adopted 146 constitutions, and ratified over 6,000 amendments to their current constitutions”
(Dinan 2009, 7), while “only nine of the fifty states have had just one constitutional convention”
(Levinson 2012, 342-343) in their histories. Coupled with the long-term decline in state
constitutional convention incidence (see above), state charters represent a more fertile ground
to assess the impact of periodic conventions on constitutional approval and loyalty. This is
especially true given that 14 states 11 ask voters whether they would like to hold a constitutional
convention at set, regular intervals. 12
Finally, there is a focus on specific support, or assessment of constitutional approval and
satisfaction. As Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) indicated (and discussed above), their work
approximates specific support. My research, though, is aimed at exploring constitutional loyalty,
or diffuse support: Given the knowledge that a constitution could be fundamentally changed and
was/was not, how does one’s loyalty vary? Does it? Conceptualized this way, Blake and Levinson’s
(2016) analysis is closer to measuring diffuse support (i.e. support for a constitutional convention,
albeit at the federal level), while Zink and Dawes (2016) demonstrate how the same policy framed
as a constitutional amendment enjoys less support than when characterized statutorily. But both
still fall short: neither discusses a constitution’s prior susceptibility to change, while both use
methods that invoke short-term assessments by respondents. Meantime, the periodic

The states are (along with their automatic submission cycles and next election when the ballot question
appears): Hawaii (9 years; 2028); Alaska (2022), Iowa (2020), New Hampshire (2022), and Rhode Island (2022) (10
years); Michigan (16 years; 2026); and Connecticut (2028), Illinois (2028), Maryland (2030), Missouri (2022),
Montana (2030), New York (2037), and Ohio (2032) (20 years). Interestingly, the Oklahoma state constitution
requires constitutional convention questions be submitted to voters every 20 years, but the state government has
not followed the provision since 1970, the last time the ballot question appeared (and was rejected by voters).
12
The idea for mandatory convention referenda dates back to the late eighteenth century, appearing in the
constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Kentucky (Dinan 2000), although no state today has
mandatory constitutional conventions – just mandatory convention questions (Snider 2017). This is somewhat
different from Jefferson’s original preference but is more in line with his later thinking and Madison’s own beliefs.
11
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convention literature could be bolstered by exploring whether voters’ constitutional opinions are
fundamentally affected by convention referenda. In sum: Assessing constitutional loyalty
requires not only a more appropriate question battery but also a different testing medium:
periodic conventions.
My Study: Research Questions, Goals, and Expectations 13
Several questions can be distilled from this philosophical debate and empirical literatures.
Is constitutional loyalty reinforced or undermined by periodic conventions? Literature on risk
aversion and constitutional status quo bias suggests that once voters are aware of the
potentiality that a periodic convention represents (i.e. replacing a constitution), voters are less
inclined to support it. Thus, I would expect periodic conventions to increase a subject’s
constitutional loyalty since conventions represent a threat to the charter’s integrity.
Hypothesis 1a: Subjects exposed to more information about periodic conventions will
exhibit higher constitutional loyalty.
Yet, the literature on diffuse support would seem to discount this possibility, given its long-term,
and resilient, nature. Periodic conventions, though, may influence a person’s constitutional
approval, given specific support’s ephemeral nature.
Hypothesis 1b: Subjects exposed to more information about periodic conventions will
exhibit higher constitutional approval.
Madison’s contention, though, remains: Does knowing that prior periodic conventions were
rejected by voters (or were approved) affect constitutional loyalty? If the position is valid, then
constitutional loyalty should increase among voters who know a constitution was successfully

13

For further refinement of these hypothetical expectations as they relate to my inquiry, see Chapters 5 and 6.
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retained in prior elections. Voters informed that prior conventions were approved, though,
should express weakened loyalty.
Hypothesis 2a: Subjects informed about prior periodic conventions being rejected by
voters will have higher constitutional loyalty than those told prior periodic conventions
were approved.
Hypothesis 2b: Subjects informed about prior periodic conventions being rejected by
voters will have higher constitutional approval than those told prior periodic conventions
were approved.
Again, the nature of diffuse support should argue against Madison’s contention, but I assume its
potentiality given the goal of empirically evaluating it.
The literature on periodic convention support also suggest two further hypotheses. First,
individuals informed about periodic conventions representing existential threats to constitutions
express their dissatisfaction electorally. While it is an open question about whether a prime (i.e.
informing voters that prior conventions had been rejected/approved) matters, my general
presumption is that a person’s constitutional status quo bias (once activated) undercuts electoral
support.
Hypothesis 3: Subjects exposed to more information about a periodic convention will
indicate lower likelihoods of voting to hold a convention.
Second, and relatedly, persons more familiar with periodic convention referenda may respond
differently to information about periodic conventions. My expectation, therefore, is that any
significant results detected will likely be driven by subjects who were previously ignorant of
periodic conventions.
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Hypothesis 4: Subjects less familiar with periodic conventions will be more susceptible to
the treatment than subjects with greater familiarity.
Finally, the extant literatures on institutional support broadly and constitutional approval
specifically both suggest evidence of “positivity bias” at work. As described by Gibson and
colleagues, persons who know more about an institution (e.g. the SCOTUS) also express greater
loyalty towards it (see, e.g., Gibson and Caldeira 2009a and 2009b; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird
1998; and Gibson and Nelson 2015). My general expectation is that persons with greater
constitutional knowledge will exhibit greater constitutional loyalty. I also assume that highknowledge persons will be less susceptible to stimuli surrounding periodic conventions than lowknowledge individuals.
Hypothesis 5: Subjects possessing less constitutional knowledge will be more susceptible
to the treatment than subjects with greater constitutional knowledge.
As described in Chapters 3 and 6, I improve on the standing measures of constitutional
knowledge by using actual knowledge rather than self-professed familiarity.
Summary
Constitutional loyalty is an understudied component of the American political system. Its
importance, however, is not only noted by the Founders themselves but arguably presumed by
citizens and political elites alike. Borrowing from the theoretical and empirical literatures on
institutional support and periodic conventions, my study aims to provide a better picture of
Americans’ underlying commitments to their constitutional charters and how these feelings are
influenced by various factors. In the coming chapters, I illustrate how various sociopolitical and
demographic characteristics influence constitutional loyalty, while empirically evaluating
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Madison’s and Jefferson’s contentions about how periodic conventions may influence
constitutional loyalty and approval. Before doing so, I describe my research methodology,
including variable operationalizations, data collection, and subject recruitment in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODS
Having reviewed the extant literature and discussed my theory and expectations, I now
turn to discussing how I design my inquiry. This dissertation seeks to accomplish three related
tasks: (1) assess whether constitutional loyalty is reinforced or undermined by periodic
conventions; (2) provide a measure of constitutional loyalty approximating diffuse support found
in the larger legitimacy theory literature; and (3) evaluate whether actual (versus self-described)
constitutional knowledge influences constitutional loyalty. To explore these questions, I develop
and use a survey experiment administered to undergraduate students that captures their
constitutional knowledge, measures their levels of constitutional approval and loyalty, and test
how periodic conventions affect their constitutional support. I discuss each component of the
experiment below, including survey instrumentation, how variables are operationalized, notes
on reliability, validity, and objectivity, and finally case selection.
General Design, Procedures, and Subjects
My inquiry proceeds using a between-subjects survey experiment. Subjects were
undergraduates at Wayne State University (Detroit, MI) recruited through introductory American
government courses (1000 level) 1 during the Winter 2018 semester. 2 Students were asked to
participate in an anonymous survey exploring their knowledge and feelings towards the federal
and Michigan state constitutions. Surveys were administered during regular class time.
Participation was voluntary, with consent derived through an information sheet that noted the

Wayne State University offers two kinds of American government courses that differ in course designator and
credit hours only. Substantive material and instructors are the same for both. For ease of clarity, I describe these
courses as one: introduction to American government.
2
A second wave of surveys were deployed during the Fall 2018 semester. Those surveys are not reported herein.
For results and a discussion about the second wave, see Appendix B.
1
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anonymous nature of the survey (indicating that consent was assumed through students’ survey
participation and submission). Students electing to participate were given 15-20 minutes of class
time to complete the survey packet. Students wishing not to participate sat quietly during the
survey’s administration. Several steps were taken to reduce the likelihood of coercion: No
curricular benefit was given for participation (e.g. extra credit), neither the primary investigator
nor his advisor were the instructor of record for participating sections, and course faculty and
teaching assistants handed out consent forms and survey packets to reduce the possibility
students may feel coerced to participate. (For subjects’ descriptives, see Chapter 5.)
Subjects were first given a pre-test measuring their demographic characteristics (e.g. age,
race, and socioeconomic status), sociopolitical variables (e.g. ideology, partisanship, and political
orientations), and initial specific and diffuse support for the federal and Michigan state
constitutions. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions (see
below). 3 Depending on condition (i.e. treatment) assigned, participants encountered varying
information concerning Michigan’s 2010 periodic convention and its abilities via a mock
newspaper article. After reading the experimental vignette (i.e. the newspaper article), subjects
completed a post-test with three sets of questions: (1) two questions on how likely they are to
support a constitutional convention at the federal and state levels; (2) two short question
batteries on federal and Michigan state constitutional knowledge; and (3) the specific and diffuse
support batteries from the pre-test. The complete survey instrument, including pre-test,
manipulations, and post-test, is available in Appendix A.

To ensure that students were not prematurely made aware of the experimental nature, students were given
survey packets that included all three components together (pre-test, experimental vignette, and post-test), with
experimental condition randomly assigned before distribution.

3
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Procedurally, this design mitigates against many threats to internal validity. Random
assignment to the control and treatment conditions ensures roughly equivalent groups, while
changes in the general environment should be balanced among both control and treatment
groups (Campbell and Stanley 1963). To prevent demand effects (Druckman and Kam 2011;
Singleton and Straits 2010; Orne 1962), the design includes a “distractor” before the support
batteries (i.e. the constitutional knowledge tests), ensuring that observed effects are genuine
and resultative of the treatment. There is precedent for this approach in other works (see, e.g.,
Kam, Wilking, and Zechmeister 2007; LaRowe and Hoekstra 2014; and McDermott 2002).
Moreover, the between-subjects design makes it difficult for a subject to infer experimenter
intent, given that: (1) the subject is unaware of which condition he was placed within and (2) the
blurring line between the experimental sections and the non-randomized material all
respondents encounter (Mummolo and Peterson 2017).
The choice of undergraduates as subjects, however, does raise validity concerns,
especially for external validity. General thinking suggests that using college students limits
generalizability to other populations (Sears 1986). However, Druckman and Kam (2011) argue
that college student samples are appropriate for most research designs, excepting those where
the larger population does not vary on key characteristics or varies in systematic ways that
influence the hypothesized relationship. Moreover, Druckman and Nelson (2003) find that
threats to external validity are less concerning with research dealing in framing and priming
effects. Given this dissertation’s focus on priming a subject to be aware of a constitution’s
susceptibility to change, it would appear the process at play here is applicable across other
groups. Likewise, a student-only sample is justifiable if the hypothesized process likely applies
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across groups (Bello et al., 2009; Ellsworth and Gonzales 2007). The literature on constitutional
support does suggest that some sub-populations do vary (e.g. older persons; racial/ethnic
minorities), but these factors are accounted for in the experiment (via both random assignment
and pre-test variables). It matters more that the pattern observed among college students
applies similarly to other groups rather than specific estimates (Ellsworth and Gonzales 2007).
From a theoretical standpoint, there is nothing in the literature to suggest that college students
vary systemically from other groups in how they may respond to this priming exercise.
It may matter, however, when the survey is administered during the semester. Since the
sample pool is American government courses, the U.S. Constitution is a subject taught during the
semester, likely early (i.e. within the first month). Thus, students surveyed earlier in the semester
may have lower constitutional knowledge scores generally compared to students surveyed later
in the semester (after being exposed to the Constitution unit). Consequently, I administer surveys
in the middle of the semester (approximately the second/third month) to account for students
having been exposed to, minimally, a preliminary lesson in the U.S. Constitution. Surveying
thereafter ensures some variation on the constitutional knowledge questions, which seemingly
may have been much lower. The point here is to assess how knowledge of constitutional
processes and features influences constitutional loyalty, thus requiring a degree of prior
knowledge to build off.
There are further reasons that a college sample is appropriate given the study’s goals and
context. First, student samples may be appropriate in circumstances where the goal is to theory
test and generate, not generalize to larger populations (Bello et al., 2009; Ellsworth and Gonzales
2007; Kam et al., 2007; Mook 1983; Pernice et al., 2008). My study does this: I explore whether
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periodic conventions influence constitutional loyalty – a contention that has never undergone
empirical testing. The point is to see if the hypothesized relationship happens, not if it typically
does. As such, internal validity is preferred (McDermott 2002). Second, while I am utilizing a
convenience sample, my survey experiment does enjoy other characteristics of a classic
experiment, including: random assignment to interventions; a relatively controlled environment;
and measurement of a respondent’s reaction to stimuli. Third, and finally, scholars have noted
that research using college student samples should be considered a first step, paired with
replication studies using national samples (Ellsworth and Gonzales 2007; Peterson and Merunka
2014). Future research, therefore, should seek to replicate my findings produced here. 4
Pre-test Instrumentation
Sociopolitical and Prior Knowledge Variables
The pre-test will be administered to all subjects regardless of experimental condition.
Subjects’ demographic and sociopolitical characteristics will be collected, along with the initial
measures of their constitutional approval and loyalty for the federal and Michigan state
constitutions. Demographic and sociopolitical questions reflect various covariates that prior
studies have found to influence constitutional support and institutional support more broadly
(see below). Where possible, the verbiage of questions utilized are based on prior studies,
permitting comparisons with prior works as well as introducing an element of validity.

Collectively, these points argue in favor of a research agenda/program: a single study, regardless of its sample
pool, should be evaluated based on what it contributes to the larger research program (which can be theory
building or determining a theory’s empirical parameters). Moreover, a Popperian approach to causation suggests
that evidence of causation is accumulated over multiple tests/studies (Druckman and Kam 2011). As such, research
using college students should not be considered conclusive by any measure; further replication is necessary by
default.
4
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First, subjects are asked several sociopolitical questions related to their partisanship,
ideological orientations, and news consumption habits. Prior studies on institutional legitimacy
(see, e.g., Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht 2000) and constitutional support (Blake and Levinson
2016; Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016) have found that persons sharing ideological and
partisan proximity with a governmental institution are more likely to support it, while more
attentive news consumption habits correspond with greater constitutional approval
(Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016). Partisanship is captured on a standard seven-point scale
(anchored by “strong Democrat” and “strong Republican”), while ideology used a five-point scale
(anchored by “very liberal” and “very conservative”). News consumption included two questions,
one for national news and the other for local news, using a frequency-based response set
(anchored by “almost daily” and “never”). Subjects are then asked about their general approval
(i.e. specific support) of federal and state institutions. There is mixed evidence about whether
specific support for one governmental institution or branch influences support (specific or
diffuse) for others, 5 although Blake and Levinson (2016) find that support for constitutionallymandated (created) bodies may affect the overall support for the constitutional system and
charter. These questions are taken/adapted from the TIME/Abt SRBI Poll conducted in June 2011
on constitutional attitudes (see Blake and Levinson 2016 for more information; questions are
accessible from the Roper Center’s iPOLL website). 6

Compare Jones and McDermott (2002), Lebo (2008), and Mondak et al. (2007) with Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn
(2000) and Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan (1992). See also Durr et al. (2000) who find no relationship.
6
For federal institutions, I ask subjects their approval (i.e. specific support) for President Trump, the U.S. Congress,
and the U.S. Supreme Court. For Michigan, I inquire about the state-level counterparts: Governor Snyder, the
Michigan State Legislature, and the Michigan Supreme Court. Specific support measurements of executive
officeholders are tied with the incumbent rather than the office itself (for the latter reference would be a diffuse
support measure). Thus, I ask for opinions on President Trump and Governor Snyder rather than U.S. President or
Michigan Governor. Given that the questioning for the legislatures and courts is not tied with any statements
5
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Next, subjects are asked a few questions about their prior knowledge on Michigan’s state
constitution and periodic convention mechanism. These questions help establish a baseline for
the experimental treatments (e.g. Does the priming effect matter if people already knew about
periodic conventions?). As such, I opt for a series of true/false questions that ask subjects the
following: (1) whether Michigan has a state constitution or not; (2) whether the subject knows
Michigan asks a periodic convention ballot question ever 16 years; and (3) whether the subject
knows what a periodic convention may do (see Appendix A for exact question wording). These
questions are designed to approximate prior knowledge and not alert the subject to the
impending treatment’s goal. I also do not include the convention support questions on the pretest for similar reasons: (1) I do not want to potentially alert subjects to the treatment and (2)
subjects may not be aware what a constitutional convention is, thus biasing initial measures and
yielding invalid comparisons with post-treatment scores (Gerber and Green 2012).
Measuring Constitutional Loyalty and Approval
Subjects are then asked two short question batteries assessing their specific and diffuse
support for the federal and Michigan state constitutions. These batteries establish a baseline of
constitutional approval and loyalty, with constitutional loyalty serving as the experiment’s
primary dependent measure. Unlike other institutions in the legitimacy theory literature, though,
there exists no standard battery for measuring a constitution’s diffuse support. However, the
work done by the legion of scholars on the U.S. Supreme Court’s (SCOTUS) institutional loyalty

asking about fundamental changes to the institutions, the literature considers this syntax to be gauging specific
support (or approval) for each.
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(and courts more generally) proves instructive and provides a model to extrapolate questions. 7
Here, I use the work by Gregory Caldeira, James Gibson, and their various colleagues (whose
diffuse and specific support questions are considered the gold-standard for studies of court
legitimacy) to create my constitutional loyalty measures.
Prior works on institutional loyalty (a term used interchangeably to connote diffuse
support) have operationalized diffuse support as opposing significant structural and functional
changes to the institution (Boynton and Loewenberg 1973), an operationalization that has
become ubiquitous within the courts literature (see, e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and
Caldeira 1992; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; and Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003a and
2005). To the extent that “people support fundamental structural changes to an institution, are
willing to punish the institution for its policy outputs, and generally distrust it,” people are
extending little loyalty (diffuse support) to that institution (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 45). This
stands in contrast to specific support, which consists of attitudes towards an institution based
upon whether particular demands, policies, or actions are fulfilled (Easton 1965; see also Easton
1975). However, scholars have often contaminated measures of specific support and diffuse
support in their operationalizations (for example: compare Caldeira and Gibson’s 1992 questions
with Murphy and Tanenhaus’s 1990 wording). Questions on how well an institution is performing
its job are dependent on whether the individual agrees with the institution’s outputs, a specific
support measure. Diffuse support, meantime, captures the enduring components of an
institution, and whether citizens are willing to accept, make, or countenance major changes in

This is because courts deal frequently with constitutional issues. It could also be that the SCOTUS’s diffuse
support is strongly correlated (or even a proxy for) constitutional loyalty, serving as an alternative
conceptualization for a constitution’s diffuse support.

7
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an institution’s fundamental character. 8 Analogously, persons willing to replace or otherwise
fundamentally alter their constitution are displaying low loyalty (minimal diffuse support),
compared to persons whom oppose any modification (high diffuse support).
Consequently, existing studies on constitutional support broadly capture constitutional
approval rather than diffuse support (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016), although others
(Blake and Levinson 2016; Zink and Dawes 2016) do utilize questioning that approximates diffuse
support in terms of supporting constitutional conventions. Specifically, Blake and Levinson (2016)
inquire whether one supports a federal constitutional convention to propose amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, while Zink and Dawes (2016) gauge a person’s support for various public
policies framed as statutes versus constitutional amendments. This questioning is a better
approximation of constitutional loyalty, but it still falls short. As Zink and Dawes (2016) note,
Americans have a great degree of “constitutional status quo bias” in addition to regular risk
aversion (see Chapter 2). Respondents were not asked to think about whether they would
support more fundamental structural and functional changes, nor wholescale replacement of the
charter.
Rather than asking a singular question or using a hypothetical amendment to determine
one’s willingness to change a constitution, I follow Gibson et al.’s (2003a) guidance that multiple
measures exploring one’s willingness to limit the power of an institution is a superior way to
validly capture diffuse support. To wit, I take the standard SCOTUS diffuse support battery
created by Caldeira and Gibson (1992) and Gibson and Caldeira (1992) and modify the questions

For an example regarding measurement and conceptual difficulties concerning specific and diffuse support, see
Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 637-642 (on the SCOTUS).

8
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to address similar themes. 9 Additionally, I opt to make these scale responses (1-5, anchored by
“strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” and fully labeled) rather than a binary choice given the
greater validity of the former in capturing diffuse support (Gibson et al., 2003a). 10 Subjects will
also be asked the same questions concerning their loyalty to the Michigan state constitution,
with corresponding verbiage modifications to emphasize the state constitution as target. This
adapting exercise is common in legitimacy theory works (see, e.g., Gibson et al., 2005, 200 for an
example).
Measuring constitutional approval, or specific support, is easier, and takes the form of
two questions: one on the federal Constitution and the other Michigan’s. For continuity
purposes, I use the performance questions on state and federal constitutions that
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) deploy, with a slight wording modification. I use a
numbered approval scale, asking respondents to circle how strongly they approve of the
federal/Michigan constitution. The scale is qualitatively labeled, with five being “strongly
approve.” Relative Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016), though, I reduce the scale’s range from
ten to five for more intuitive interpretation.

The themes are: (1) willingness to change the institution’s structure or functionality; (2) wholescale elimination of
the institution; (3) whether the institution is too controversial (i.e. “mixed up in politics”); and (4) whether the
individual believes the institution is unjust towards some groups more than others (i.e. the institution favors some
groups).
10
There is debate concerning the optimal number of gradations in a response set (e.g. 5 categories versus 7).
Weijters, Cabooter, and Schillewaert (2010) argue that when using student populations more response categories
can be used since these respondents generally rate higher on cognitive ability, verbal skills, and prior questionnaire
experience than non-college populations. However, Revilla, Saris, and Krosnick (2014) found that quality decreases
with more categories, suggesting that five-point scales yield better-quality data. While I am using a student
population here, I have opted to go with the five-point scale given the better-quality data provided, especially
prudent considering that there is little prior research on constitutional loyalty. Thus, quality concerns should be
privileged. Moreover, I opt to use labeled scales (i.e. each number is labeled rather than just the poles) since
labeling makes the scale more interpretable for any population (Weijters et al., 2010). (For reviews on recent
literature concerning scales, see Revilla et al., 2014 and Weijters et al., 2010).
9
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Demographics
Finally, subjects are asked demographic questions and whether they are a U.S. citizen and
permanent resident of Michigan. Wording is adopted from Stephanopoulos and Versteeg’s
(2016) survey, although these questions are roughly equivalent to other batteries across the
discipline and beyond. For race/ethnicity, I use the standard response set from the U.S. Census.
For determining socioeconomic status, I base the question off the MacArthur Scale of Subjected
Social Status (The MacArthur Foundation 2007). It permits subjects to effectively estimate their
socioeconomic status without knowing household incomes, educational levels, and occupations.
Experimental Vignettes
After completing the pre-test, subjects were randomly assigned to one of four
experimental treatments (conditions). The treatments aim to explore how additional information
about periodic conventions, namely how a convention may wholescale replace the Michigan
constitution, influences a subject’s constitutional loyalty, including whether the inclusion of a
prime (i.e. prior conventions were rejected/approved) modifies results. There is precedent in the
literature for this approach: Zink and Dawes (2016) conducted two experiments exploring the
degree of constitutional bias present in people generally, and how it manifests specifically in
Michigan and California during the 2012 election cycle. They found that how one frames
proposals matters in terms of support: policy changes presented as constitutional amendments
were far less likely to be supported than when those same proposals were characterized as
statutory changes. Similar logics may be at work here regarding Madison’s propositions: priming
the public that past convention referenda have been rejected by the public may increase a
person’s constitutional loyalty.
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Before continuing, I briefly note the selection of Michigan. Assessing subjects on
Michigan’s constitution is prudent given: (1) Subjects are attending a Michigan public university,
with the bulk of the student population (and sample) coming from Michigan; (2) Given the
Michigan-based sample, subjects are also likelier to have a greater understanding of the Michigan
periodic convention mechanism as well as the Michigan constitution; and (3) Michigan is one of
14 states that actually uses periodic conventions in its constitutional practice, providing a degree
of mundane realism that reduces the need for artificiality (see footnote 10, below). The
experiment, moreover, can speak more generally to other states using periodic conventions as a
result.
During the treatments, subjects are exposed to varying information about Michigan’s
2010 periodic convention referendum (the last time the ballot question appeared) through a
mock newspaper article. In composing the article, I used John Minnis’s (2010) article published
in the Oakland Legal News as a model (predominately borrowing phrasing), although my
instruments differ significantly from the original piece. Minnis’s piece is a great model given its
comprehensive account of the ballot question, including direct quotes from various organizations
and officials supporting and opposing the convention, as well as positive and negative
justifications for why a convention is (un)necessary. I lift various paragraphs, editing and
reorganizing them in a manner that approximates the article I sought. Moreover, using a
newspaper article to convey the manipulation increases the experiment’s mundane realism. 11

Mundane realism refers to “the similarity of experimental events to everyday experiences” (Singleton and Straits
2010, 213). Mundanity is usually considered less important in an experiment given the experiment’s contrived
nature, since controlling and isolating variables sacrifices some degree of mundane realism. However, using
Michigan overcomes some of the challenge here.
11
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Subjects assigned to the “control” (Condition 0) received a “plain” article on the 2010
convention question. The article did not frame, prime, or otherwise emphasize features of a
periodic convention (specifically that it can wholescale replace the present charter) and balances
discussion by providing an affirmative and negative position on holding the convention. The
remaining conditions received altered articles. Subjects assigned to the “more information”
group (Condition 1) read the control article but with an added paragraph describing how a seated
convention could fundamentally alter or replace the current constitution. Condition 1 effectively
measures whether a constitutional status quo bias exists by inducing the subject to consider
replacing the charter (see also Zink and Dawes 2016). The remaining treatments (Conditions 2
and 3) examine whether including a prime modifies results. The “negative prime” treatment
(Condition 2) presents subjects with the article found in Condition 1 (“more information”) but
with a new paragraph near the end highlighting how past convention referenda were rejected by
voters (using the actual vote margins). Conversely, the “positive prime” article (Condition 3)
emphasizes a series of past referenda that were approved by voters, suggesting that the public
in the past has been critical of the state’s constitution, albeit earlier versions. Knowledge that
voters have voted to fundamentally review the state constitution may work against the charter’s
institutional loyalty (and perhaps approval).
Post-test Instrumentation
Following the vignette, subjects encounter a common post-test. The post-test will: (1) ask
subjects about their support for a constitutional convention at the federal and state levels; (2)
record their knowledge of the federal and Michigan state constitutions; and (3) measure, again,
their constitutional loyalty and approval using the pre-test question batteries.
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Convention Support
First, subjects are asked about their probability of supporting a constitutional convention
at the state and federal levels. These questions are designed to be direct measures of the
experimental treatments. While the experiment is directed at state conventions, I include the
federal convention question to somewhat tease out whether the treatments influence just state
constitutional loyalty or bleed into federal loyalty. I adapt Zink and Dawes’s (2016) verbiage,
replacing the response set with a five-point scale (anchored by “very likely” and “very unlikely”).
Constitutional Knowledge
Next, subjects are asked a series of questions designed to estimate their federal and state
constitutional knowledge. Examining the relationship between constitutional knowledge and
one’s constitutional loyalty serves two functions: First, knowledge of a constitution likely
contributes to a “positivity bias,” where greater familiarity with an institution corresponds with
greater levels of specific and diffuse support (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a). Blake and Levinson
(2016) and Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) found that respondents who described
themselves as knowing more about the federal or their state constitutions tended to support the
charter at greater rates. The problem is that there exists no formal question battery for
measuring actual constitutional knowledge (either state or federal varieties), unlike the common
measures used to assess general civic knowledge (see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). This is an
important shortcoming in the literature: most studies rely on self-described measures of
constitutional knowledge to examine the relationship between constitutional knowledge and
approval. There is evidence indicating that these self-professed measures are invalid:
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016, 146), for example, found that “purportedly higher-
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knowledge respondents” did not score any higher on survey comprehension checks compared to
“their ostensibly lower-knowledge peers.” This suggests a considerable gap “between professed
and actual understanding of the constitution” (146) casting doubt on whether a relationship
between knowledge and constitutional support exists and/or our present measure is faulty.
Second, asking subjects questions on their constitutional knowledge prior to remeasuring their specific and diffuse support helps to reduce the possibility of demand effects
from the experiment (Druckman and Kam 2011). As discussed above, prior works on framing and
the SCOTUS’s loyalty have used similar devices in their experiments to ensure that the differences
in pre- and post-measures are more genuine and attributable to the experiment’s treatment.
To measure constitutional knowledge, I look towards the political and civic knowledge
literatures for conceptualization and measurement strategies. While there is disagreement over
how best to measure political knowledge, there appears to be “consensus on the central
importance of the individual’s ability to understand and retain concrete political facts” (Nie, Junn,
and Stehlik-Barry 1996, 22). Today, Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996, 304-305) five-question
battery (based off questions asked by the American National Election Studies) is considered the
gold standard in political science. The five questions range in difficulty from easy to complex,
while measuring different kinds of political knowledge (e.g. knowledge of democratic norms,
political officials, and current political facts; see Nie et al., 1996, 22-25 for a discussion). Questions
on the (Federal) Constitution appearing in professional and scholastic surveys often follow this
conceptualization: factual knowledge on constitutional norms, principles, and/or practices, with

53

many being open-ended. 12 Green and colleagues (2011) provide a convenient example: to
operationalize knowledge of constitutional principles, they focus on respondents’ understanding
of civil rights and liberties accorded by the Bill of Rights and other amendments. This approach –
operationalizing constitutional knowledge in terms of rights – is perhaps appropriate given the
dominance of the Bill of Rights in civics instruction (see Glendon 1991). Nonetheless, structural
principles (e.g. federalism, separation of powers, and legislative processes) should not be
ignored.
For federal constitutional knowledge, I ask six questions designed to assess subjects’
factual understanding in three areas: structural factors; principles and norms; and general facts.
In line with Gibson and Caldeira’s (2009b) critique of political knowledge surveys, I eschew openended, recall questions in favor of closed-ended inquiries stressing cognition. Utilized this way,
citizens are far more likely to answer questions correctly and demonstrate less ignorance than
recall questions would suggest.13 My questions reflect their high frequency appearing on multiple
surveys, and are adapted or inspired from various surveys, including the Annenberg Public Policy
Center’s annual Constitution Day Civics Survey; the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) civics exam; the American National Election Studies; and prior works on political and civic
knowledge (see, e.g., Blake and Levinson 2016; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gainous and

Some examples: The United States Capitol Historical Society’s online quizzes; the Annenberg Public Policy
Center’s annual Constitution Day Civics Survey; the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) civics
exam; and various online quizzes from think tanks and other constitutional-oriented interest groups.
13
I also aim for a “humbler” conceptualization of ignorance (Gibson and Caldeira 2009b). Like Lupia (2006), Gibson
and Caldeira (2009b) argue that the public’s purported ignorance on civic and political issues is significantly
overstated since political knowledge surveys are biased towards facts that scholars think citizens ought to know,
rather than a practical understanding.
12
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Martens 2012; Green et al., 2011; and Niemi and Junn 1998). 14 I have opted to limit this battery
to six questions to prevent fatigue. Finally, I include an introductory note leading the
constitutional knowledge battery as recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996).
Assessment of Michigan constitutional knowledge requires an altogether different
approach. In general, people’s knowledge of their state governments is less than their familiarity
with federal institutions (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Niemi and Junn 1998; Lyons, Jaeger, and
Wolak 2013). This holds true for state constitutional knowledge: A survey by the National Center
for State Courts found that 54 percent of respondents incorrectly responded that their state had
no constitution (see Lyons et al., 2012, note 1; see also Snider 2017). No wonder Roeder (1994,
34) has argued that state politics represents an “invisible layer of government” for most citizens.
Measurement of state constitutional knowledge, therefore, is difficult; if most persons are
unaware that their state even has a constitution, how can one accurately measure true
constitutional knowledge?
I use a recognition measure like the one used by Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016,
134). These authors asked respondents to identify whether they would like to see a substantive
provision included in their state’s constitution. Provisions presented were based on similar ones
present in state charters but did not appear in the federal Constitution. I propose an analogous
exercise: present a substantive or structural provision and inquire whether it is part of the
Michigan Constitution of 1963 or not. 15 Subjects able to identify constituent provisions of the

Green et al. (2011) and Niemi and Junn (1998) provide convenient questions with better discriminating power.
Green and colleagues also used high school students for their study, suggesting that their questions may be
especially prudent to use on college students with varying civics backgrounds.
15
Zackin (2013) also notes how state constitutions are the repositories for positive, substantive rights in American
constitutional jurisprudence, suggesting that citizens may be more familiar with their state constitution when
14

55

Michigan Constitution are likelier more informed about the document than others. This battery
is, like the federal question bank, preceded by an introductory note as adapted (and
recommended) from Delli Caprini and Keeter (1996).
It should be noted that this question battery is likely to result in poor and/or rough
approximations of Michigan constitutional knowledge. Citizens generally tend to perform poorly
on measures assessing state politics and government (Patterson et al., 1992; Lyons et al., 2013)
and are also unable to transfer conceptual knowledge of national institutions to corresponding
state constitutions (Niemi and Junn 1998). It is likely that even general knowledge of a state
constitution is likewise missing from most citizens’ minds (see Snider 2017, 279).
Re-measuring Constitutional Loyalty and Approval
Finally, subjects will again complete the diffuse and specific support question batteries
from the pre-test. In experiments, especially between-subjects designs, it is imperative to record
measures of the dependent variables before the treatment is applied and again afterwards
(Gerber and Green 2012; Singleton and Straits 2010). Pre-test measures of constitutional loyalty
and approval will provide initial descriptive statistics and baseline scores for comparison with
post-test measures that will capture the treatment’s effect (if any).
Afterword
The next three chapters discuss these data collected and evaluate the hypotheses
discussed in Chapter 2. First, Chapter 4 outlines descriptive data and examines predictors of
constitutional loyalty. Next, Chapter 5 explores the experimental results, including post-hoc

presented this way. Substantive policy prescriptions, however, are but one feature of state constitutions, and
structural features should not be ignored.
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analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the role of constitutional knowledge in generating
constitutional loyalty and whether it served as a mediator during the experiment.
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CHAPTER 4 – WHAT GENERATES CONSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY?
Having reviewed the extant literature and discussed the general methodological
procedures of my study, I now present findings. In this chapter, I examine one facet of these data:
What generates constitutional loyalty? In doing so, I first identify overall levels of federal and
Michigan constitutional loyalty and discuss its measurement. Next, I examine loyalty across three
dimensions: personal attributes (demography), political affiliations, and institutional attitudes. 1
Finally, I turn to regression analysis to explain how these various factors collectively influence a
person’s constitutional loyalty. Alongside these presentations, I also explore constitutional
approval, comparing my findings with the established literature while also examining the
relationship between approval and loyalty.
Measuring Constitutional Loyalty
Before discussing the results, a note on the main dependent variables: federal and
Michigan constitutional loyalty, also referred to as a constitution’s diffuse support. Prior works
on institutional loyalty (a term used interchangeably to connote diffuse support) have
operationalized diffuse support as opposing significant structural and functional changes to the
institution (Boynton and Loewenberg 1973), an operationalization that has become ubiquitous
within the courts literature (see, e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 1992;
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; and Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003a, 2005). As Gibson and
Caldeira (2009a) describe it, “To the extent people support fundamental structural changes in an
institution, are willing to punish the institution for its policy outputs, and generally distrust it,
they are extending little legitimacy (loyalty) to that institution” (45). Analogously, persons willing

1

Chapter 6 adds a fourth dimension: civic knowledge. The results reported here will be expanded upon below.
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to replace or otherwise fundamentally alter their constitution are displaying low loyalty (minimal
diffuse support), compared with individuals who oppose any modification (high diffuse support,
or institutional fealty).
As noted above in the literature review (Chapter 2), institutional loyalty differs from
specific support, or what scholars term institutional approval. For my purposes here,
constitutional approval captures a person’s specific support for a constitution. Existing studies on
constitutional support broadly capture constitutional approval rather than diffuse support
(Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016), although others (Blake and Levinson 2016; Zink and Dawes
2016) do utilize questioning that approximates diffuse support. Specific support is normally
distilled through “feeling thermometers” or approval scales, and is a more contextualized
appraisal of one’s support; how does one presently “feel” about the constitution? Respondents
are not “induced to reflect on whether they still would adhere to (the constitution’s) commands
if they thought them unjust, or whether they would like to scrap it and start afresh”
(Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016, 120). Therefore, measures that approximate a current
assessment or feeling on the constitution should be considered a measure of approval, not
loyalty.
Therefore, a different approach to capturing a person’s constitutional loyalty is necessary.
Blake and Levinson (2016) and Zink and Dawes (2016) represent two studies that induce
respondents to consider their underlying loyalty towards the federal constitution. Specifically,
Blake and Levinson inquire whether one supports a constitutional convention to propose
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, while Zink and Dawes gauge a person’s support for various
public policies framed as statutes versus constitutional amendments. This questioning is a better
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approximation of constitutional loyalty, but it still falls short. As Zink and Dawes note, Americans
have a great degree of “constitutional status quo bias” in addition to regular risk aversion (see
Chapter 2 for a greater elaboration). Respondents were not asked to think about whether they
would support more fundamental structural and functional changes, nor wholescale
replacement of the document.
Rather than asking a singular question or using a hypothetical amendment to gauge one’s
willingness to change a constitution, I derive a new measure of constitutional loyalty from Gibson,
Caldeira, and Spence’s (2003a) United States Supreme Court diffuse support battery. Their
battery poses a series of statements about eliminating the Court as an institution, reducing its
institutional powers, and general trust in the institution. Respondents indicate their degree of
agreement (or disagreement) on a five-point Likert scale. From here, a “scale of support” is
generated by counting the number of “supportive” answers given by a respondent. Since the
statements are written in the negative, respondents answering with “disagree” or “strongly
disagree” are coded as being “supportive” of the institution. 2 Thus, these individuals have higher
diffuse support, or institutional loyalty, than those who agree or are undecided. Using these
statements, I create a new battery of questions designed to assess one’s loyalty towards a
constitutional charter. Question wording is provided in Table 1, along with descriptive statistics
for each. While original responses were on a five-point Likert scale, each question was recoded
into three-categories (agree, undecided, and disagree), with the disagree category representing
supportive answers (and, therefore, greater constitutional loyalty). Using this recoded variable, I

The statements are presented in a critical fashion. For instance: “If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of
decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether.”
Respondents answering “disagree” or “strongly disagree” would be considered “supportive” of the institution.

2
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create a “constitutional loyalty scale” that provides the mean response for a subject across all
four statements (i.e. the “row average”). This scale becomes my dependent measure for
subsequent analyses (each subject has two; one for federal loyalty and the other for loyalty
towards the Michigan state constitution). 3
Several observations can be made regarding constitutional loyalty for both the federal
and Michigan state constitutions among college students. At the federal level, there appears to
be a well-spring of diffuse support, but it is somewhat tempered. A large majority notes that it
does matter if the Constitution were rewritten/amended (58 percent), while a slight majority
disagrees that the Constitution is too controversial to be useful (52 percent). 4 Importantly,
however, a majority (54 percent) believes the Constitution favors some groups more than others,
while only a plurality (46 percent) would not support doing away with the Constitution if it
prevented actions popularly supported. Taken together, these findings note that American
college students view their national charter with a supportive yet critical eye. Many balk at
replacing it or viewing it as too controversial to be useful, yet a substantial portion consider the
Constitution biased and would consider doing away with it if it continually frustrates popular
decision-making. Further indicating this trend is the fact that, across all four statements, the
average number of supportive replies is 1.7, with 26 percent of subjects expressing no support

There are several different scales used in the larger literature to produce a summary measure of diffuse support. I
report here using the arithmetic mean of the four statements since the results are more intuitive to interpret.
Other scale measures I created for constitutional loyalty (both federal and Michigan) include: the number of
supportive statements (i.e. Gibson’s 2012 preferred method); creating a factor score using principal component
factor analysis (see Gibson and Caldeira 1992); and proportion support (i.e. the number of supportive responses
divided by total statements). Substantive findings do not differ significantly from those reported here. See also
Chapter 5.
4
All percentages reported herein are rounded to the nearest whole number, meaning that percentages may not
sum to 100.
3
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at all for the constitution (i.e. zero supportive statements), and 10 percent providing supportive
statements for all questions. A majority (54 percent), though, issued two or more supportive
statements.
Table 1.
Constitutional Loyalty Towards the U.S. and Michigan State Constitutions

Percentage
Item
Agree
Disagree
No difference if rewritten
Federal
18
58
State
19
35
Constitution favors some groups
Federal
54
17
State
27
8
Do away with the Constitution
Federal
21
46
State
18
30
Constitution is too controversial
Federal
17
52
State
7
32

Level of Diffuse Support
Undecided

Mean

Std. Dev.

N

Factor
Loadinga

24
46

3.5
3.2

1.1
0.9

250
246

0.60
0.72

29
64

2.5
2.8

1.1
0.7

250
246

0.66
0.58

33
52

3.4
3.1

1.1
0.9

249
246

0.83
0.80

31
61

3.5
3.3

1.0
0.7

250
245

0.87
0.83

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures. Percentages are calculated using the collapsed variables (i.e. “strongly
agree” and “agree” responses are combined). Due to rounding, percentages may not sum to 100. Agree category
corresponds with low constitutional loyalty while disagree connotes high constitutional loyalty since questions are
written in the negative (see below). Means and standard deviations are calculated using the uncollapsed
distributions (i.e. scale is 1-5). Higher mean scores indicate greater constitutional loyalty.
a
Loadings come from the first factor from the unrotated solution of a principal-components factor analysis (one
each for federal and Michigan). No rotation was necessary due to additional factors having trivial eigenvalues.
Question wording is as follows (with “Michigan state” substituting federal in the state-level battery):
1. No difference if rewritten. “It would not make much difference to me if the federal constitution were rewritten
or amended.”
2. Constitution favors some groups. “The federal constitution favors some groups more than others.”
3. Do away with the Constitution. “If the federal constitution continually prevents decisions that the people
agree with, it might be better to do away with the Constitution altogether.”
4. Constitution is too controversial. “The federal constitution is too controversial to be useful today.”

A different story is painted by the Michigan state data. Majorities are undecided across
three of the four statements, while a sizable plurality (46 percent) remains undecided if it would
make a substantive difference if the Michigan state constitution were rewritten or amended.
Excluding the undecideds suggest supportive replies on all questions save whether the Michigan
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constitution is biased towards groups (74 percent believe it is), a finding paralleling the federal
results. Counting across all four statements provides further evidence of this trend: Across all
four statements, the average number of supportive replies is only one (1), while 46 percent
express no support at all for the Michigan constitution. Only three (3) percent responded with a
supportive response for all four questions. 5
At face value, these findings suggest that loyalty towards Michigan’s constitution is low,
especially given the loyalty scale results. However, the large number of undecided responses
suggests an alternative interpretation: there is a great degree of ignorance of the Michigan state
constitution, enough that respondents chose the noncommittal response (i.e. undecided/neither
agree or disagree). This explanation is made more plausible when one ignores the undecideds:
Large majorities (greater than 60 percent) gave supportive responses to all questions save
whether they thought the Michigan state constitution favored some groups. Thus, for those who
did choose a category other than undecided, they were more likely to express loyalty towards it.
Why the greater loyalty baseline for the federal constitution? There are two likely factors:
First, college students generally know more about the federal charter given its significance in
secondary and collegiate civic courses. This may explain why subjects gave fewer undecided
responses to the federal questions than on the state battery. The relationship between
knowledge about a constitution and loyalty towards is worthy of further examination at both
levels. I build upon these observations and provide an empirical test of this proposition in Chapter
6. Second, and relatedly, the U.S. Constitution does enjoy a “protected status” of sorts given the
innate constitutional status quo bias Americans are likely to express regarding it (Zink and Dawes

5

Only 31 percent of the sample gave two or more supportive answers.
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2016). The status quo bias, though, seems to be weaker at the state level given the default:
undecided rather than simply disagree. There remains a potential third factor as well: Given the
likely low familiarity with the Michigan constitution, subjects simply “transferred” their feelings
on the federal constitution to the Michigan charter. I further evaluate this proposition below.
While these statistics are illuminating, there is still the question about whether combining
these four statements into a formal scale validly captures constitutional loyalty. Each battery of
questions was analyzed using principal-components factor analysis (PCF, using Stata). If the four
statements are collectively measuring constitutional loyalty, only one factor should explain a
substantial amount of the variance. For federal constitutional loyalty, only one factor achieved
an eigenvalue greater than one, indicating that the four statements are measuring a common
concept. About 56 percent of the federal variance is explained by this single factor. As indicated
in Table 1, all statements also have factor loadings greater than 0.4, again suggesting these
statements are good indicators of constitutional loyalty. Similar results are observed for the
Michigan battery. While not reported here, the Cronbach’s Alpha for test scales (using means)
are high (0.72 for federal and 0.71 for Michigan). Collectively, these tests suggest that both
batteries are validly and reliably capturing subjects’ constitutional loyalty levels.
Does Constitutional Loyalty Vary Between Individuals?
Prior works on institutional support and loyalty suggest four broad dimensions that may
influence one’s support for an institution. These dimensions are also found in the extant work on
constitutional support more broadly (see Blake and Levinson 2016; Stephanopoulos and Versteeg
2016). These four dimensions are: personal/demographic attributes; political affiliations; civic
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knowledge; and institutional attitudes. 6 The only prior study to address individual determinants
of constitutional loyalty is Blake and Levinson (2016), albeit through the guise of asking whether
a respondent would favor holding a federal constitutional convention or not. While this question
does examine constitutional loyalty, it is but one facet. Blake and Levinson (2016) found that
approximately one-third of Americans support holding a constitutional convention, but the
likelihood of support varied among different dimensions. For my purposes here, I discuss each
dimension below, with the exception of civic knowledge that I leave for Chapter 6 (and, therefore,
expand upon the results presented here). I present descriptive statistics for the various factors
within each dimension, using primarily Blake and Levinson’s (2016) results as a guide. 7
Demographic Attributes
First, personal/demographic attributes, including race, gender, and income. Given my
sample population, I drop educational attainment and age from my analyses; this is because I am
dealing with only “young” persons by most studies’ standards 8 and all subjects have a similar
educational attainment (i.e. some college). For the remaining factors, Blake and Levinson (2016)
found: (1) African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to support holding a constitutional
convention than other minorities and whites; (2) females were less likely to support holding a
convention than males; and (3) that persons with higher incomes were less likely to support a
I follow Gibson’s (2012) taxonomy here. Some scholars combine the demographic and political affiliations
dimensions, while others often add other factors that are arguably their own dimensions while ignoring others. For
example, Blake and Levinson (2016) discuss constitutional interpretative philosophies in their work in addition to
the other dimensions.
7
In many respects, the findings on generators of constitutional approval mirror the factors influencing
constitutional loyalty. Compare Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) with Blake and Levinson (2016); both studies
use the larger literature on institutional legitimacy to determine which dimensions to include in their surveys (see
also Chapter 2).
8
Subjects range in age from 18 to 40 years old. The bulk of the sample (93 percent) are 25 years old or younger.
Prior studies on constitutional support (e.g. Blake and Levinson 2016; Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016) pool
those younger than 35 years old into one category, meaning only five of my subjects would fall outside this bin.
6
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convention. I expect similar patterns here: minorities, women, and working-class persons with
lower mean loyalty scores.
Table 2.
Mean U.S. Constitutional Loyalty by Demographic Attributes

Item
Race/Ethnicity
Caucasian
Black
Asian Am.
Hispanic
Arabic
Gender
Male
Female
SES
Working Class
Middle Class
Upper Class

Level of Diffuse Support

Mean

Federal
Std. Dev.

N

Mean

Michigan
Std. Dev.

N

3.4
3.0
3.0
2.9
3.3

0.8
0.8
0.4
0.6
0.8

123
55
26
11
15

3.2
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.8

0.6
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.5

119
55
26
11
15

3.2
3.2

0.9
0.7

112
131

3.0
3.1

0.7
0.5

112
127

3.0
3.4
3.1

0.7
0.8
0.9

70
130
47

3.0
3.2
3.0

0.6
0.6
0.6

69
128
46

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures. Statistics calculated using dependent measure for constitutional loyalty
(i.e. the average response to all four statements).

Table 2 shows how mean constitutional loyalty differs by these factors (note the side-byside comparison between federal and Michigan constitutional loyalty for each attribute). For
federal loyalty, African Americans and Hispanics have lower mean scores than whites, although
these differences are somewhat trivial. Men and women, meantime, do not differ at all in their
federal loyalty. Socioeconomic status appears to matter, albeit, again, only marginally: the middle
and upper classes express greater loyalty than their working-class brethren, with middle-class
persons expressing the greatest loyalty. Switching to Michigan mean constitutional loyalty, a
larger pattern between whites and minorities emerges, although Arab Americans express the
lowest loyalty. Indeed, Arab Americans are the only group that varies between their federal and
state loyalty scores; Arab Americans are more supportive of the federal constitution (3.3) than
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the Michigan charter (2.8). Turning to gender, men and women, again, do not drastically differ in
their state mean constitutional loyalty, while there are only marginal differences among
socioeconomic status. These results are somewhat different from Blake and Levinson (2016):
while minorities are more likely to express lower loyalty towards the U.S. and Michigan state
constitutions, the differences appear trivial. Moreover, men and women hold similar loyalty
scores while socioeconomic status appears to only make a difference at the federal level.
Political Affiliations
Having explored the (ostensibly) limited role of demography in differentiating
constitutional loyalty, I now turn to two likelier culprits: partisan affiliation and ideological
persuasion. Previous legitimacy studies, broadly, support the idea that persons sharing
ideological and partisan proximity with a governmental institution are more likely to support it
(see, e.g., Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht 2000). Concerning constitutions, Blake and Levinson
(2016) find that Republicans and conservatives were less likely to support holding a federal
constitutional convention than Democrats and liberals. This may be due to the constitutional
veneration that the Republican Party and conservative ideology broadly favor and impress upon
its adherents. Univariate distributions are illustrated in Figure 1 for both partisanship and
ideology. As witnessed, the expected pattern emerges: Republicans and conservatives have
significantly higher loyalty averages than their Democratic and liberal counterparts.
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Figure 1.
Mean Federal and Michigan Constitutional Loyalty by Partisanship and Ideology

Federal Constitutional Loyalty

Mean Constitutional Loyalty

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5

Democrat

Independent

Republican

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Michigan Constitutional Loyalty

Mean Constitutional Loyalty

4

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

Democrat

Independent

Republican

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Note: Data based on pre-test measures. Loyalty scores presented as group mean. Partisanship is presented as a
collapsed three-category variable (with “strong” and “weak” partisans pooled together, and pure and leaning
independents combined). Ideology is similarly collapsed by merging “weak” and “strong” ideological affinities
together. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval around the mean.
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Institutional Attitudes
There is mixed evidence in the empirical literature about whether support for one
governmental institution or branch influences support for the others. For example, some studies
find a link between presidential and Congressional approval ratings (Jones and McDermott 2002;
Lebo 2008; Mondak et al., 2007), whereas others find no linkage (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn
2000; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) or that some branches are unaffected (see, e.g., Durr,
Martin, and Wolbrecht 2000). Importantly, though, these works are analyzing the relationship
among institutions’ specific support, not their diffuse support. Blake and Levinson (2016)
consider these institutional attitudes and whether they influence a person’s constitutional loyalty
(diffuse support). From a descriptive standpoint, they find that higher approval ratings for federal
institutions (president, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court) correspond with higher
constitutional loyalty (i.e. a lower likelihood of supporting a constitutional convention). Although
this relationship is qualified in their regression analyses (see below), Blake and Levinson’s (2016)
findings suggest a positive relationship between institutional attitudes and constitutional loyalty.
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Figure 2.
Mean Federal and Michigan Constitutional Loyalty by Institutional Attitudes

Federal Constitutional Loyalty
Mean Constitutional Loyalty
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Trump
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A lot
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Congress

Some

A lot

SCOTUS

Institutional Approval Rating

Michigan Constitutional Loyalty
Mean Constitutional Loyalty

4
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3
2.8
2.6
2.4
2.2
2

A little

Some
Snyder

A lot

A little

Some

A lot

MI Leg

A little

Some

A lot

MI Sup

Institutional Approval Rating

Note: Data from pre-test measures. Loyalty scores presented as group mean. Approval ratings originally captured as
a five-category variable (anchored by “Not at all” and “A lot”). Results were collapsed into three categories: A little
(combining “Not at all” and “A little” responses), Some (no change), and A lot (combining “A lot” and “A great deal”).

Given the debate in the literature, I examine federal and Michigan mean constitutional
loyalty by other institutional attitudes. For federal constitutional loyalty, I ask subjects their
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approval ratings (i.e. specific support) of three federal institutions: President Trump, the U.S.
Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS). For Michigan constitutional loyalty, I inquire
about the state-level counterparts: Governor Rick Snyder, the Michigan State Legislature, and
the Michigan Supreme Court. 9 Results are presented in Figure 2. At the federal level, it appears
that increasing support for governmental institutions corresponds with an increase in mean
constitutional loyalty. This is true, and pronounced, across all three branches, although the
magnitude is greater between those with low and high approval. A similar pattern occurs
between state institutions and Michigan constitutional loyalty, although it is less pronounced
with gubernatorial approval; mean constitutional loyalty scores are approximately equal across
levels of approval for Governor Rick Snyder. Overall, though, a person’s general attitudes towards
other governmental institutions appears to be reflected in their constitutional loyalty.
Generators of Constitutional Loyalty
Descriptive data, however, do not offer definitive answers to whether constitutional
loyalty is grounded in these dimensions or not. Patterns of loyalty varying across factors in
isolation does not account for the interrelated nature of these variables. As the literature on
institutional support and loyalty suggest, many of these factors appear substantial in isolation
(e.g. demography) but become trivial once other controls are included (e.g. partisan affiliations).

Readers may note that measuring executive branch institutional support is inquired via subject’s opinion on the
present incumbent. This is because the dimension here aims to capture a person’s specific support for
governmental institutions, or institutional approval (and see if these short-term assessments have a larger impact).
This is standard practice in the literature, since inquiring about the presidency generally would invoke a measure
more akin to institutional loyalty rather than specific support. (Ironically, the literature considers general approval
questions about the U.S. Congress and the SCOTUS, as asked here, to be reflections of specific support.) This
question wording also permits a test for whether a specific officeholder (e.g. President Trump) is influencing
results (see regression analysis, below).

9
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Blake and Levinson (2016) provide an illustrative example of how several dimensional
factors become unrelated to constitutional loyalty when all factors are considered. 10 In their
unified regression modeling accounting for all four dimensions (demography, political affiliations,
institutional attitudes, and civic knowledge), Blake and Levinson found that while race and age
remained significant, the influence of other personal attributes (namely socioeconomic status
and gender) had no discernible effect on constitutional convention support. Moreover, both
partisanship and ideology matter little in explaining a person’s support for holding a
constitutional convention. Indeed, the influences of demographic attributes, partisan affiliation,
and ideological persuasion disappeared after controlling for institutional attitudes, civic
knowledge, and preferred method of constitutional interpretation. Comparing these results with
the predictors of constitutional approval (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016), a similar pattern
emerges – although partisanship and ideology remained significant even after controlling for
institutional attitudes and civic knowledge.
The suggestion from the literature, therefore, is that the four dimensions interact with
each other albeit in different ways for specific and diffuse support. Given my better
approximation of constitutional loyalty, I proceed to test the various dimensions empirically,
controlling for multiple factors to determine whether they serve as predictors or not. I mimic the
estimation procedure (OLS regression) of prior constitutional support studies (namely Blake and
Levinson 2016 and Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016) by estimating a base model of
constitutional loyalty using only demographic/personal attributes (model 1). From there, I
estimate a further two models: one incorporating political affiliations (model 2), and another

10

See, below, for a similar discussion regarding constitutional approval (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016).

72

including institutional attitudes (model 3). These procedures are replicated twice: one for federal
constitutional loyalty (see Table 3) and one for Michigan constitutional loyalty (see Table 4). I also
consider the importance of constitutional knowledge in a fourth model, which is presented in
Chapter 6. For now, I consider the importance of demography, political affiliations, and
institutional attitudes.
Before doing so, I briefly discuss the choice of simple linear (OLS) regression rather than
ordered logit/probit techniques. Despite the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, OLS is
used because it is easier to interpret and present OLS coefficients (despite the non-plausible
numbers produced). Moreover, there is debate concerning whether the estimation differences
between OLS and ordered logit are consequential enough and outweigh OLS’s simplicity (see,
e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009) despite the technical violation of OLS regression assumptions.
Additionally, the works on constitutional support opt to use OLS regression for interpretation
purposes. I opt to use OLS for these reasons, but also because I am less interested in the specific
point estimates than in identifying the causal relationship and its strength.
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Table 3.
Regression Modeling of Federal Constitutional Loyalty

Female
Age
African American
Other Minority
SES
Partisanship

Model 1
-0.032
(0.104)
0.028^
(0.015)
-0.547***
(0.137)
-0.431***
(0.125)
0.001
(0.079)

Model 2
-0.018
(0.115)
0.019
(0.016)
-0.445**
(0.155)
-0.339*
(0.143)
-0.038
(0.087)
0.069
(0.047)
0.044
(0.065)

2.913***
(0.371)

2.811***
(0.412)

Model 3
0.092
(0.126)
0.022
(0.017)
-0.148
(0.166)
-0.18
(0.142)
-0.194*
(0.089)
0.056
(0.054)
-0.053
(0.07)
0.19*
(0.086)
-0.141
(0.086)
0.448***
(0.077)
2.35***
(0.45)

226
0.083

198
0.097

151
0.296

Ideology
Trump Approval
Congress Approval
SCOTUS Approval
Constant
N
Adjusted R2

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ^ p < 0.10

Federal Predictors
I consider federal constitutional loyalty first. The dependent variable for all models is the
index of constitutional loyalty discussed prior, or the mean response for a subject across all four
federal diffuse support statements. Values range from one to five, with higher scores indicating
greater mean constitutional loyalty. 11 In the first model, I include only demographic variables: a

As discussed prior, I created several alternative dependent variables in addition to the mean index: a factor
score, proportion support, and a simple additive index of number of supportive replies. Regression analyses were
replicated for all alternative dependent variables, yielding no significant or substantial differences from the results
presented here.
11
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binary measure for gender; the subject’s age; two dummy variables to capture race, with one
noting if the subject was African American and the other indicating if the subject was part of
another minority group (i.e. Hispanic, Native American, Asian American, Pacific Islander, Arab
American, or mixed-race); and, finally, an ordinal variable capturing the subject’s socioeconomic
status (SES) (working, middle, and upper-class are the categories). As the findings indicate,
gender and income class have no significant effect on constitutional loyalty, but race and age do.
Being African American reduces one’s mean constitutional loyalty by approximately a half-point
on the five-point loyalty scale, while being a member of another minority ethnicity reduces
loyalty by a smaller, yet still significant, magnitude. This pattern holds across all models, except
in model 3 (see below). These findings are similar to prior work on constitutional loyalty and
approval specifically, and diffuse support more generally: African Americans are less likely to
express institutional loyalty or approval than other minorities and whites likely given their
historical experience relative these other groups (Blake and Levinson 2016; Stephanopoulos and
Versteeg 2016; see also Gibson and Caldeira 1992). While not significant at conventional levels,
the age variable reaches significance at the .10 level in the demography model; an additional year
in age increases the subject’s mean constitutional loyalty by .028 points. This finding – that older
subjects have greater loyalty than younger persons – squares with the literature on constitutional
approval and loyalty, and the marginal significance is more likely a result of the sampling frame:
college students reduces age variability considerably. 12

While not reported here, regression diagnostics (i.e. influential observations, or DFbeta, and standardized
residuals analysis) confirm that the age coefficient is being heavily influenced by older subjects (those 25 years and
older). This is also true in the remaining models.
12
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However, demographic variables may share a complex and interrelated relationship with
a subject’s partisan and ideological affiliations. Given the increasing polarization of American
politics at both the federal and state levels, it could be that constitutional loyalty is explained
more by how one identifies politically than what one’s ascribed attributes would suggest. For
example, the Republican Party and conservatives increasingly emphasize the U.S. Constitution as
sacrosanct, with characterizations of opponents “shredding” or “ignoring” the Constitution a
potent and common political attack. Model 2 explores this relationship by adding two additional
variables: partisanship captures a subject’s political party identification on the typical seven-point
scale (anchored by “strong Democrat” and “strong Republican”), while ideology is a five-point
scale anchored by “strong” liberal at the low end and “strong” conservative at the high pole.
While prior institutional support studies (especially those on Congress and the president)
have found that one’s partisanship and ideology matter, works examining constitutions find that
these variables matter little in explaining a person’s constitutional approval or loyalty. That
pattern is true here: neither partisanship or ideology reaches statistical significance in model 2. 13
Instead, only race remains significant and negatively related to mean constitutional loyalty. Age
is no longer even marginally significant (but see footnote 12, above). While somewhat surprising
given the larger institutional support literature, in the context of constitutions it is not. Diffuse
support is meant to be resilient and based more on belief in the underlying system’s or
institution’s legitimacy, or right to govern. Specific support, meantime, is more of a short-term
appraisal, and is more likely to be affected by ideology and partisanship. For the U.S. Constitution,
though, belief in it is concomitant with belief in America’s civic creed (Smith 1993), a belief that

13

Collinearity diagnostics do not indicate a problem in any model with running both partisanship and ideology.

76

should transcend political attributes (and demography, for that matter). Lending credence to this
theory is the fact that race remains significant across models 1 and 2: those persons considered
to be outside “the true meaning of Americanism” (Smith 1993, 549; emphasis in original) are less
likely to express approval and loyalty towards the Constitution. Thus, African Americans and
other racial minorities – all of whom found their disapparate treatment justified on constitutional
grounds at one time or another – do not express the same level of loyalty as white Americans.
This relationship transcends the partisan and ideological forces that are otherwise more
influential for the institutions the Constitution establishes.
Relatedly, there may be a relationship between the specific support enjoyed by the
institutions of government created by the U.S. Constitution and a subject’s loyalty towards the
charter itself. Moreover, and as aforementioned, there is a debate in the literature if institutional
support for one institution affects another’s. To test for this interactive effect, model 3 includes
three approval variables: one for the president (specifically President Donald J. Trump), the U.S.
Congress, and the SCOTUS. These variables are measured on a five-point scale on how well the
subject approves of the way the institution is handling its job, with higher scores indicating
greater approval.
As the results show, institutional attitudes matter a great deal in determining one’s mean
constitutional loyalty. While congressional approval does not reach significance, approval of the
president and the SCOTUS are positively related with mean constitutional loyalty. A one-unit
increase in presidential rating corresponds with approximately a 0.2-point increase in mean
loyalty, while a corresponding increase in the SCOTUS’s approval increases mean loyalty by
roughly half a point. These results suggest two, interdependent explanations: First, the role of
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the SCOTUS in interpreting the Constitution and resolving constitutional issues likely factors into
constitutional loyalty. Since the SCOTUS enjoys a high degree of public support generally and
given its role as “guardian” of the Constitution, support for the Court likely transfers to the
charter itself. However, Blake and Levinson (2016) found a null-finding for the SCOTUS’s approval
and likelihood of supporting a federal constitutional convention. They attribute this null finding
to the SCOTUS’s high diffuse support, meaning there was already limited opposition expressed
towards the Court. Yet, my findings suggest the opposite: the SCOTUS’s approval substantially
matters.
My interpretation is that today’s political context may be influencing results. Since
institutional approval is a specific support measure, recent decisions of the Court and the
judiciary more generally striking down Trump administration actions may be causing a positive
feedback: a common refrain from the Left and Trump critics is that the courts are “protecting”
the Constitution with these decisions. Thus, agreement with the SCOTUS’s decisions are often a
reflection of agreement with the Constitution itself. Importantly, the question of whether one
approves of the SCOTUS’s present job handling is not inducing the subjects to consider the
SCOTUS’s diffuse support; they are not being asked if they would eliminate the Court or curtail
its power. Rather, they are simply asked if they agree with its present job performance. As Gibson
and his colleagues have found, this kind of question wording matters. Therefore, in thinking
about the Court’s actions (i.e. its opinions), individuals are consequently reflecting on the
Constitution itself – with those opinions reflected in the relationship between the SCOTUS’s job
approval and one’s constitutional loyalty.
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A second, related explanation also presents itself: presidential approval, specifically of
Trump’s approval, may be skewing the results. Unlike prior administrations, the Trump
presidency has encountered (triggered?) more constitutional conflicts that may influence one’s
constitutional loyalty to a greater degree than previously. To control for this possible confounder,
I run a modified version of model 3 (results not reported here) without Trump’s approval rating
included. The results do modify somewhat, but not unexpectedly: in addition to the SCOTUS’s
approval rating, partisanship now becomes significant and in a positive direction (i.e. Republicans
express greater loyalty than Democrats) and one race variable (minority other than African
American) reaches significance at the .10 level (p=.078). These findings suggest that Trump’s
approval rating does have some leverage on one’s mean constitutional loyalty, enough that it
subsumes the influence of partisanship and racial minority status.
What these findings on institutional attitudes suggest is that when institutions of
government engage in constitutional-level politics (e.g. debates over what the constitution
requires) their job performance matters in influencing one’s constitutional loyalty. This finding is
somewhat troubling given that a general dislike of government could potentially pervade into
the civic creed of the nation. It could also mean that loyalty towards the Constitution changes
with the political winds, a byproduct of partisan polarization and the increasing tribal nature of
American politics. These findings parallel the relationship explored by Stephanopoulos and
Versteeg (2016) where other institutional attitudes were positively related with constitutional
approval, again suggesting that the U.S. Constitution’s institutional support is related to other
institutions’ support.
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Interestingly, model 3 also indicates that socioeconomic status has a negative
relationship: being from a higher socioeconomic class (i.e. middle and upper class) depresses
average loyalty. This is somewhat surprising, given the general null findings in prior works on
income. Furthermore, it becomes significant only in model 3. One tentative explanation is that
this finding, again, has something to do with the current political context; those from the upper
classes may perceive American politics as dysfunctional, ameliorated with structural changes
achieved only via constitutional alterations.
Michigan Predictors
Turning to Michigan constitutional loyalty, I repeat the analyses using Michigan-level
data. In estimating these models, I use the Michigan scale of constitutional loyalty constructed
above using the mean response to the four Michigan diffuse support questions. 14 All independent
variables used in the federal analyses are the same unless otherwise noted. Finally, the Michigan
models are run using robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity present in the
normal OLS regression. 15

Like in the federal regressions, I repeat the analysis here for the alternative dependent variables, which yielded
no substantial differences. See note 11, above.
15
Analysis of the residuals for each Michigan model indicated non-normal distributions, including significant
skewness and kurtosis scores. Analysis of the federal models detected no heteroskedasticity.
14
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Table 4.
Regression Modeling of Michigan Constitutional Loyalty

Female
Age
African American
Other Minority
SES
Partisanship

Model 1
0.088
(0.081)
0.01
(0.012)
-0.228*
(0.114)
-0.276***
(0.082)
0.009
(0.058)

Model 2
0.127
(0.085)
0.001
(0.014)
-0.17
(0.128)
-0.27**
(0.09)
0.027
(0.063)
0.035
(0.034)
0.03
(0.052)

2.98***
(0.284)

2.913***
(0.316)

Model 3
0.207
(0.128)
0.021
(0.014)
-0.12
(0.167)
-0.203
(0.126)
-0.01
(0.094)
0.022
(0.039)
0.071
(0.071)
-0.055
(0.071)
0.037
(0.184)
0.235
(0.172)
1.1***
(0.417)

222
0.053

195
0.082

116
0.211

Ideology
Snyder Approval
Legislature Approval
Michigan Sup. Ct.
Approval
Constant
N
R2

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ^ p < 0.10

As presented in Table 4, predictors of Michigan constitutional loyalty are similar to federal
factors, albeit with some crucial differences concerning institutional attitudes. First, demography
does not appear to be destiny (again). Only the racial variables (African American and other racial
minority) are statistically significant in model 1. Being an African American reduces one’s
Michigan mean constitutional loyalty by about 0.2 points, while other racial minorities see their
mean loyalty reduced by a similar magnitude (0.27 points). Socioeconomic status, age, and
income are all non-significant (although I caution that the sample may be disguising age’s effect;
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see footnote 12, above). Expanding the modeling to include partisanship and ideology does little;
neither factor is significant, while only other racial minority status remains statistically significant
in the expanded model (model 2). It would appear that similar patterns of behavior at the federal
level concerning personal and political attributes are replicated at the state level.
The influence of other institutional attitudes, however, is markedly different at the statelevel. Subjects were asked their job approval for state-level institutions created by the Michigan
constitution, including the state governor (designated as Governor Rick Snyder), the Michigan
State Legislature, and the Michigan Supreme Court. These variables were measured the same
way as their federal counterparts. Whereas greater approval of President Trump and the SCOTUS
were positively related to federal mean constitutional loyalty, there exists no similar relationship
at the state level. Indeed, no variable achieves significance in model 3, including the race
variables.
How to explain these findings? First, the general ignorance of the Michigan constitution
and state governmental actors may be confounding the results. In Chapter 6, I control for
knowledge about the Michigan constitution and report those findings there. Another possibility
is that state-level institutional attitudes matter less in generating Michigan constitutional loyalty
than their federal counterparts. Second, and related, it may be that Michigan constitutional
loyalty suffers from what Zink and Dawes (2016) call a “warmglow” effect: federal-level attitudes
diffuse down into state-level feelings. Consequently, I re-estimate model 3 (results not reported
here) but with federal institutional attitudes rather than state. The results provide some partial
evidence of this “warmglow:” while Trump’s and Congress’s approval do not achieve statistical
significance, the SCOTUS’s approval does (p=0.008). The model also suggests two other factors
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that become significant: other minority status is negatively associated with mean loyalty while
gender achieves significance at the 0.10 level (p=0.099), with females expressing greater loyalty
than males.
As Zink and Dawes (2016) opine, the federal “warmglow” likely explains individuals’
attachments to their state constitutions, connoting that state constitutional loyalty may be
dependent on federal loyalty. Put another way, federal and state constitutional loyalty are
strongly correlated with each other. A simple crosstabulation suggest this is the case (r=0.61). To
further control (and test) for this possibility, I re-ran Michigan model 3 but with an added control:
mean federal constitutional loyalty. Two differences are worthy of note: First, the explained
variation (R2) in the new estimate is substantially larger than the original model 3 (0.53 versus
0.21). Second, no variables (again) reach traditional levels of statistical significance except for
federal constitutional loyalty; the latter is highly significant (p=.000) and positively related to
Michigan constitutional loyalty. A one-unit increase in federal mean constitutional loyalty
corresponds with a 0.53-point increase in state mean constitutional loyalty.
Summary
Collectively, these findings suggest two preliminary conclusions. First, the predictors of
constitutional loyalty are very similar to the generators of constitutional approval, save for
institutional attitudes in the case of Michigan constitutional loyalty. Demography and political
affiliations are considerably un-influential when it comes to explaining a person’s constitutional
support. This is not that unsurprising but raises concerns about how constitutional loyalty may
be driven more by the performance of the institutions the charter creates. Indeed, a person’s
attitudes towards the SCOTUS is intriguing, especially given the SCOTUS’s interpretative role to
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say what the U.S. Constitution (and to a lesser extent state charters) is, indirectly influencing the
charter’s underlying support. Second, Michigan constitutional loyalty appears dependent on
federal constitutional loyalty. This “warmglow” is not unexpected given the widespread exposure
to the symbolism attached to the U.S. Constitution. Most citizens have limited engagement with
their state constitutions in civics courses relative to the federal charter, suggesting that subjects
are transferring analogous feelings to a lesser known entity but nonetheless still carrying the title
of “constitution.”
There remain two questions: First, how does familiarity with a constitution influence
one’s loyalty? As Gibson and Caldeira (2009a) note in examining the SCOTUS’s diffuse support,
“To know it is to love it.” Thus, positivity bias may further explain loyalty scores. I examine this
proposition in the coming chapters (especially Chapter 6). Second, is there a relationship
between constitutional loyalty and constitutional approval? The literature on institutional
support suggests that while specific support does play a role in generating diffuse support, the
two are distinct concepts. In the next section, I consider the role of constitutional approval and
its predictive influence on one’s constitutional loyalty.
What About Constitutional Approval?
While the focus of this study is on constitutional loyalty, I do analyze constitutional
approval (i.e. specific support) to (1) see if a relationship exists between approval and loyalty, (2)
if my subjects’ approval patterns mirror prior work, and (3) if periodic conventions influence
subjects’ approvals of their constitutions (see Chapter 5). The most comprehensive work on
constitutional approval to date is Stephanopoulos and Versteeg’s (2016). In general, these
authors found a high degree of constitutional approval for both the federal and respondents’
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state constitutions, although the former was stronger than the latter. As discussed above, I
capture a subject’s constitutional approval by using a numbered approval scale, which asks
respondents to assess how strongly they approve of the federal or Michigan state constitution. 16
Given my subject pool is college students, my findings are somewhat different: the average
approval score for the federal constitution is 3.4, while the average is 3.2 for the Michigan state
constitution. At face value, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the Michigan state constitution
enjoys less approval than its federal counterpart, but by a somewhat trivial (albeit statistically
significant; p=0.002) margin. Second, it appears that college students are far “cooler” in their
orientations towards the federal and Michigan constitutions than what Stephanopoulos and
Versteeg (2016) found. This may be indicative of the fact that younger persons are less likely to
express high institutional support more generally (e.g. towards courts and legislatures) than older
persons, with the same pattern found in support for holding a federal constitutional convention
(Blake and Levinson 2016).
Nonetheless, differences do emerge below the surface. Stephanopoulos and Versteeg
(2016) found that African Americans exhibited lower approval ratings than other racial minorities
and whites; men were more supportive than women of constitutions; those from upper-income
brackets demonstrated higher approval; and older persons (especially those over 55) expressed
greater approval. However, these differences become insignificant when pooled into regression
models, with other political and knowledge variables explaining the variation, although there are
two exceptions: age and race.

Subjects were asked to circle their approval on a five-point number line, with five being “strongly approve.” This
measure is adapted from Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016), albeit I reduce the scale from ten to five points for
more intuitive interpretation.
16
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My results here echo these findings, with some differences. On federal approval, African
Americans rate the Constitution lower than other groups, especially whites; men have higher
approval ratings than women; and those coming from the middle- and upper-income classes
express greater approval than those coming from the working class. Political affiliations also
differed, although these are reversed from Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (perhaps reflecting a
change in political control at the federal level): Republicans and conservatives were more likely
to rate the Constitution higher than liberals. Finally, other institutional attitudes (i.e. towards
other federal governmental branches and officials) do influence constitutional approval: subjects
whom strongly approved of President Trump, the U.S. Congress, and the SCTOUS rated the
Constitution higher than those with more negative attitudes. The Michigan results are similar to
the federal findings, 17 except on the matter of gender: both men and women rate the Michigan
constitution on average a 3.2.
Two questions persist: First, how does familiarity/knowledge of the constitution influence
approval? I consider this question in Chapter 6 but highlight what prior works have found here:
persons more attentive to political news and expressing greater self-knowledge of a constitution
are more likely to support it. Second, what is the relationship between constitutional approval
and constitutional loyalty? The literature suggests that specific and diffuse support should,
theoretically and conceptually, not be closely related; specific support represents current
satisfaction with the institution’s outputs, which waxes and wanes. Diffuse support, meantime,
is more durable and represents a commitment to the institution that should be independent of

Rather than measuring institutional attitudes towards federal institutions, I replace the three federal institutions
with state-level equivalents (e.g. Governor Rick Snyder, the Michigan State Legislature, and the Michigan Supreme
Court). See also footnote 9, above.
17
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present satisfaction. Thus, the theories hypothesize no empirical relationship between specific
and diffuse support.
Actual empirics, however, tend to disprove this theoretical assumption, demonstrating a
great degree of relationship between specific and diffuse support. The literature is widespread
on the degree of correlation between the two (see Gibson and Caldeira 1992), with some scholars
arguing that it is too difficult to effectively disentangle the two concepts empirically-speaking
(see, e.g., Davidson and Parker 1972). Concerning my data, bivariate correlations between
constitutional approval and loyalty yield mixed results: there is a weak-to-moderate positive
relationship between Michigan constitutional approval and loyalty (r=0.34), whereas the
correlation is somewhat stronger between federal constitutional approval and loyalty (r=0.52).
Keeping with the “warmglow” effect, federal constitutional approval is moderately correlated
with Michigan constitutional approval (r=0.50).
While I do not try to adjudicate the empirical debate in the literature here, I do note that
there should be some relationship between specific and diffuse support. For instance, Gibson and
Caldeira (1992, 1127) note that most literature on the SCOTUS’s institutional support indicate a
strong correlation between the Court’s specific and diffuse support. This is not unsurprising in
the sense that specific support should help to generate diffuse support over the long-term. An
analogy helps: Marital relationships include both specific and diffuse support elements. Specific
support refers to a partner’s current feelings toward her spouse, which are context dependent
and will likely wax and wane depending on the spouse’s outputs (e.g. forgetting to take the
garbage out). However, marital diffuse support is the long-term commitment to the institution
of marriage; while she may express dissatisfaction that he has not taken the garbage out, she
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nonetheless remains committed to the marriage. However, if he continually causes displeasure,
the long-term effect (i.e. low specific support) may generate a decline in diffuse support (and,
ultimately, dissolve the underlying marriage).
Correlations, though, do not help us determine causation. In the face of other
demographic characteristics, political attributes, and institutional attitudes, constitutional
approval’s influence may diminish. To test for this possibility, I control for one’s constitutional
approval alongside the other three dimensions (demographics, political affiliations, and
institutional attitudes) in two new regression models, one each for federal and state
constitutional loyalty. Readers will note the reduced Ns compared to the prior regression models;
this is due to several subjects missing (i.e. non-answers) constitutional approval scores, especially
in the Michigan model. 18 Results are provided in Table 5.

18

Analysis determined that non-answers are random and do not systemically vary.
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Table 5.
Regression Modeling with Constitutional Approval

Female
Age
African American
Other Minority
SES
Partisanship
Ideology
Executive Approval
Legislature Approval
Supreme Court
Approval
Constitutional Approval
Constant
N
Adjusted-R2
R2

Federal
0.128
(0.117)
0.009
(0.016)
-0.08
(0.156)
-0.057
(0.134)
-0.182*
(0.084)
0.071
(0.05)
-0.074
(0.064)
0.16*
(0.08)
-0.147^
(0.08)
0.287***
(0.078)
0.38***
(0.069)
1.55***
(0.442)

Michigan
0.19
(0.136)
0.043***
(0.013)
0.022
(0.177)
-0.171
(0.139)
-0.056
(0.11)
0.045
(0.043)
0.035
(0.063)
-0.076
(0.074)
0.06
(0.192)
0.176
(0.174)
0.242*
(0.098)
0.948^
(0.499)

147
0.412

100
0.284

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures. Standard errors in parentheses for federal model; robust standard errors
for Michigan model.
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ^ p < 0.10

In general, constitutional approval is indeed a significant and positive predictor of federal
and Michigan mean constitutional loyalty. In the federal model, a one-unit increase in
constitutional approval corresponds with an increase of 0.38-points in mean loyalty. Therefore,
a person rating the federal Constitution a “five” on the approval scale would be 1.9-points higher
in average loyalty than a person rating the U.S. Constitution a “one.” Compared with model 3
(see Table 3), institutional attitudes and socioeconomic status remain significantly related and in
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the same direction as prior. The one new significant factor in this model is Congressional
approval, which is significant (p=0.067) at the 0.10 level. Higher satisfaction with Congress,
however, reduces mean constitutional loyalty. This is somewhat surprising but may reflect a
preference for popular decision-making undertaken by Congress (as the deliberative body of the
country) unencumbered by constitutional limits. Michigan constitutional loyalty is also
significantly influenced by one’s specific support for the state charter. A one-unit increase in
Michigan constitutional approval corresponds with a 0.24-point increase in mean loyalty.
Therefore, a person expressing a high degree of job satisfaction with the Michigan constitution
(scoring a “five” on approval) would see approximately a 1.22-point increase in mean loyalty. The
only other factor that reaches significance is age, but the effect is inconsequential at best (this
effectively null finding is, again, likely caused by the limitation of the college student sample; see
footnote 12, above).
While not presented here, I estimate another Michigan model that controls for federal
constitutional loyalty, given the “warmglow” effect. The results do not substantially differ,
excepting that federal constitutional loyalty is significant and provides a substantial increase in
mean Michigan constitutional loyalty (b=0.483; p=0.000). Michigan constitutional approval’s
coefficient is somewhat reduced (b=0.139) and is marginally insignificant at traditional levels
(p=0.066). However, this is likely due to the “warmglow” effect; minimal familiarity with the
Michigan constitution likely means that one’s federal loyalty is substituting for both specific and
diffuse support of the Michigan constitution, thus explaining the insignificant result.
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Discussion
Overall, these results present a clearer picture about how college students evaluate the
federal and Michigan state constitutions. Both documents enjoy a degree of diffuse support, or
loyalty, although it is a qualified loyalty in many respects. For example, while majorities believe
the federal charter is not too controversial and expressed skepticism at rewriting it, a majority
does believe the document favors some groups over others and only a plurality explicitly rejected
eliminating the Constitution entirely. These college students, though, express a great degree of
undecidedness towards the Michigan charter, although large majorities demonstrate support for
the document once the undecideds were removed. This is likely a function of the mass ignorance
of the state charter.
Like other institutional loyalties, constitutional loyalty follows similar, predicted patterns
for college students. Demography does not appear to meaningfully influence one’s federal or
Michigan constitutional loyalty, with partisanship and ideology also noninfluential. Institutional
attitudes, or the specific support for other governmental institutions, does appear to predict
one’s average constitutional loyalty. However, this is likely a result of the political context of the
time (e.g. the Trump administration), while the SCOTUS’s roles as constitutional arbiter and
interpreter indirectly influence one’s constitutional attitudes; agreement with the Court’s
decisions on major constitutional questions reflects one’s underlying loyalty to the charter. The
influence of federal attitudes is also apparent at the state-level, with Michigan constitutional
loyalty depended on how one feels about federal institutions and the U.S. Constitution. Finally,
one’s constitutional approval (specific support) influences his/her loyalty to the charter.

91

Importantly, these findings reflect more of the expectations of the literature than not.
While a more comprehensive examination of diffuse support predictors (borrowing from the
larger literatures on constitutional approval and the courts’ institutional support), the
relationships observed here follow the patterns elsewhere. What is surprising is the extent that
institutional attitudes appear, at least in these preliminary analyses, to be driving college
students’ mean constitutional loyalties. It appears that constitutions are, indirectly, being
evaluated via their own outputs – namely, the performance of their created institutions (i.e. the
executive, legislature, and judiciary). Thus, how well a constitution’s institutions perform helps
to determine its own loyalty and approval. If these institutions are not doing well, individuals may
find that structural changes to the charter are necessary – necessitating a lower loyalty to
countenance fundamental changes.
But there is a key dimension that is unaccounted: What about constitutional knowledge?
Do persons with greater familiarity of their constitutional charters behave the same? Does
knowledge thwart the influence of institutional attitudes? I consider these propositions in
Chapter 6. In the next chapter, however, I explore the dissertation’s primary focus: What role do
periodic conventions play in generating constitutional loyalty?
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CHAPTER 5 – PERIODIC CONVENTIONS & CONSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY
Having discussed overall levels and the predictors of constitutional loyalty, I now turn to
examining my dissertation’s experimental results. In this chapter, I first restate my central
research question and theory, noting my expectations and formal hypotheses. My primary focus
is addressing the role that periodic conventions play in generating or undermining constitutional
loyalty. Next, I summarize my methods and discuss my subject sample. Following these
preliminaries, I discuss the experiment’s results and evaluate my hypothetical predictions.
Finally, I conclude with a discussion on the experiment’s limitations and implications.
How Do Periodic Conventions Influence Constitutional Loyalty?
Research Questions and Theory
As detailed above (see Chapter 2), Thomas Jefferson was not a fan of permanent
constitutional charters. Jefferson feared that blind support for a constitution may have negative
consequences, including saddling the polity with suboptimal institutions. Instead, succeeding
generations should have the opportunity to effect “periodic repairs,” or constitutional revisions
– including wholescale replacement of the current charter. In modern parlance, Jefferson’s
criticism is a call for periodic constitutional conventions, or opportunities for the public to modify
or replace their existing constitution, a process more fundamentally involved than simply
amending it. James Madison, among others, feared that periodic conventions would reduce the
constitution’s legitimacy; to make the constitution subject to a sunset provision would reduce its
habitual obedience, reducing its long-term effectiveness by eviscerating popular support.
However, Madison did concede that periodic conventions may bolster support: in Federalist 49,
he wrote that if succeeding generations knew prior conventions were rejected, then respect for
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the present charter may increase given the deliberate choice expressed by the people (Madison
[1788] 1961). Put another way, knowing that prior generations could have replaced the
constitution but chose not to would increase loyalty towards it.
This debate yields two mechanisms by which constitutional loyalty may be influenced.
First, the notion that habit breeds obedience; a preference for the status quo generates further
satisfaction and loyalty with a constitution simply because it is the default. The longer the status
quo exists, moreover, the stronger its support. An alternative mechanism is the one Jefferson
and Madison quibble over: the constitution’s susceptibility to change may reinforce its loyalty.
Periodic conventions represent an existential threat; the charter could be fundamentally altered
or even replaced by a convened convention. Studies on risk aversion (see Chapter 2 for a review),
for instance, note that people prefer options that mimic the status quo’s characteristics or
otherwise avoid alternatives that carry risks. Highlighting what periodic conventions could do
may be enough to reinforce a person’s constitutional loyalty.
Several questions can be distilled from this philosophical debate and empirical literatures.
Is constitutional loyalty reinforced or undermined by periodic conventions? Literature on risk
aversion and constitutional status quo bias suggests that once voters are aware of the
potentiality that a periodic convention represents (i.e. replacing a constitution), voters are less
inclined to support it. Thus, I would expect constitutional loyalty to increase due to periodic
conventions since conventions represent a threat to the constitution’s integrity. Madison’s
contention, though, remains: Does knowing that prior periodic conventions were rejected by
voters (or were approved) affect constitutional loyalty? If the proposition is valid, then
constitutional loyalty should increase among voters who know a constitution was successfully
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retained in prior elections. Voters informed that prior conventions were approved, though, may
express weakened loyalty.
Expectations
Importantly, Madison’s contention directs us to consider one’s loyalty towards
constitutions, or that an individual’s diffuse support should increase. The more a subject is
primed to think about changing a constitution, the more likely she will not support proposed
modifications (see also Zink and Dawes 2016). As such:
Hypothesis 1a: Subjects exposed to more information about periodic conventions will
exhibit higher constitutional loyalty.
Yet, the literature on diffuse support would seem to discount this possibility, given its long-term,
and resilient, nature. Periodic conventions, though, may influence a person’s constitutional
approval, or specific support. The contextual, ephemeral nature of specific support would be far
more susceptible to periodic conventions and priming surrounding them than diffuse support.
Therefore:
Hypothesis 1b: Subjects exposed to more information about periodic conventions will
exhibit higher constitutional approval.
It is important to tease out this possibility; a person’s constitutional loyalty may be unaffected
(especially given constitutional status quo bias), but her constitutional approval may respond to
the stimuli represented by periodic conventions. Nonetheless, I still proceed with Madison’s
expectations (i.e. Hypothesis 1a) given the dissertation’s focus.
A second set of hypotheses moves beyond this general relationship between periodic
conventions and constitutional loyalty and examines different primes. Federalist 49 suggests one
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such prime: knowledge of prior conventions being rejected promotes greater constitutional
loyalty. This could also be true of constitutional approval; knowing that prior generations kept
the document wholescale may additionally bolster its specific support. Therefore, I expect:
Hypothesis 2a: Subjects informed about prior periodic conventions being rejected by
voters will have higher constitutional loyalty than those told prior periodic conventions
were approved.
Hypothesis 2b: Subjects informed about prior periodic conventions being rejected by
voters will have higher constitutional approval than those told prior periodic conventions
were approved.
Again, the nature of diffuse support should argue against Madison’s contention in Hypothesis 2a,
but I assume its potentiality here given my dissertation’s goal of empirically testing Madison’s
proposition.
A third hypothesis also presents itself: Knowledge about periodic conventions may
manifest electorally, to the degree that a subject would vote to hold a periodic convention. My
experiment tests for this possibility (see below), and I proceed with the assumption that a
subject’s constitutional status quo bias will undercut their electoral support irrespective of
whether their constitutional loyalty or approval is affected.
Hypothesis 3: Subjects exposed to more information about a periodic convention will
indicate lower likelihoods of voting to hold a convention.
I leave open my expectations about whether a particular prime (i.e. being informed that prior
conventions were approved versus rejected) will have a differential effect on a convention’s
electoral support (see results section, below).
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Finally, I note that the experimental nature of this study requires a degree of post-hoc
control. Subjects who are unaware of what periodic conventions represent may respond
differently to the treatments than subjects already acquainted.
Hypothesis 4: Subjects less familiar with periodic conventions will be more susceptible to
the treatment than subjects with greater familiarity.
My expectation, therefore, is that any significant results detected will likely be driven by subjects
who were previously ignorant of periodic conventions. Subjects more familiar with periodic
conventions likely did not respond to the treatment, seeing no significant change in their mean
constitutional loyalty and/or constitutional approval scores. (See Table 6, below, for a summary
of hypotheses and results.)
Methods and Data1
Survey Instrument
I test these hypotheses using a between-subjects survey experiment. Subjects were first
given a pre-test measuring their demographic characteristics (e.g. age, race, and socioeconomic
status), sociopolitical variables (e.g. ideology, partisanship, and political orientations), and initial
specific and diffuse support for the federal and Michigan state constitutions. 2 Subjects were then
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions (see below). Depending on condition
assigned, participants encountered varying information concerning Michigan’s 2010 periodic
convention and its powers via a mock newspaper article. After reading the experimental vignette,

Greater elaboration of these methods (including justifications) can be found in Chapter 3. This section serves as
both a quick primer and reminder.
2
See Appendix A for the complete survey instrument, including pre-test, manipulations, and post-test. See also
Chapter 3 for variable operationalizations not discussed below.
1
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subjects completed a post-test with three tasks: (1) two questions on how likely they are to
support a constitutional convention at the federal and state levels; 3 (2) two short question
batteries on federal and Michigan state constitutional knowledge; and (3) complete, again, the
specific and diffuse support batteries from the pre-test.
Measurement and Manipulations
My main dependent variable is the index of constitutional loyalty (one each for federal
and Michigan). Briefly, this measure is the average response across all four diffuse support
statements from the post-test (and used in the prior chapter). I also measure the treatment’s
effect on a subject’s constitutional approval (scores range from 1 = “strongly disapprove” to 5 =
“strongly approve”) and the two constitutional convention support questions (scores range from
1 = “very unlikely” to 5 = “very likely”). Finally, to investigate whether effects differ by a subject’s
prior knowledge about periodic conventions, I use three pre-test measures to create a summary
scale of prior knowledge. These three true/false questions include: (1) whether Michigan has a
state constitution (true); 4 (2) if Michigan voters are asked every 16 years if they would like to
hold a constitutional convention (true); and (3) if the current state constitution can be revised by
a periodic convention (true). The resultant “prior knowledge” scale ranges in scores from zero
(no correct answers) to three (all questions correctly answered). For simplicity, I recoded this
variable into a binary measure, with subjects answering zero or a single question correctly as

I do not include the convention support questions on the pre-test for two reasons: (1) I do not want to potentially
alert subjects to the treatment and (2) subjects may not be aware what a constitutional convention is, thus biasing
initial measures and yielding invalid comparisons with post-treatment scores (Gerber and Green 2012).
4
This is a legitimate question given the general ignorance of state government (Roeder 1994; see also Armaly and
Black 2016) and that one national survey found that 54 percent of respondents incorrectly identified that their
state had no constitution (Lyons, Jaeger, and Wolak 2012).
3
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“low prior knowledge” and those answering two or three questions correctly as “high prior
knowledge.” 5 Experimental results were reanalyzed using this grouping variable.
The experimental treatment is a mock newspaper article covering the 2010 Michigan
periodic convention ballot question (the last time the ballot question appeared). In composing
the article, I used John Minnis’s (2010) article published in the Oakland Legal News as a model
(predominately borrowing phrasing), although my instruments differ significantly from his
original piece. 6 Subjects assigned to Condition 0 (“control”) received a “plain” article on the 2010
convention question. The article did not frame, prime, or otherwise emphasize features of a
periodic convention (specifically that it can wholescale replace the present charter) and balances
discussion by providing an affirmative and negative position on holding the convention. (See
Appendix A for full wording for each condition.) The control (Condition 0) will serve as the
baseline for subsequent analysis.
The remaining conditions received altered articles. Subjects assigned to Condition 1
(“more information”) received the “control” article but with an added paragraph describing how
a seated convention could fundamentally alter or replace the current constitution. Condition 1
effectively measures whether a constitutional status quo bias exists by inducing the subject to
consider replacing the charter (see also Zink and Dawes 2016). However, this treatment does not

Each statement also included a “Don’t Know” option. I recoded these variables into simply binary measures with
respondents coded as having known the correct answer (“True” responses) versus not knowing the correct answer
(“False” and “Don’t Know” responses). Binary recodes were used to construct the original additive index.
6
I selected Minnis’s piece as a model given his comprehensive account of the Michigan convention ballot question
in 2010. The article includes direct quotes from various organizations and officials supporting and opposing the
ballot question, as well as positive and negative justifications for why a convention is (un)necessary. While I do not
use the entire piece as originally published, various paragraphs are lifted, edited, and reorganized in a manner that
approximates the article I sought. Moreover, the mundane realism here is heightened given usage of an actual
article on the convention question rather than a purely artificial one.
5
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address the priming nature described in Federalist 49 by Madison: knowing that prior convention
questions were defeated bolsters one’s support (approval and/or loyalty) for the constitution.
Conditions 2 and 3 test for this prime: Condition 2 (“negative prime”) presents the article found
in Condition 1 but with a new paragraph near the end highlighting how past convention referenda
were rejected by voters (using the actual vote margins). Conversely, Condition 3 (“positive
prime”) emphasizes a series of past referenda that were approved by voters, suggesting that
voters in the past have been critical of the state’s constitution, albeit earlier versions. Knowledge
that voters have voted to fundamentally review the state constitution may work against the
document’s institutional approval and loyalty.
Subjects
Subjects were 251 undergraduates at Wayne State University recruited through
introductory American government courses (1000 level). Students were asked to participate in
an anonymous survey exploring students’ knowledge and feelings towards the federal and
Michigan state constitutions. Participation was voluntary; students wishing to participate
completed an in-person survey during regular class time. Persons opting to not participate were
free to sit quietly during the survey’s administration. (For more information on selection
procedures and safeguards, see the relevant discussion in Chapter 3.) Steps were taken to ensure
that students did not take the survey twice, nor were they alerted to the experimental
randomization process (i.e. students received a survey “packet” that already included a random
treatment condition). In my sample, 46 percent were male, and 54 percent were female (with 7
invalid or missing responses). The average age was 20 years (15 missing). Politically, 67 percent
identified as Democrats, 12 percent as independents, and 21 percent as Republicans (18 missing).
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Ideologically, the sample tilts leftwards on a five-point ideology scale, with a two (2) as the
median ideology score (24 missing). Finally, 50 percent of the sample identifies as Caucasian, 22
percent as African American, 11 percent as Asian American, 4 percent as Latinx, 6 percent as
Arabic/Middle Eastern, and 6 percent reporting other (5 missing). 7
Analysis and Results
Randomization Checks
While a convenience sample, random assignment should produce groups that are
equivalent on initial measures of the dependent and relevant independent factors. The latter
included demographic and sociopolitical characteristics, as well as prior knowledge on Michigan’s
periodic conventions and institutional attitudes towards federal and state institutions.
Preliminary tests suggest that randomization worked: ANOVAs (for ratio-level variables), KruskalWallis H tests (for ordinal-level variables), and chi-squares (for nominal-level variables) revealed
no significant differences for any pre-test measure across all four conditions. This includes initial
measures of constitutional approval and loyalty, where all conditions reported similar pre-test
measures.8 Finally, of the 251 subjects, 62 were assigned to Condition 0 (“control”); 79 to
Condition 1 (“more information”); 55 to Condition 2 (“negative prime”); and 55 to Condition 3
(“positive prime”).

Subjects coded as “other” include those identifying as Native American, Pacific Islander, or mixed race. Only four
subjects identified as Native American or Pacific Islander, explaining why I report them here with other categories.
Note that all percentages reported here may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
8
Analysis of missing data on dependent and independent factors by experimental condition also yielded nonsignificant results.
7
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Michigan Results
Having established equal groups, I now test my hypotheses (see Table 6 for a summary of
hypotheses and results). There are three dependent variables of interest: how likely one supports
a federal or state constitutional convention, constitutional approval, and constitutional loyalty. 9
I first examine Michigan-level findings before considering whether the experiment (aimed
primarily at Michigan constitutional support) also affected federal constitutional feelings. In
conducting my analysis, I run one-way ANOVAs to ascertain whether the dependent variables
varied among the conditions. ANOVAs, or a one-way analysis of variance, permits researchers to
determine if three or more independent (unrelated) groups differ significantly on an outcome
variable by examining the variance among group means. As used here, ANOVA provides a
statistical test for whether the group means are equal, noting if the means are significantly
different from one another. Should significant differences be found, post-hoc tests are used to
identify which groups significantly differ from one another (using a pairwise comparison of
means). While there exists multiple post-hoc methods, I use the Bonferroni method since I have
four conditions (control, more information, negative prime, and positive prime) and each
condition varies in sample size (see above) (thus, I opt for a post-hoc test that is more
conservative in correcting for Type I errors). I also report effect sizes (Eta-squares, η2) where
appropriate. 10

Constitutional loyalty is, again, measured using the subject’s average response to all four diffuse support
statements. As noted in Chapter 4 (footnote 3), I created alternative measures to capture one’s constitutional
loyalty. While the findings reported herein are based on the mean response, other analyses conducted using the
alternative measures yielded no substantial differences. This is true for both federal and state-level findings.
10
Effect size indicates how strong the difference is between means. Eta-squares are a measure of explained
variation, or how much of the variance in the group mean (dependent variable) is explained by the independent
variable.
9
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Table 6.
Hypotheses: Summary and Results
Hypothesis

Expectation

Hypothesis 1a

More information about periodic conventions increases
subject’s mean constitutional loyalty

Hypothesis 1b

Hypothesis 2a

Hypothesis 2b

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 4

More information about periodic conventions increases
subject’s constitutional approval score
Informed periodic conventions rejected by voters
increases subject’s mean constitutional loyalty
Informed periodic conventions rejected by voters
increases subject’s constitutional approval score
More information about periodic conventions decreases
subject’s likelihood of voting for a convention

Subjects less familiar with periodic conventions will be
more susceptible to treatments than subjects with
greater familiarity

Results

No significant differences

No significant differences

No significant differences

Yes, but scores decreased

No significant differences
No significant differences
among subjects with
greater familiarity, but
only for constitutional
approval

Concerning Michigan, the experiment produced mixed results. For constitutional loyalty,
the one-way ANOVA did not indicate significant differences between the groups (F(3234) = 0.15,
p = 0.927). 11 Constitutional loyalty scores did not significantly vary between any of the conditions.
These results cast doubt that more information about periodic conventions (specifically that a
convention can replace the constitution) increases one’s loyalty towards the charter itself
(Hypothesis 1a). Moreover, priming voters about past periodic conventions (whether approved
or rejected) does not seem to matter (Hypothesis 2a); subjects informed that prior conventions

It is not standard practice within the literature to illustratively report ANOVA tables, and I adhere to this practice
throughout the dissertation. Formal ANOVA tables are available upon request.
11
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had been rejected (“negative prime”) did not differ in their mean constitutional loyalty from
subjects told that prior conventions had been approved (“positive prime”).
However, a different picture is painted for constitutional approval. The results of a oneway ANOVA show a significant difference between the conditions (F(3,222) = 3.06, p = 0.029),
indicating constitutional approval scores differed. Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that
subjects informed that prior conventions were approved (Condition 3, 𝑦𝑦�= 3.43; 𝑠𝑠 = 0.84) had

significantly larger mean constitutional approval scores than those told that prior conventions
were rejected by voters (Condition 2, 𝑦𝑦�= 2.96; 𝑠𝑠 = 0.81; p = 0.019). However, there were no
statistically significant differences between the other conditions. Results are graphically
illustrated in Figure 3. 12

I opt to not visually report non-significant findings. Therefore, only significant findings are illustrated here and
for the remainder of the chapter.

12
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Figure 3.
Michigan Constitutional Approval Scores by Experimental Condition
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval score presented on five-point scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

These results are somewhat intriguing, and do not square with my hypothetical
expectations. The lack of significant findings except between the differing primes discounts
Hypothesis 1b’s expectation that subjects exposed to more information about a periodic
convention will express greater constitutional approval. Instead, the significant difference
between Conditions 2 and 3 illustrates how additional information about a periodic convention
is only meaningful if it includes a prime: knowing how other conventions were decided by voters
and that a convention can replace the constitution induces changes in constitutional approval,
although the effect size is small (η2 = 0.04). However, I hypothesized (Hypothesis 2b) that the
negative prime (Condition 2, i.e. prior conventions were rejected) would galvanize support for
the current charter relative those told that prior conventions had been approved (Condition 3).
This is also in line with Madison’s assertion in Federalist 49: voters would provide further support
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for charters they knew were previously upheld rather than subject to a convention. Results here
point to the opposite conclusion: knowing that prior conventions were approved – and thus
subjected the charter to revision and, ultimately, replacement – induced greater constitutional
approval in subjects. I further discuss this finding, below.
I also examine whether subjects’ likelihood of voting for a periodic convention was
different among the treatments. My general expectation (Hypothesis 3) is that subjects exposed
to more information about a periodic convention will express lower likelihoods of electorally
supporting a periodic convention. A one-way ANOVA suggests this is not the case; there are no
statistically significant differences between conditions (F(3,244) = 1.14, p = 0.333). This is not
terribly unsurprising given the null findings for constitutional loyalty; constitutional status quo
bias likely serves as a considerable barrier already, and the treatment was not enough to
overcome it. Madison would certainly take comfort here!
However, there is a further possibility that those with prior knowledge about Michigan’s
periodic convention mechanism may react differently than those more ignorant (Hypothesis 4).
As Langton and Jennings (1968) found, students less familiar with political information and events
found their civics courses in high school more meaningful compared to students who had prior
exposure. For example, African American students’ political knowledge, political efficacy, and
tolerance levels increased at greater rates compared to their more informed and experienced
white peers. A similar “redundancy” effect may be at work here; subjects with a better
understanding of periodic conventions will be less influenced by the treatment. 13 To test for this
potentiality, I use the “prior knowledge” scale described above to re-estimate my ANOVAs.

13

Level of constitutional knowledge may work in a similar fashion, a proposition I explore in Chapter 6.
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Summary statistics suggest that there is a great degree of ignorance on Michigan’s
periodic conventions. Approximately 64 percent of subjects correctly identified that Michigan
has a state constitution, although 34 percent were unsure (only 2 percent incorrectly identified
Michigan as having no charter). 14 Concerning the frequency of periodic conventions, only 16
percent correctly noted it was true; 13 percent indicated it was false, with the vast majority of
subjects (71 percent) unsure. Finally, about a quarter (24 percent) knew that a periodic
convention could revise and replace the present Michigan constitution; a small percentage (4)
thought it could not, while 71 percent were unsure. The resulting additive index of correct
answers ranged from 0 correct answers (33 percent of subjects) to 3 (all) correct answers (only 9
percent). Most subjects (72 percent) had one or no correct answers (ostensibly many only
correctly noting that Michigan had a state constitution), providing motivation for replicating the
above analyses controlling for prior periodic convention knowledge.
In replicating my ANOVAs, I recode the additive index of prior periodic convention
knowledge into a dichotomous measure, pooling incorrect and “Don’t Know” responses together
(see footnote 5, above). Those with one or no correct answers were coded as “low prior
knowledge” with subjects providing two or three correct answers labeled as “high prior
knowledge.” I re-run the above analyses using the prior convention knowledge dummy as a
grouping variable (i.e. ANOVAs are produced for each level of prior knowledge). No significant
differences among levels of prior knowledge emerges in these new ANOVAs, keeping with prior
findings, except for constitutional approval. Like before, significant differences in constitutional

Relative prior work (Lyons, Jaeger, and Wolak 2012, where 54 percent of respondents incorrectly identified their
state as not having a constitution), this is a better-than-expected result!
14
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approval scores emerges between Conditions 2 (“negative prime”) and 3 (“positive prime”), but
only for those with low prior periodic convention knowledge (F(3,158) = 3.53, p = 0.016). 15
Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicate that subjects exposed to the negative prime (𝑦𝑦�= 2.75; 𝑠𝑠 = 0.77)

had lower approval scores than the positive prime group (𝑦𝑦�= 3.35; 𝑠𝑠 = 0.92; p = 0.01). The effect

is also stronger than observed in the original run (η2 = 0.06). Results are graphically presented in
Figure 4.
Figure 4.
Michigan Constitutional Approval Scores by Prior Knowledge
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval score presented on a five-point scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

What these findings suggest is that, again, more information about a periodic convention
must be accompanied by a prime in order to have a meaningful impact. However, the effect

15

One-way ANOVA results for those with greater prior knowledge were non-significant (F(3,59) = 1.21, p = 0.316).
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appears to be limited to those unfamiliar with Michigan’s periodic convention. The moderate
effect size also indicates that the treatment matters more for those uninformed. Yet, the positive
prime still induces stronger constitutional approval rather than the hypothesized negative prime.
I return to this finding in the discussion section, below, but at least note here that it appears
Madison’s logic in Federalist 49 was incorrect: knowing that prior generations voted to keep a
constitution (by rejecting periodic conventions) does not generate greater support for it. Rather,
the opposite is true; knowing prior conventions have been supported (and possibly replaced the
constitution) produces greater approval of the present charter.
Federal Results
I now turn to federal results for the three dependent variables. While the experiment
deals with Michigan’s periodic convention mechanism, it is prudent to examine whether subjects’
federal constitutional feelings change in response to a state-level stimulus. While the federal
constitution has no history of periodic conventions (nor being subject to a revising convention),
perhaps a “warmglow” effect occurs – or state level feelings on periodic conventions bleed into
federal thinking, similar to what Zink and Dawes (2016) find (see also Chapter 4 for a discussion).
To this end, I run another series of ANOVAs to test for whether levels of federal constitutional
loyalty, constitutional approval, and likelihood of supporting a federal constitutional convention
vary with the treatments.
Results paint a mixed picture. On federal constitutional loyalty, the one-way ANOVA did
not indicate significant differences between the conditions (F(3,238) = 1.07, p = 0.361). Similar
null findings were observed for likelihood of voting for a federal constitutional convention
(F(3,245) = 1.05, p = 0.371); the treatments had no effect on subjects’ federal proclivities. These
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findings suggest that, like Michigan, federal constitutional loyalty is unaffected by primes about
periodic conventions. Similarly, subjects’ electoral support for a federal convention appears
unmoved – an expected result given the treatments’ inability to move a person’s diffuse support.
However, federal constitutional approval is affected by the treatments. Per the one-way ANOVA,
significant differences among the conditions occur (F(3,216) = 3.55, p = 0.015). Bonferroni posthoc tests show subjects exposed to a negative prime had lower federal constitutional approval
scores (𝑦𝑦�= 3.06; 𝑠𝑠 = 0.88) than those in the positive prime condition (𝑦𝑦�= 3.28; 𝑠𝑠 = 0.92; p = 0.027),

as depicted in Figure 5. This echoes the Michigan constitutional approval findings, suggesting that
a reverse “warmglow” is occurring (with a moderate effect size, η2 = 0.05); subjects informed
that prior periodic conventions had been rejected not only rated the Michigan constitution lower
but correspondingly offered a frostier evaluation of the federal charter.
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Figure 5.
Federal Constitutional Approval Scores by Experimental Condition
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval score presented on five-point scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Perhaps these results, though, are different depending on the subject’s familiarity with
Michigan’s periodic convention. Again, I re-run the analyses using the index of prior periodic
convention knowledge described above, but this time using federal-level dependent variables.
One-way ANOVAs do not find significant differences among the groups for either federal
constitutional loyalty or the likelihood of supporting a federal constitutional convention.
However, and like in the Michigan re-runs, federal constitutional approval does significantly differ
among the conditions for those with low prior periodic convention knowledge (F(3,156) = 5.26,
p = 0.002). 16 Bonferroni post-hoc tests determined that subjects in the negative prime (𝑦𝑦�= 2.83;
𝑠𝑠 = 0.75) had significantly lower federal constitutional approval scores than subjects in the

16

Subjects with greater prior knowledge did not significantly differ among conditions (F(3,55) = 1.39, p = 0.255).
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positive prime (𝑦𝑦�= 3.3.53; 𝑠𝑠 = 0.93; p = 0.004), as shown in Figure 6. Taken together with the
former findings on federal constitutional approval, it appears the reverse “warmglow” is
moderately occurring among subjects more ignorant of periodic conventions (η2 = 0.09). This is
an unsurprising result given that low prior knowledge subjects were also more susceptible to the
negative prime in the Michigan analysis.
Figure 6.
Federal Constitutional Approval Scores by Prior Knowledge
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval score presented on a five-point scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Discussion
Collectively, these findings challenge the expectations in the literature and those
proffered by Madison and others. Only one hypothesized relationship was fully supported by my
analyses (Hypothesis 4; see also Table 6 above); the rest were largely unsupported or countered
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by alternative patterns. Given these results, three, interrelated observations can be made. First,
it appears that primes about periodic conventions – noting the existential threat they represent
to constitutions – have minimal, if any, effect on either Michigan or federal constitutional loyalty.
Providing subjects with additional information about what periodic conventions can do did not
result in significant differences in a person’s constitutional loyalty. Similarly, priming subjects to
think about prior conventions (either those rejected or supported) did not induce greater or
lower loyalty. This runs squarely contrary to Madison’s argument in Federalist 49 that persons
knowing that prior conventions were rejected (i.e. the charter was deliberately kept by previous
generations) would exhibit greater loyalty towards the constitution.
This null finding, though, is not entirely unexpected. Institutional loyalty (or diffuse
support) is meant to be a reliable well-spring of support for an institution. It should not be
influenced by short-term assessments. While periodic conventions represent a fundamental
threat to constitutional integrity, they are infrequent. Michigan’s periodic convention ballot
question, moreover, is relatively a short-term threat, too; it occurs once every 16 years and
during only one election that cycle. Given the general status quo bias that exists among
Americans (albeit to a lesser extent at the state level; see Zink and Dawes 2016), it is not
surprising that constitutional loyalty remained unaffected by the treatments. This also helps
explain why the treatments did not generate greater Michigan constitutional loyalty (or bleed
into federal constitutional loyalty) among the negative and positive prime conditions: subjects’
constitutional loyalties are resilient (as is the nature of diffuse support generally) and designed
to counteract negative and positive information that may compromise constitutional integrity.
Moreover, this result is replicated when measuring subjects’ likelihood of voting for a state or
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federal constitutional convention; the conditions did not significantly vary, again pointing to an
entrenched opposition to fundamental constitutional change.
And yet, state constitutions have been replaced and amended (i.e. their integrities
violated) far more frequently than the federal charter (Dinan 2009). Perhaps the way
constitutional change is presented to voters affects (or rather overcomes) their underlying
loyalties. Priming voters to think about how past conventions were rejected (approved), for
example, may lead to greater (lower) constitutional support. While this is not the case for
constitutional loyalty, it is indeed the case for constitutional approval. This leads me to my second
observation: priming does matter for a constitution’s specific support, at both the state and
federal levels. It appears that periodic conventions induce a short-term reassessment of
constitutional satisfaction, as evidenced by the significant differences in approval scores between
the negative and positive primes. Thus, just providing greater information about how a
convention can wholescale replace a constitution is not enough; a prime makes the statement
more meaningful.
What is surprising about the priming, though, is how approval decreases for those
exposed to a negative prime. This is somewhat counter-intuitive. The logic of a negative prime is
that if prior constitutional conventions were rejected by voters, then there is an implicit message
that earlier generations have continuously endorsed the present constitution (see Brennan
2017). Subsequently, subjects in this condition should exhibit higher approval scores; they did
not. Instead, those informed that prior conventions had been approved, ultimately replacing the
constitution, expressed greater approval for the present charter. Meantime, the implicit
assumption in the positive prime is that it is okay to do-away with the constitution. Yet, previous
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studies suggest that primes emphasizing risks (see Eckles and Schaffner 2011; Kam and Simas
2012) should engender opposition to the proposed changes, or, in this example, greater
constitutional approval.
I propose two explanations for this finding. On the one hand, my subjects are likelier to
express lower constitutional approval given their ages. As Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016)
found, younger persons have lower constitutional approval scores than older persons. Thus, for
a college student who is already likely to express disapproval with a constitution, it is not
surprising to see that a negative prime (that the constitution continues to survive) may encourage
the individual to express dissatisfaction with it. Yet, merely providing subjects with information
about the role of a periodic convention (Condition 1) did not evidence any changes in approval.
This suggests that something else with the prime is at work and may be a consequence of the
college student sample being afforded an opportunity to express dissatisfaction. Additionally, the
positive prime may be working as intended; by priming subjects to believe that it is okay to
replace the constitution, subjects’ risk aversion may have activated, causing them to express
greater approval of the current constitution simply because it is the status quo (see Kim and
Simas 2012; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
Periodic conventions, therefore, influence a constitution’s specific and diffuse support
differently, and impact at both the state and federal levels. Constitutional approval is affected by
relatively short-term events, like periodic conventions, that prompt momentary reconsiderations
of the charter. However, one’s diffuse support remains unaffected. This can be seen in the
significant results between the negative and positive primes: while approval scores decreased in
the negative prime condition, the same condition did not see a change in one’s constitutional
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loyalty or likelihood of supporting a constitutional convention relative the other conditions. In
the larger debate about whether specific and diffuse support empirically differ (see, e.g., Caldeira
and Gibson 1992; Davidson and Parker 1972; and Gibson and Caldeira 1992; see also the relevant
discussion in Chapter 4), these experimental results would suggest they do. I also note that there
appears to be a reverse “warmglow” effect present, at least where it concerns constitutional
approval. My findings illustrate that the periodic convention treatments aimed at Michigan also
transferred into federal constitutional feelings. Subjects in the negative prime expressed both
lower Michigan and federal constitutional approval compared to the positive prime subjects.
Where Zink and Dawes (2016) found that federal constitutional feelings underscored state
constitutional feelings (serving as a convenient default or foundation), I find a similar
phenomenon here, albeit reversed: periodic conventions at the state level also influence the
subjects’ federal constitutional approval.
Finally, a third observation is that periodic conventions influence subjects differently
depending on their prior knowledge of the mechanism. Subjects who expressed greater
familiarity with Michigan’s periodic convention mechanism were unaffected by the treatments.
Instead, the significant differences uncovered between the negative and positive primes
concerning constitutional approval were driven by those largely ignorant of periodic conventions.
Practically, this suggests that efforts to pass (or defeat) a periodic convention proposal likely turn
on low-information voters who, in the face of new information, reevaluate their views. But this
is limited to constitutional approval, or the constitution’s specific support; there is no difference
on constitutional loyalty scores, suggesting that constitutional status quo bias is more universally
held.
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Collectively, these findings also point to a more general role played by knowledge in
constitutional loyalty and approval. If varying prior knowledge on periodic conventions qualified
results, then perhaps greater knowledge about the charter itself will also factor. Prior studies on
constitutional approval indicate this is the case, finding that educational attainment, general
familiarity with politics (e.g. attentive news consumption), and greater familiarity with a charter
produce higher approval (see, e.g., Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016). But does this
relationship hold for constitutional loyalty? Moreover, prior studies rely on self-described levels
of constitutional knowledge rather than an actual measure. It could be that this relationship is
non-existent. Since my sample controls for educational attainment automatically, I can measure
and test the effect of actual constitutional knowledge as both a predictor of constitutional loyalty
and its role in the experiment. I explore these propositions in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 – THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE
I now turn to my final empirical results: What role does constitutional knowledge play in
predicting constitutional loyalty? Do more constitutionally knowledgeable persons react
differently to periodic conventions than those less informed? In answering these questions, I
expand upon the analyses done thus far and revise conclusions tentatively drawn. First, I present
a theoretical overview of the interplay between civic knowledge (including news consumption
and constitutional knowledge) and constitutional support, drawing upon prior works. Specifically,
I note how prior works fail to capture actual constitutional knowledge; instead, the standard
operationalization is to ask respondents to self-describe their (alleged) familiarity with a charter.
This raises validity concerns that I attempt to remedy with a new measurement scheme for both
federal and Michigan constitutional knowledge. After discussing these measures, I re-evaluate
the results presented in Chapters 4 and 5, extending my analyses to include controls for two
facets of civic knowledge: attentiveness to national/local news and level of constitutional
knowledge. Finally, I conclude by discussing implications and limitations.
Civic Knowledge and Its Influence on Constitutional Support
Theory
The institutional support literature suggests that knowledge about the institution impacts
one’s support towards it. However, the relationship varies depending on the institution. Work by
Gibson and colleagues find that persons who know more about the U.S. Supreme Court also
express greater loyalty towards it (see Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2009b; Gibson, Caldeira, and
Baird 1998; and Gibson and Nelson 2015), a phenomenon known as “positivity bias.” Conversely,
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 2002) found that those who knew the most about Congress
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were also the same persons who liked it the least. Others (Jones and McDermott 2002; Mondak
et al., 2007) have found a similar relationship concerning Congress’s specific support, or
institutional approval, although Mondak et al. (2007) note this is likely due to differences in how
high knowledge and low knowledge persons evaluate Congress, not because of knowledge’s
direct effect. 1 Thus, institutional knowledge appears to impact an institution’s specific and diffuse
support.
Prior works on constitutional support indirectly control for levels of constitutional
knowledge. Blake and Levinson (2016) and Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) found that
better educated subjects (e.g. high school graduates versus bachelor’s degree holders) tended to
express greater support for the U.S. Constitution and their state charter (or, in the former study’s
case, less supportive of holding a federal constitutional convention). However, this is a proxy
measure; an implicit assumption that greater education corresponds with greater knowledge
about governmental institutions generally. In their comprehensive accounting of constitutional
approval, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) ask respondents to assess their own familiarity
with their state constitution’s content as well as the federal charter’s (on a five-point scale, with
five indicating greater familiarity). This self-described measure is a better direct approximation
of constitutional knowledge. Beyond constitutional knowledge, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg
(2016) also test the impact of more general public affairs knowledge on constitutional approval.
They ask two questions on news consumption habits, or how often the subject follows national
and local news. Collectively, these measures form a common dimension of civic knowledge.

Mondak et al. (2007, 42-47) show that high-knowledge persons evaluate Congress’s job performance based on
whether the institution conforms with their preferred policies (i.e. policy congruence), while low-knowledge
individuals make assessments based on their views of the sitting president.

1
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Using these measures, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) find that civic knowledge
matters in predicting constitutional approval. In general, those expressing greater knowledge of
the federal constitution rated the document significantly higher than low-knowledge persons.
The same relationship held for attentiveness to national news. Similar relationships were
observed for state constitutional approval. In the study’s unified regression models, moreover,
both news consumption and charter knowledge remained highly significant and substantively
impactful alongside the significant roles of institutional attitudes, race, and age. These findings,
though, address only constitutional approval, or specific support; no study has addressed the
impact of charter knowledge (or news consumption) on constitutional loyalty, or diffuse
support. 2
Importantly, two caveats must be acknowledged with these findings on constitutional
approval, both noted by Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016). First, the measures are selfreported; respondents were not assessed on actual constitutional knowledge or news
consumption habits. Thus, the findings offer tentative evidence of a relationship between
constitutional approval and civic knowledge. Moreover, participants with greater charter
knowledge fared no better on Stephanopoulos and Versteeg’s (2016) survey reading
comprehension quizzes than low-knowledge respondents, further evidence that self-reported
knowledge may differ from genuine familiarity. 3 Second, it is possible that respondents felt they
were more familiar with their constitutions because they approved (or supported) them. Thus,

As a reminder, constitutional approval refers to one’s current satisfaction with or feelings about the charter.
Constitutional loyalty, meantime, reflects the subject’s underlying, long-term commitment to the charter and its
institutional integrity.
3
These surveys were designed to assess whether the respondent had actually read and understood the survey’s
treatment. Coincidentally, they also provided a further test of whether low- and high-knowledge persons differed.
2

120

both “support and professed familiarity stem from the same general positive attitude toward the
documents” (Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016, 145). Little research has addressed this
psychological aspect of knowledge, with the literature on political knowledge focusing almost
exclusively on actual rather than professed knowledge (for a review, see Delli Carpini and Keeter
1996). Combined, these caveats suggest that a different conceptualization and measurement
scheme are needed to better evaluate the impact of civic knowledge generally, and charter
knowledge specifically, on constitutional approval and loyalty.
Measuring Actual Constitutional Knowledge
Measuring actual levels of constitutional knowledge, though, is difficult given that no
formal battery or measure exists to do so beyond self-purported questions. This is true at both
the federal and, especially, state levels. Yet, actual demonstrations of constitutional knowledge
are ostensibly more valid than merely asking if one knows a great deal about a charter. Indeed,
social desirability bias (Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg 1991) likely overestimates the degree of
familiarity given the importance of the U.S. Constitution as the nation’s civic creed; to express
little knowledge of it can be construed as unpatriotic (see Blake and Levinson 2016). Instead,
asking questions about the constitution’s content is a better way to ascertain whether the subject
has actual familiarity with the charter’s content or not.
To measure actual constitutional knowledge, I look towards the political knowledge and
civic education literatures for conceptualization and measurement strategies. While there is
disagreement over how best to measure political knowledge, there appears to be “consensus on
the central importance of the individual’s ability to understand and retain concrete political facts”
(Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996, 22). Today, Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996, 304-306) five-
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question battery is considered the gold standard in political science. The five questions, based off
items asked on the American National Election Studies survey, range in difficulty from easy to
complex, while measuring different kinds of political knowledge (e.g. knowledge of democratic
norms, political officials, and current facts; see also Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996, 22-25 for
further elaboration). Questions on the federal constitution appearing in professional and
scholastic surveys often follow this conceptualization: factual knowledge on constitutional
norms, principles, and/or practices, with many being open-ended. Green and colleagues (2011)
provide a convenient example: To operationalize knowledge of constitutional principles, they
focus on students’ understanding of civil and political rights accorded by the Bill of Rights and
other amendments. This approach – operationalizing constitutional knowledge in terms of rights
– may be appropriate given the dominance of the Bill of Rights in civics instruction (see Glendon
1993). Nonetheless, the structural principles (e.g. institutional processes and separation of
powers) should not be ignored.
I employ two different approaches to capture federal and state constitutional knowledge.
For federal constitutional knowledge, I ask six questions designed to assess subjects’ factual
understanding in three areas: structural factors; principles and norms; and general facts. In line
with Gibson and Caldeira’s (2009b) critique of political knowledge surveys, I eschew open-ended,
recall questions in favor of closed-ended inquiries stressing recognition. Utilized this way,
subjects are far likelier to answer questions correctly, demonstrating less ignorance than recall
questions would suggest (but see Luskin and Bullock 2011). 4 My questions are adapted or

I also aim for a “humbler” conceptualization of ignorance (Gibson and Caldeira 2009b). Like Lupia (2006), Gibson
and Caldeira (2009b) argue that the public’s purported ignorance on civic and political issues is significantly

4
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inspired from various surveys, including the Annenberg Public Policy Center’s annual Constitution
Day Civics Survey; the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) civics exam; the
American National Election Studies; and prior works on political and civic knowledge (e.g. Delli
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gainous and Martens 2012; Green et al., 2011; and Niemi and Junn
1998). Green et al. (2011) and Niemi and Junn (1998), in particular, provide convenient question
verbiage and usefulness in establishing which questions are better for discriminatory power. 5
Questions selected reflect their high frequency appearing on multiple political knowledge
surveys. To discourage guessing and artificially inflating knowledge scores, each question
included a “Don’t Know” response (DK), with the battery preceded by Delli Caprini and Keeter’s
(1996) recommended disclaimer informing subjects it is okay to be unsure (see note for Table 7,
below). 6

overstated since political knowledge surveys are biased towards facts that scholars think citizens ought to know,
rather than a practical understanding.
5
Green and colleagues used high school students for their study, signifying that their questions may be especially
prudent to use on college students with varying civics backgrounds.
6
There is debate in the literature about whether DK responses are overestimating, underestimating, or otherwise
producing differences in political knowledge among sub-populations, including the genders. For illustrious
accounts, compare Mondak and Anderson (2004) and Luskin and Bullock (2011). I opt to encourage DK responses
since I conceptualize one as either knowing constitutional content or not. Therefore, if one incorrectly answers a
question or expresses uncertainty, the net result is the same: the subject is unfamiliar.
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Table 7.
Federal Constitutional Knowledge Questions

Item
U.S. Senator Term of Office
Congress 2/3 Override Veto
Bill of Rights Name
Judicial Review & SCOTUS
Freedom of Religion
President Nominates Judges

Correct
46
79
93
67
83
71

Percentage
Incorrect
44
11
6
25
11
13

Don’t Know
10
10
1
9
7
17

N
248
250
250
248
247
248

Note: Data taken from post-test battery. Percentages are calculated using collapsed variables (i.e. all incorrect
answers were pooled together). Due to rounding, percentages may not sum to 100.
Question wording is as follows (correct response provided in parentheses):
1. U.S. Senator Term of Office: “How long is the term of a U.S. Senator?” (6 years)
2. Congress 2/3 Override Veto: “If Congress passes a law and the President vetoes it, Congress can enact it
anyway with a two-thirds majority vote of both houses.” (True)
3. Bill of Rights Name: “What are the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution called?” (Bill of Rights)
4. Judicial Review & SCOTUS: “Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not?” (Supreme
Court)
5. Freedom of Religion: “Among the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right to:” (Freedom of
Religion)
6. President Nominates Judges: “It is the President’s responsibility to nominate federal judges.” (True)
All questions included the following disclaimer adapted from Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 305): “We are now going
to ask you a few questions concerning your knowledge of the FEDERAL Constitution. Many people don’t know the
answers to these questions, so if there are some you don’t know, select ‘Don’t Know’ and move on.”

Question wording and descriptive statistics appear in Table 7. In general, there is a high
degree of knowledge regarding the federal constitution. Large majorities answered correctly for
all questions save one; only 46 percent correctly identified a U.S. Senator’s term of office as six
years. These results are promising, especially given the college student sample. Since students
were exposed to the U.S. Constitution as part of their class’s curriculum, it appears many retained
a functional understanding of several constitutional features, weeks after when the U.S.
Constitution was formally discussed. Thus, this sample can be used to critically test the theory
that those with greater knowledge about constitutions have higher levels of constitutional
approval and loyalty. To summarize these findings, I create a simple additive index of the number

124

of correct answers (range 0-6). Most participants (52 percent) correctly answered at least five
questions, with less than ten percent answering two or fewer questions correctly. I use this
additive scale in my subsequent analyses.
As an initial test on whether federal constitutional knowledge influences federal
constitutional approval and loyalty, I divide subjects into low and high knowledge using the
federal constitutional knowledge scale’s median score. 7 I expect to see that low knowledge
subjects will approve of the federal constitution at a lower rate than high knowledge subjects,
while low knowledge subjects will have lower constitutional loyalty than high knowledge
subjects. Simple difference of means tests between low and high knowledge subjects on both
constitutional approval and loyalty produce significant results in expected directions. Low
knowledge subjects have a mean approval rating of 3.2 compared to 3.6 for high knowledge
subjects (p=0.000). Meantime, high knowledge subjects express greater average constitutional
loyalty (𝑦𝑦�= 3.4) compared to those with lower levels of knowledge (𝑦𝑦�= 2.9) (p=0.000). On its face,
then, it appears that (actual) constitutional knowledge does influence constitutional approval
and loyalty, confirming expectations associated with positivity bias and prior works.
Turning to assessing knowledge of the Michigan Constitution, an altogether different
approach is necessary. In general, people’s knowledge of their state governments is less than

It is difficult to determine an objective “low” and “high” regarding constitutional knowledge, given the difficulties
inherent in measuring it – especially Michigan constitutional knowledge. One way could be to set a threshold for a
“passing” score (e.g. 80 percent or more correct answers) similar to licensing examinations. I use the median score
for two reasons: (1) constitutional knowledge (for both federal and Michigan) is heavily skewed and (2) this
provides some objectivity relative the sample itself. Given the goal of trying to determine whether those with
greater constitutional familiarity react differently than those who do not, it makes sense to use the underlying
sample’s properties to determine “low” and “high.” Moreover, prior works examining diffuse support (e.g. LaRowe
and Hoekstra 2014) use the median as a basis for dividing their samples into high and low categories. I leave it for
future research to determine a universal baseline for “high” and “low” constitutional knowledge.

7
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their familiarity with the federal government (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Niemi and Junn
1998; Lyons, Jaeger, and Wolak 2013). This holds true for state constitutional knowledge: A
survey by the National Center for State Courts found that 54 percent of respondents incorrectly
responded that their state had no constitution (see Lyons, Jaeger, and Wolak 2013, nt. 1). No
wonder Roeder (1994, 34) has argued that state politics represents an “invisible layer of
government” for most citizens. Measurement of state constitutional knowledge, therefore, is
difficult; if most individuals are unaware that their state even has a constitution, how can one
adequately measure true constitutional knowledge with enough validity?
I propose a recognition measure like the one used by Stephanopoulos and Versteeg
(2016, 134). These authors asked respondents to identify whether they would like to see a
substantive policy provision included in their state’s constitution. Provisions presented were
based on similar ones present in state charters but did not appear in the federal constitution. I
propose a similar exercise to measure the subject’s knowledge of the Michigan state constitution:
present a substantive or structural provision and inquire whether it is part of the Michigan
Constitution of 1963 or not. 8 Subjects able to correctly identify constituent provisions of the
Michigan Constitution are likelier more informed about the document than others.

Zackin (2013) also notes how state constitutions are the repositories for positive, substantive rights in American
constitutional jurisprudence, suggesting that citizens may be more familiar with their state constitutions when
asked about substantive policy provisions. Substantive policy statements or prescriptions, however, are but one
feature of state constitutions, and structural features should not be ignored.

8
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Table 8.
Michigan Constitutional Knowledge Questions

Item
Judge Term of Office
Legislative Term Limits
Death Penalty Prohibition
Education Mandate
Governor Term of Office

Correct
20
34
56
68
32

Percentage
Incorrect
28
15
19
9
25

Don’t Know
52
51
25
23
43

Note: Data taken from post-test battery. Due to rounding, percentages may not sum to 100.

N
247
247
248
247
248

Question wording is as follows (correct response provided in parentheses):
1. Judge Term of Office: “State judges and supreme court justices serve for life.” (Not in the MI Constitution)
2. Legislative Term Limits: “Members of the state legislature serve only a limited number of terms in office
before mandatory retirement.” (In the MI Constitution)
3. Death Penalty Prohibition: “The death penalty is prohibited.” (In the MI Constitution)
4. Education Mandate: “State government is required to provide free, public primary and secondary (5-12)
educational institutions for all residents.” (In the MI Constitution)
5. Governor Term of Office: “The state governor serves for a two-year term.” (Not in the MI Constitution)
All questions included the following disclaimer from Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 305) and subsequently
modified here: “Now we are going to ask you some questions about the MICHIGAN STATE constitution. For each
provision, please indicate whether you think this provision is a part of the MICHIGAN STATE constitution or not. If
you are unsure, select ‘Don’t Know’ and move on.”

These questions and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 8. As one can quickly
identify, these data paint a mixed picture regarding Michigan constitutional knowledge. A
substantial amount of uncertainty is recorded for each question as evidenced by the Don’t Know
(DK) category. DK responses represent a majority for questions on whether judges serve life
terms (52.2 percent; they do not) and whether Michigan state legislators are term limited (51
percent; yes, they are), while 43.5 percent of subjects are unsure if the state governor serves a
two-year term (the Michigan governor serves a four-year term). Only 19.8, 34, and 31.8 percent,
respectively, of subjects correctly answered these questions. The general ignorance of judicial,
legislative, and executive terms can be explained by a few factors: First, subjects may be
confusing federal and state judges, although a more generous interpretation is that subjects did
recognize that there may be a difference between the two kinds given the high DK response.
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However, given that incorrect responses (27.9 percent) outnumbered correct responses (19.8
percent), it appears many subjects may simply have transferred federal knowledge onto a
corresponding state institution. Second, other Michigan political knowledge surveys have found
a high degree of ignorance surrounding Michigan’s legislative term limits. Armaly and Black
(2016), for example, found that only 45 percent of Michiganders knew that state legislators were
subject to term limits. Third, there appears to be general confusion regarding the gubernatorial
term; while roughly 32 percent correctly noted that the Michigan Constitution did not create a
two-year gubernatorial tenure, about a fourth did, with the rest expressing uncertainty. 9
Conversely, majorities did correctly identify that the Michigan Constitution prohibits the
death penalty (55.6 percent) and requires the state to provide primary and secondary education
(68.4 percent). Of the policy provisions presented, these two are likely more commonly
highlighted (in the media and elsewhere) than the others. Michigan’s death penalty prohibition
was the first in the nation, a fact usually shared during death penalty discussions. Moreover,
many subjects likely encountered firsthand the state’s mandate for primary and secondary
education, thus knowing (or at least logically reasoning) that the requirement extends from a
constitutional mandate (see also Zackin 2013).

There may be an additional issue with how these questions were worded. Both statements on judicial and
gubernatorial terms are not only absent in the Michigan constitution but they also are factually incorrect (i.e.
Michigan judges serve fixed-terms and the governor has a four-year tenure). Thus, both statements are measuring
more than just whether the provision appears in the Michigan charter. This may explain some of the DK responses.
I do not drop these questions, though, in constructing the knowledge index because: (1) the already limited
amount of questions asked; (2) the importance of including structural features of the constitution; and (3) it is
likely that subjects, especially those unfamiliar with the state constitution, were making “double-barred”
assessments in terms of identifying whether the provision was true of Michigan generally and if it was included in
the constitution or not.

9
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To summarize these findings, I again create a simple additive index of Michigan
constitutional knowledge. This scale ranges from zero to five correct answers. Most subjects
scored an average of two correct answers out of five, a failing score. The bulk of respondents
(approximately 65 percent) identified two or fewer provisions correctly. Perfect scores were rare
(1.2 percent), while a sizable amount (13 percent) identified zero provisions correctly.
Collectively, these findings suggest subjects are far less familiar with their state charter than the
federal. I use this additive scale in the below analyses.
However, I provide an initial test here on whether Michigan constitutional approval and
loyalty differ based on level of Michigan constitutional knowledge. Like above, I divide subjects
into low and high knowledge by using the Michigan constitutional knowledge scale’s median
score. 10 Again, I expect that low knowledge subjects will disapprove of the Michigan constitution
more than high knowledge subjects, while also expressing lower constitutional loyalty. Difference
of means tests produce trivial and insignificant differences. For constitutional approval, low
knowledge subjects have a lower mean (3.1) than those with greater knowledge (3.2), but these
means are not significantly different from each other (p=0.699). Likewise, there is no difference
in Michigan constitutional loyalty: low and high knowledge subjects express the same average
loyalty for the Michigan charter (3.1; p=0.271). These findings differ from the federal pattern
noted above and run contrary to the expectations in the literature. However, this is just a
descriptive inquiry; regression analyses, below, help to better estimate the causal effect.
One final observation: It should be noted that these batteries (both federal and state) are
likely to produce rough approximations of citizen constitutional knowledge. For federal

10

See footnote 7 (above).
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constitutional knowledge, the emphasis on “rights rhetoric” (Glendon 1991) in most
constitutional curricula suggests that subjects will perform better on questions geared towards
Bill of Rights knowledge rather than the Constitution’s structural and institutional features (e.g.
office terms, separation of powers, and the like). My sample, however, is composed of college
students in American government courses, explaining the high accuracy rate; compared to the
general American population, my scale measure may be overestimating actual federal
constitutional knowledge. Concerning Michigan constitutional knowledge, citizens tend to
perform poorly on measures assessing state politics and government generally (see, e.g.,
Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992 and Lyons, Jaeger, and Wolak 2013), and are also unable to
transfer conceptual knowledge of national institutions to corresponding state constitutions
(Niemi and Junn 1998). 11 As evidenced, it is likely that general knowledge of one’s state charter
is likewise missing from most citizens’ minds. While I believe these batteries represent valid first
attempts at establishing actual, rather than self-professed, constitutional knowledge, they are
not perfect; in Chapter 7, I explore the limitations associated with these measures further, and
task future research with improving the scheme developed here.
The Other Factor: Measuring News Consumption
Constitutional knowledge, though, is but one factor within the civic knowledge
dimension; the other concerns national and local news consumption. Individuals more attentive
to national or local news may be more informed about the federal and their state charters from
media exposure to the documents. I test for this possibility by using Stephanopoulos and

For instance, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) civics examinees were able to correctly
identify Congress as the national legislative branch but could not do so regarding their state’s equivalent legislative
assembly.
11
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Versteeg’s (2016) approach; subjects are asked (on the pre-test) how closely they follow national
and local news, with responses ranging from “never” to “almost daily.” 12 Most subjects do not
closely follow the news; 51 percent indicated they followed national news only 3 or 4 times a
month or less, while about 55 percent said the same for local news. These findings are somewhat
surprising, given that college-educated persons are usually more attentive to national and local
news (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), but may simply be an artifact of my college student
sample. 13 I use both scales in my analyses below.
I provide here, though, an initial examination of whether constitutional approval and
loyalty differ by news consumption habits alone. Using each measure’s median score (each range
from 0-5), I divide subjects into those that closely follow national/local news and those that do
not. Subjects more attentive to national/local news should express greater constitutional
approval and loyalty than those less attentive. Results, however, run contrary to expectations
(running difference in means tests): For federal constitutional approval, there is no difference in
average approval (𝑦𝑦�= 3.4; p = 0.671) between those who closely follow the news and those who

do not. Similar findings are observed for federal constitutional loyalty (𝑦𝑦�= 3.2; p = 0.643). This

pattern is replicated at the state level using local news attentiveness: Michigan constitutional

approval does not differ among low and high local news watchers (𝑦𝑦�= 3.2; p = 0.743); the same
goes for Michigan constitutional loyalty (𝑦𝑦�= 3.1; p = 0.472). On its own, then, news consumption

habits do not yield apparent differences in constitutional approval or loyalty, but they may in

The full ordinal response set is: never; hardly ever; a few times a year; 3 or 4 times a month; 2 or 3 times a week;
and almost daily.
13
Given that most young persons get their news through social media exposure (see Bialik and Matsa 2017),
subjects may have misinterpreted the question to mean overt exposure (i.e. reading a physical newspaper,
watching a news program, etc.). However, the questions asked how “closely do you follow” national/local news,
meaning subjects may have answered based on how well they keep tabs on issues versus simple exposure to them.
12
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conjunction with other factors. I further examine the causal knowledge of the civic knowledge
dimension (both news consumption and constitutional knowledge) in the next section.
Does Civic Knowledge Predict Constitutional Loyalty?
In Chapter 4, I tested three dimensions, or predictors, of constitutional loyalty:
demography, political affiliations, and institutional attitudes. I briefly review those findings here.
First, predictors of constitutional loyalty are similar generators of constitutional approval, namely
institutional attitudes; how one thinks about the constitution’s created institutions (e.g. the
President, Congress, or Supreme Court) influences one’s loyalty towards the charter. This is not
true, however, at the state level, where attitudes toward Michigan-level political institutions
matter little in generating Michigan constitutional loyalty. Second, Michigan constitutional
loyalty is influenced by a federal “warmglow” effect (Zink and Dawes 2016), where level of federal
constitutional loyalty influences Michigan constitutional loyalty. It appears that subjects are
transferring analogous feelings at the federal level to a lesser known entity (but still called a
“constitution”) at the state level. Third, and finally, it appears that an individual’s degree of
constitutional approval influences her level of constitutional loyalty; thus, a constitution’s specific
support causally influences its diffuse support.
A key dimension, though, remains unaddressed: What about civic knowledge? Do persons
with greater constitutional familiarity and news attentiveness exhibit similar patterns? In their
comprehensive study on constitutional approval, Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016, 113)
found that self-reported familiarity with the federal charter and national news consumption
frequency were significantly and positively associated with constitutional approval. The same
occurred with state-level variables; greater knowledge of a state charter and being more
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attentive to local news caused state constitutional approval scores to increase. Civic knowledge
and approval “appear to go hand in hand no matter which constitution is at issue”
(Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016, 158).
Analysis
To analyze whether civic knowledge influences constitutional loyalty, I continue my
estimation procedures found in Chapter 4. I add two additional factors onto the current base
model incorporating demographic attributes, political affiliations, and institutional attitudes (i.e.
Chapter 4’s model 3): level of (actual) constitutional knowledge and national/local news
consumption. I replicate these procedures twice: once for federal constitutional loyalty (see
Table 9) and again for Michigan constitutional loyalty (see Table 10). In each model, only
appropriate-level factors are incorporated (i.e. the federal model controls for federal
constitutional knowledge and national news attentiveness). The dependent variable for all
models is the index of constitutional loyalty used in prior chapters, or the mean response for a
subject across all four federal (or state) diffuse support statements. Values range from one to
five, with higher scores indicating greater constitutional loyalty. 14
Federal Results
I start with federal constitutional loyalty. For ease of comparison, Table 9 includes model
3 from Chapter 4 alongside the new models. In this former model, institutional attitudes,
particularly on President Trump and the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS), appear to be

As noted in former chapters, I replicate my regression analyses using alternative dependent variables beyond
this mean score index. These include a factor score, proportion support, and a simple additive index of number of
supportive replies. No significant or substantial differences were found in these alternate estimates for both
federal and state modeling relative the findings reported herein.
14
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driving federal constitutional loyalty. Model 4 continues controlling for these institutional
attitudes, alongside demographic attributes and political affiliations, while adding new variables
on federal constitutional knowledge and national news attentiveness. As the results show,
constitutional loyalty significantly differs among those with varying levels of constitutional
familiarity (p=0.006). For each additional correct answer on federal constitutional knowledge, a
subject’s mean constitutional loyalty increases by approximately 0.4-points while controlling for
other factors. Attentiveness to national news, however, was highly insignificant (p=0.207).
Concerning the other dimensions, demography and political affiliations remained insignificant,
including race and age. Institutional attitudes, however, remained significant; subjects approving
of President Trump’s and the SCOTUS’s job performance expressed higher mean loyalty than
those who did not. 15

As discussed in Chapter 4, I use OLS regression rather than ordered probit techniques despite the ordinal nature
of the dependent variable because: (1) OLS coefficients are easier to interpret and (2) prior works on constitutional
support use OLS regression coefficients despite the technical violations.
15
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Table 9.
Predictors of Federal Constitutional Loyalty

Female
Age
African American
Other Minority
SES
Partisanship
Ideology
Trump Approval
Congress Approval
SCOTUS Approval
Const. Knowledge

Model 3
0.092
(0.126)
0.022
(0.017)
-0.148
(0.166)
-0.18
(0.142)
-0.194*
(0.089)
0.056
(0.054)
-0.053
(0.07)
0.19*
(0.086)
-0.141
(0.086)
0.448***
(0.077)

Model 4
0.056
(0.127)
0.019
(0.017)
-0.15
(0.163)
-0.129
(0.14)
-0.157^
(0.089)
0.031
(0.053)
-0.029
(0.069)
0.17*
(0.085)
-0.086
(0.087)
0.366***
(0.081)
0.137**
(0.049)
-0.06
(0.047)

2.35***
(0.45)

2.02***
(0.493)

Model 5
0.1
(0.12)
0.007
(0.016)
-0.077
(0.155)
-0.031
(0.134)
-0.165^
(0.085)
0.059
(0.051)
-0.058
(0.065)
0.14^
(0.08)
-0.121
(0.083)
0.257**
(0.08)
0.067
(0.049)
-0.05
(0.045)
0.355***
(0.073)
1.54**
(0.474)

151
0.296

149
0.313

145
0.409

News Attentiveness
Const. Approval
Constant
N
Adjusted R2

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures, excepting constitutional knowledge that was derived from the post-test.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ^ p < 0.10

These findings are interesting for several reasons. First, institutional attitudes continue to
positively, and strongly, affect one’s average constitutional loyalty. This is especially true of the
SCOTUS’s specific support; a one-unit increase in SCOTUS’s job approval results in a 0.366-point
increase in the subject’s mean constitutional loyalty. Trump’s job performance provides a more
modest 0.17-point increase, but still a significant bump. The results again reinforce the conclusion
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that constitutions are being evaluated on the performance of its created governmental
institutions, a logical fact given the role of constitutions in creating governments and establishing
the rulebook. Second, constitutional knowledge is positively related to constitutional loyalty,
providing evidence of Gibson and Caldeira’s (2009a) positivity bias; to know the constitution is to
love it. While the magnitude is substantially smaller than what Stephanopoulos and Versteeg
(2016) observed (they found that a one-unit increase in self-described constitutional knowledge
corresponded with a one-point increase in approval), one would expect this is due to the selfdescribed nature of their variable; my measure is a better estimate of actual knowledge of
constitutional topics. Therefore, the relationship between constitutional familiarity and support
is indeed positive but the magnitude is likely more modest than previously found.
Another interesting observation is the null finding for national news attentiveness.
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg (2016) found that federal constitutional approval increased for
respondents more attentive to national news. My analysis casts doubt on this relationship, at
least when it concerns constitutional loyalty and college students. It could be that attentiveness
to national news influences specific support for the constitution but not its underlying diffuse
support given that news reports on constitution-related issues are momentary and contextual,
influencing specific support more so than diffuse support. I test this proposition by running a
regression on federal constitutional approval controlling for national news attentiveness (results
not reported here). I find that while federal constitutional knowledge is significantly and
positively related with constitutional approval, attentiveness to national news fails to reach
significance. While these findings do suggest that national news consumption matters less for
constitutional loyalty, it may also be a construct of my sample; college students generally have
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lower news watching habits (see The Media Insight Project 2015a, 2015b) explaining the null
finding. 16
As discussed in Chapter 4, constitutional approval may be influencing, indeed generating,
constitutional loyalty. While the literature debates whether this should theoretically be possible
(i.e. specific and diffuse support should be conceptually different), empirically a relationship
exists between the two (see Gibson and Caldeira 1992 for a review). Bivariate correlations
indicate a moderate relationship between federal constitutional approval and loyalty (r=0.52).
Prior regression modeling in Chapter 4 also found that constitutional approval is a significant and
positive predictor of federal constitutional loyalty; a one-unit increase in constitutional approval
corresponds with an increase of 0.38-points in mean loyalty. To control for this possible
confounder, therefore, I estimate another model (model 5) that adds the subject’s federal
constitutional approval score alongside all four dimensions: demography, political affiliations,
institutional attitudes, and civic knowledge. Results are presented in Table 9, above.
Several observations can be made. First, the explained variation in model 5 is substantially
larger than the prior models. Constitutional approval and the other dimensions collectively
explain approximately 41 percent of the variation in federal mean constitutional loyalty, a full ten
percent more than model 3. Second, constitutional approval provides a substantial boost in one’s
constitutional loyalty; a one-point increase in constitutional approval increases a subject’s
average constitutional loyalty by 0.355-points, all other factors constant. Third, previously
significant factors lose their significance in this new model. SCOTUS approval remains highly
significant (p=0.002), but its effect is somewhat diminished, while President Trump’s approval no

16

See also footnote 12 (above).
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longer reaches traditional levels of significance (p=0.085). Socioeconomic status, however, is
insignificant by traditional levels (p=0.054) and inversely related to constitutional loyalty; a oneunit increase in socioeconomic class (e.g. middle to upper-class) decreases mean loyalty by
roughly 0.165-points. Finally, demography and political affiliations remain insignificant, including
the race variables.
What to make of these findings? On the one hand, the empirical connection between
constitutional approval and loyalty is unmistakable at the federal level; subjects’ approval rating
of the U.S. Constitution significantly influences their expressed loyalty towards it, but this finding
may be attributable to the college student sample. Since college students are predisposed to
have lower diffuse support levels across institutions, it is likely that constitutions fare no better.
Thus, the connection between specific and diffuse support is more meaningful for this subpopulation; how a college student approves of the constitution influences constitutional loyalty
more so than other groups. This may also help explain the mixed findings discussed in Chapter 4
on the individual constitutional loyalty questions: many subjects expressed support for the
federal charter’s continued operation, but it was tempered by the belief that the document was
biased towards certain groups. This can also be seen in how the SCOTUS approval remains
significant and influential; since the SCOTUS often engages in constitutional-level politics,
agreement with the SCOTUS’s decisions (i.e. evaluating its job performance) likely serves as a
proxy for constitutional support (see Chapter 4 for further elaboration). I further explore these
findings, and their implications, below.
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Michigan Results
A different relationship emerges for Michigan constitutional loyalty. In estimating these
models, I use Michigan-level data for institutional attitudes, constitutional knowledge, and (local)
news attentiveness. These models are also run using robust standard errors to correct for
heteroskedasticity present in the normal OLS regressions. 17 Results are presented in Table 10.
Again, I use Chapter 4’s state-level model 3 as a basis, with model 4 adding the new civic
knowledge factors. As illustrated, no variable achieves significance in model 4, including the civic
knowledge factors. Only age is significant at the 0.10 level (p=0.079), with trivial effect: an
additional year of age increases a subject’s Michigan mean constitutional loyalty by 0.023-points
controlling for all other factors. These findings mirror those observed in Chapter 4’s modeling,
where similar relationships at the federal level were not replicated at the state-level.

17

See Chapter 4, footnote 15 for explanation regarding Michigan models’ residuals analyses.
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Table 10.
Predictors of Michigan Constitutional Loyalty

Female
Age
African American
Other Minority
SES
Partisanship
Ideology
Snyder Approval
Legislature Approval
State Sup. Ct. Approval
Const. Knowledge
News Attentiveness
Const. Approval

Model 4
0.155
(0.124)
0.023^
(0.013)
-0.124
(0.166)
-0.173
(0.121)
-0.0001
(0.093)
0.008
(0.038)
0.074
(0.071)
-0.06
(0.072)
0.203
(0.159)
0.069
(0.149)
-0.005
(0.051)
0.01
(0.042)

Model 5
0.13
(0.133)
0.042**
(0.013)
0.018
(0.174)
-0.127
(0.132)
-0.033
(0.103)
0.028
(0.042)
0.035
(0.064)
-0.08
(0.074)
0.238
(0.169)
0.002
(0.146)
-0.028
(0.056)
-0.18
(0.048)
0.246*
(0.101)

2.01***
(0.403)

1.14*
(0.513)

Model 6
0.083
(0.119)
0.015
(0.012)
0.134
(0.147)
0.013
(0.124)
0.041
(0.077)
-0.006
(0.037)
0.014
(0.053)
-0.072
(0.065)
0.238*
(0.11)
-0.054
(0.1)
0.024
(0.052)
0.012
(0.032)
0.123
(0.079)
0.487***
(0.102)
0.381
(0.407)

115
0.192

99
0.267

99
0.533

Federal Const. Loyalty
Constant
N
R2

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures, excepting constitutional knowledge that was derived from the post-test.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ^ p < 0.10

As previously mentioned, these null findings likely result from both the general ignorance
of the Michigan state constitution and governmental actors and the federal “warmglow” effect
(Zink and Dawes 2016): Given the general ignorance of Michigan state government, federal
symbolism and feelings diffuse down upon state-level, analogous institutions. This “warmglow”
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suggests, therefore, that federal and state constitutional loyalty are strongly correlated with each
other. Controlling for federal constitutional loyalty may help better estimate the causal
relationship. There is also the potential connection between Michigan constitutional approval
and loyalty, or whether specific support is influencing diffuse support. A subject’s approval rating
of the Michigan constitution may similarly influence her loyalty towards it, like in the federal
model above.
To test for these possibilities, I run two additional models. First, I include an additional
variable measuring subjects’ Michigan constitutional approval; results are presented in model 5
in Table 10, above. As displayed, a subject’s approval of the Michigan constitution is significantly
(p=0.017) and positively related to mean constitutional loyalty. A one-unit increase in
constitutional approval increases a subject’s average constitutional loyalty by 0.246-points,
holding all other factors constant. In this new model, as well, only one other variable reaches
significance: a subject’s age is positively related, with one additional year of age increasing
average loyalty by 0.042-points, a somewhat inconsequential effect (although is likely due to the
limited age variability within the sample). Importantly, the explained variation in this new model
improves considerably relative model 4, suggesting that a subject’s specific support figures
prominently in underlying diffuse support. However, these relationships disappear when federal
constitutional loyalty – the federal “warmglow” – is taken into account (model 6). Subjects’
loyalty towards the federal charter significantly (p=0.000) and substantially influences their
Michigan constitutional loyalty. A one-unit increase in average federal constitutional loyalty
increases Michigan mean constitutional loyalty by nearly a half point, holding all other factors
constant. This is a substantial effect, one further indicated by the overall model’s explained
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variation: approximately 53 percent of the variation in Michigan constitutional loyalty is
explained by these factors alone.
Two important conclusions can be drawn here: First, Michigan constitutional loyalty is
heavily tied with federal constitutional loyalty. Those who express greater federal charter fealty
likewise espouse a state level loyalty, although the effect is not a one-to-one. This is in line with
the expectations of the “warmglow” described by Zink and Dawes (2016), where greater
exposure to federal constitutional symbolism instills in all Americans a general sense of
constitutional veneration that diffuses down upon state charters, although loyalty to state
charters is observably weaker. My findings mirror this pattern. Second, Michigan constitutional
loyalty appears unaffected by a subject’s civic knowledge. This is not too surprising given the
general ignorance of the Michigan constitution and the charter’s general lack of media attention
(although that may change during years when the state constitution is in the news, such as during
hotly contested constitutional amendment referenda). 18 Thus, how one feels about the U.S.
Constitution appears to be a good proxy for Michigan’s constitutional support.
Discussion and Implications
I can now revise the preliminary conclusions made in Chapter 4 about constitutional
loyalty predictors. Like other institutional loyalties, constitutional loyalty follows some similar
patterns: demography, partisanship, and ideology are insignificant, while institutional attitudes

Michigan constitutional approval, though, does appear to follow the expectations established in the larger
literature (see, e.g., Stephanopoulos and Versteeg 2016). I estimate a model that controls for all four dimensions
and federal constitutional approval, finding that Michigan constitutional approval is significantly and positively
influenced by subjects’ Michigan constitutional knowledge (b=0.112, p=0.031) and federal constitutional approval
(b=0.369, p=0.000). No other variables reach traditional levels of significance, keeping with prior findings in
Chapter 4 and other studies on institutional support (save for the null finding regarding state institutional
attitudes).
18
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(especially on the SCOTUS’s job performance) matter. However, college students’ news
attentiveness and constitutional knowledge do not significantly predict their loyalty to the
charter, diverging from the larger literature’s expectations of positivity bias. Instead, these
findings suggest that college students have weaker federal constitutional loyalty than other
groups – a loyalty that is influenced heavily by short-term assessments of other governmental
institutions and how well one approves of the constitution’s performance. While I cannot
definitively say this is the case with these data here, I can conjecture that the SCOTUS’s role as
constitutional arbiter and interpreter indirectly influences college students’ constitutional
attitudes explaining its significance here; (dis)agreement with the Court’s decisions on major
constitutional questions may (weaken) solidify one’s underlying loyalty to the charter.
Additionally, there is a strong connection between a constitution’s specific and diffuse
support. Put another way, a person who has high constitutional approval likewise espouses
greater loyalty. This suggests there may not be much observable difference between specific and
diffuse support, at least where constitutions are concerned, or that it is empirically difficult to
separate the distinct concepts (see Davidson and Parker 1972). Both federal and Michigan
constitutional support exhibit this relationship. For college students, though, this may be simply
a byproduct of the connection noted above: judging constitutional performance based on the
outputs of its created institutions, such as the courts. The implication, therefore, is that shortterm outputs of governmental institutions, potentially colored by partisanship and polarization,
can indirectly influence college students’ constitutional support.
Furthermore, Michigan constitutional loyalty is highly dependent on attitudes toward the
federal constitution. The federal “warmglow” noted by Zink and Dawes (2016) occurs here, with
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modeling illustrating the substantial effect that federal constitutional loyalty has upon
subsequent loyalty expressed toward the Michigan state charter. Again, this is not surprising
given the minimal familiarity with the Michigan state constitution; federal attitudes are
substituting for state constitutional support. Consequently, changes in federal attitudes will also
affect state level feelings – a potentially problematic development if one considers that the two
levels are not mutually exclusive. Approval and loyalty towards the Michigan constitution,
therefore, could be influenced by federal constitutional politics that may not have any direct,
substantive connection with the Michigan charter. The “warmglow,” therefore, may not be
entirely benign; it does help generate a basis of support for the Michigan constitution, but it could
also reduce it.
However, these findings are limited in two crucial aspects. First, they speak only to college
students’ behaviors on constitutional loyalty and may not completely generalize to the general
American adult population. Future research should use representative samples to test whether
the observed patterns happen population-wide. I hasten to add, though, there is no evidence
suggesting college students systemically differ from the rest of the American adult population
regarding constitutional loyalty predictors, meaning the use of the college sample may not
undermine external validity (Druckman and Kam 2011). Nonetheless, these findings do suggest
fruitful avenues that scholars can explore regarding constitutional loyalty predictors and the
relationship between constitutional approval and loyalty. Second, the null findings between
Michigan constitutional loyalty and Michigan constitutional knowledge may be explained by my
measurement of Michigan constitutional knowledge (see also footnote 9, above). This battery
should be considered a rough approximation, but I would argue that recognition of constituent
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provisions of the Michigan Constitution is a better approximation of constitutional familiarity
than self-professed measures. Thus, it could be that positivity bias does exist at the federal level
because college students are indeed more familiar with that charter than they are of Michigan’s;
the insignificant result at the state level simply reflects that most Michigan college students do
not have actual familiarity with their state’s constitution – and, therefore, the models do not
have enough variability to accurately estimate whether a relationship does exist between charter
knowledge and loyalty.
Periodic Conventions, Constitutional Knowledge, and Constitutional Loyalty
Foregoing sections have offered tentative conclusions on the predictors of constitutional
loyalty among college students. These findings can provide the basis for future research avenues
assessing whether the general population of Americans exhibit similar behaviors. My
dissertation’s main focus, however, concerns testing the threat of periodic convention referenda
upon constitutional loyalty. Briefly, my experimental analysis in Chapter 5 found that: (1) primes
about periodic conventions, emphasizing the threat they represent to constitutional integrity,
have minimal effect on either Michigan or federal constitutional loyalty; (2) priming subjects that
past convention questions were rejected (versus approved) does matter in modifying a
constitution’s specific support, or constitutional approval, with those informed that prior
conventions were rejected having lower federal and Michigan constitutional approval scores
than those told prior conventions had been approved; and (3) subjects less familiar with
Michigan’s periodic convention mechanism were the persons affected most by the priming
treatment.
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I further explore this latter finding, which offers evidence of positivity bias at work.
Difference in means tests (pooling all subjects together) indicate general differences between
those more and less familiar with Michigan’s periodic convention mechanism and how they
evaluate Michigan’s constitution. As illustrated in Figure 7, subjects less familiar express
significantly lower average Michigan constitutional approval and loyalty than those more
familiar. Subjects more familiar have average approval scores of 3.43 compared to those less
familiar with average approval scores of 3.07 (p=0.003), although the magnitude difference is
somewhat small. Greater difference, though, is observed on average constitutional loyalty
scores, with more familiar subjects averaging a score of 1.65 compared to less familiar subjects
whom average 0.83 (p=0.000). These differences offer evidence that positivity bias is at play.
Figure 7.
Michigan Constitutional Support by Prior Periodic Convention Knowledge
4
3.5

Mean Score

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Const. Approval

Const. Loyalty

Const. Approval

Low

Const. Loyalty
High

Prior Periodic Convention Knowledge

Note: Dependent measures based on pre-test data. Prior periodic convention based on post-test data.
Constitutional approval and loyalty presented on five-point scales, with higher numbers indicating greater approval
and loyalty. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Expectations and Analysis
Similarly, level of constitutional knowledge may also impact the experimental results. Just
how those persons less familiar with Michigan’s periodic convention acted differently to the
treatment, so to may subjects with low knowledge of Michigan’s constitution. Therefore:
Hypothesis 5: Subjects possessing less constitutional knowledge will be more susceptible
to the treatment than subjects with greater constitutional knowledge.
Again, and like in Chapter 5’s analysis, my expectation is that any significant differences among
conditions will likely be driven by subjects lacking constitutional familiarity. To test for this
possibility, I run one-way ANOVAs using level of federal/Michigan constitutional knowledge as a
grouping variable. The latter are the re-coded binary measures (i.e. low and high) of the scale
measures used in the prior section, meaning that ANOVAs are produced for each level of
constitutional knowledge. There are three dependent variables of interest: likelihood of
supporting a federal or state constitutional convention, constitutional approval, and
constitutional loyalty. 19 Bonferroni post-hoc tests were used to identify statistically significant
differences between conditions, and I also report effect sizes where appropriate. 20
Results
I begin with Michigan constitutional support. Like Chapter 5, one-way ANOVAs do not find
significant differences among the groups for either Michigan constitutional loyalty or likelihood
of supporting a Michigan constitutional convention. However, there are significant differences

Constitutional loyalty is, again, measured using the subject’s average response to all four diffuse support
statements. Analyses reported here were re-ran using the alternative dependent measures noted in infra-note 9
(above), yielding no substantial differences.
20
See Chapter 5 for a discussion about the use of ANOVA and the Bonferroni method. Formal ANOVA tables
available upon request.
19
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among low and high knowledge persons on Michigan constitutional approval, but only among
those in the negative (Condition 2) and positive prime (Condition 3) groups. Results are
graphically presented in Figure 8. As expected, these differences occur only for those with low
Michigan constitutional knowledge (F(3,142) = 3.06, p = 0.03). 21 Bonferroni post-hoc tests
indicate that subjects exposed to the negative prime (𝑦𝑦�= 2.83; s = 0.82) had lower approval scores

than the positive prime group (𝑦𝑦�= 3.38; s = 0.75; p = 0.041), a moderate effect size (η2 = 0.06).

These findings mirror those found in Chapter 5: information about a periodic convention must
both be (1) accompanied by a prime to have a meaningful effect and (2) influences those with
lower (constitutional) knowledge more than others.
Figure 8.
Michigan Constitutional Approval Scores by Constitutional Knowledge

Mean Constitutional Approval
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Level of Michigan Constitutional Knowledge

Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval presented on a five-point scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
One-way ANOVA results for those with high constitutional knowledge were non-significant (F(3,76) = 1.29, p =
0.283).
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Alongside these findings, Chapter 5 also noted that a reverse “warmglow” (Zink and
Dawes 2016) appeared to be influencing federal constitutional approval. Put another way,
subjects informed that prior periodic conventions had been rejected (the negative prime) not
only rated the Michigan constitution lower but correspondingly offered a frostier evaluation of
the U.S. Constitution. Further analysis confirmed this reverse “warmglow” occurred among those
with lower prior knowledge about Michigan’s periodic convention mechanism (see Chapter 5 for
elaboration). Therefore, it stands to reason those with lower Michigan constitutional knowledge
and those with lower federal constitutional knowledge may also exhibit similar tendencies.
Figure 9.
Federal Constitutional Approval and the Reverse “Warmglow” Effect

Federal Mean Constitutional Approval

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5

control

more
information

negative
prime

positive
prime

control

more
information

High

negative
prime

positive
prime

Low

Level of Michigan Constitutional Knowledge

Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval presented on a five-point scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
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I test both propositions here. First, I re-run the one-way ANOVAs above using federal
dependent variables. No significant differences among experimental conditions by levels of
Michigan constitutional knowledge emerge for either federal constitutional loyalty or the
likelihood of supporting a federal constitutional convention. However, and like in the Michigan
results above, federal constitutional approval does significantly differ among the conditions for
those with low Michigan constitutional knowledge (F(3,137) = 5.32, p = 0.002). 22 Bonferroni posthoc tests determined that subjects in the negative prime (𝑥𝑥̅ = 2.91; s = 0.91) had significantly
lower federal constitutional approval scores than subjects in the positive prime (𝑥𝑥̅ = 3.79; s =
0.72; p = 0.001), as shown in Figure 9. This is a moderately strong effect (η2 = 0.104), resulting in
almost a full point difference in federal constitutional approval. Taken together, these findings
indicate that a reverse “warmglow” is occurring: subjects more ignorant of the Michigan
constitution and periodic conventions are also more susceptible to the negative prime. The same,
however, cannot be said about federal constitutional knowledge levels, the second proposition.
One-way ANOVAs for all three dependent variables yield null findings. Thus, it is the differences
among Michigan constitutional knowledge that determine susceptibility to the treatment.
Discussion and Implications
These findings, coupled with those of Chapter 5, further qualify the conclusion that
periodic conventions influence subjects differently depending on their prior knowledge.
Differences on Michigan constitutional approval are driven by subjects who (1) are not familiar
with periodic conventions and (2) have low constitutional knowledge scores, but these

One-way ANOVA results for those with high constitutional knowledge were non-significant (F(3,74) = 1.80, p =
0.154).
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differences occur only between the negative and positive primes. Put another way, subjects
informed that prior periodic conventions had been rejected expressed lower constitutional
approval, but this difference occurred among those with low Michigan constitutional knowledge
and not previously familiar with periodic conventions. Positivity bias leads us to think there
should be differences among those groups with greater familiarity of an institution than not, an
expectation confirmed by these results. Practically speaking, therefore, campaigners will want to
focus on low-information voters. 23
There remains, however, the unexpected direction of the negative and positive prime
conditions. To review, the negative prime (subjects informed that prior conventions were
rejected) sends an implicit assumption that the constitution has been supported by past
generations who refused to fundamentally alter it. Conversely, the positive prime (subjects
informed that prior conventions were approved) communicates an implicit message that it may
be okay to replace or alter the charter because it has been done before (see Brennan 2017; see
also Chapter 5 for elaboration). Instead, results here still confirm what was observed in Chapter
5: negative prime subjects expressed higher average constitutional approval scores than those in
the positive prime, opposite of expectations. However, I believe my prior explanations still fit:
Younger persons, including my sample, already have lower approval scores generally, which may
have been accentuated by the negative prime that afforded college students opportunities to
express dissatisfaction. More likely, though, is the positive prime is working as intended; priming

Although these voters are less likely to vote/participate, a fact that also explains why opponents of
constitutional change have an easier time defeating ballot initiatives and periodic conventions.
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subjects to believe it is okay to replace a constitution activates subjects’ risk aversion, bolstering
their support for the current constitution.
Additionally, the null findings on Michigan and federal constitutional loyalty, even among
differing constitutional knowledge levels, provide evidence that specific and diffuse support
empirically differ. Given that periodic conventions influence specific support, or constitutional
approval, more than diffuse support, it would suggest that periodic conventions are prompting
relatively short-term reassessments that do not affect the subjects’ underlying constitutional
orientations. However, this assertion must be squared with the regression analyses above;
specific support for the constitution appeared to be heavily predicting one’s constitutional loyalty
even amongst other controls. At least among college students, my findings would seem to
indicate that the debate in the larger literature on specific and diffuse support is far from settled.
Finally, I note the (still) occurring reverse “warmglow” among subjects. Whereas Zink and
Dawes (2016) found that federal constitutional feelings underscored state constitutional feelings,
a reversed phenomenon continues to occur here: negative and positive priming on periodic
conventions influenced subjects’ Michigan and federal constitutional approval. I posit that the
“warmglow,” regardless of its direction, is more a manifestation of the constitutional status quo
bias that pervades the nation’s constitutional feelings – at both the state and federal levels.
Summary
Constitutional knowledge has a qualified relationship with constitutional loyalty. On the
one hand, higher levels of constitutional knowledge engender a positivity bias among college
students, increasing average constitutional loyalty. But there are significant caveats, least among
them that the relationship holds at the federal level only; Michigan constitutional loyalty is
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unaffected by one’s actual familiarity with the charter’s content, instead influenced more by the
subject’s federal constitutional attitudes (i.e. the “warmglow”). More importantly is that
subjects’ constitutional approval appears to heavily inform their loyalty; if one approves of the
constitution, then you less willing to alter or do away with the charter. This is true for both
Michigan and federal constitutional support. Yet, constitutional knowledge does matter; those
unfamiliar with their constitutional charters respond differently to periodic conventions than
those who have better understandings. Proponents and opponents of periodic conventions,
therefore, would do well to focus their energies on these kinds of individuals.
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS & FUTURE WORK
Having reviewed my findings, I now turn to a larger discussion about how these results
square with prior works and political reality. The scholarly literature on institutional support
indicates that my results – particularly the null findings on primes about periodic conventions
influencing a person’s constitutional loyalty – are not entirely unexpected, but also may be
welcomed; if a person’s constitutional loyalty is not influenced by primes emphasizing the
existential threat periodic conventions represent to constitutional charters, then proponents of
constitutional veneration can breathe a sigh of relief. However, there still remains the political
reality: people do express disapproval with the constitutional system of government and its
outputs, and primes about periodic conventions do influence a person’s approval of their
constitutions, albeit in unanticipated ways. Below, I discuss my findings and their implications,
including where future research should focus in further exploring constitutional loyalty and
periodic conventions.
Lessons & Implications: Constitutional Loyalty, Periodic Conventions, and the Big Picture
Opinions on Political Institutions (and System) Drive Constitutional Loyalty
Constitutional scholar Sandford Levinson often describes the U.S. Constitution as our
nation’s “sacred text” (see, e.g., Levinson 2006, 2012, & 2018). And we do, indeed, venerate the
document, or at least are risk averse about fundamentally altering it (Zink and Dawes 2016). My
findings detailed in the prior chapters reinforce this belief (the U.S. Constitution enjoys a deep
wellspring of loyalty) but it also offers some cautionary notes. For example, while my subjects
expressed skepticism at rewriting the Constitution, less than a majority explicitly rejected the
idea of eliminating the Constitution altogether (see Table 1). These findings are not out of the
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mainstream; the Pew Research Center (2018) found that 61 percent of the country believes
significant changes are needed in the fundamental design and structure of American government
– both of which are created by the Constitution itself. Thus, a paradox of sorts: Americans express
support for their federal constitutional charter, yet also are underwhelmed with the political
system that charter creates.
The paradox is also reflected in how attitudes towards the U.S. Constitution’s created
institutions matter in predicting one’s federal constitutional loyalty. This is particularly true with
feelings toward the U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) and President Trump. When institutions of
government engage in constitutional-level politics (e.g. debates over what the constitution
requires, whether a governmental branch’s actions are constitutional, etc.) their job performance
matters in determining one’s constitutional loyalty. This finding is somewhat troubling given that
a general dislike of government could potentially pervade into the civic creed of the nation. It
could also mean that loyalty towards the Constitution changes with the political winds, a
byproduct of partisan polarization and the increasing tribal nature of American politics. It may
already be happening, too: in this context, the Pew survey above (finding that a majority of
Americans favoring fundamental system-wide changes to the constitutional system) could be
read to signal that constitutional loyalty has taken a significant hit (see Pew Research Center 2018
for a comparison with prior years).
Although this may not be all doom-and-gloom; partisanship may certainly weigh on
people’s feelings toward the political system, but it is another question if those feelings about
requiring fundamental change extend to the constitutional system itself (i.e. the general design
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of government). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) argue that the public is critical of governmental
institutions but not the system’s design per se:
People actually see two quite different political systems…. [A]nything associated with the
constitutional system elicits a positive response…. To the extent there are problems with
the political system it is because we have deviated from what was outlined in the
Constitution, not because that outline was flawed. (104)
The problem, though, is that the Pew survey did differentiate between feelings on governmental
institutions and the general design of government. Respondents not only dislike specific
institutions (especially Congress), but they also feel that the larger, governmental design requires
significant, fundamental changes.
My findings would suggest that these feelings, moreover, are taking aim at the
Constitution itself. People no longer are keeping the Constitution separate from criticism, or
attributing blame to the created institutions. Instead, the Constitution itself is seen as “flawed”
(see, e.g., Levinson 2006 & 2018). My subjects may not have been overtly willing to do away with
the U.S. Constitution completely, but they did express skepticism regarding its fairness and only
a plurality agreed that fundamentally altering it would not matter (see Table 1). Likewise, if other
institutional attitudes – on the SCOTUS and president – are influencing constitutional loyalty, it
suggests that our hyperpartisan polarization may actually be harming our underlying faith in the
constitutional system. My findings on the positive relationship between constitutional approval
and loyalty (i.e. high constitutional specific support predicts high constitutional diffuse support)
also reaffirms the assertion that short-term assessments do influence long-term dispositions.
State constitutions are not immune, either. While my results did not indicate that statelevel institutional attitudes predict state constitutional loyalty, my regression analysis did
demonstrate the existence of a “warmglow” effect. As Zink and Dawes (2016) find, a
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constitutional status quo bias at the federal level diffuses down into the states, although some
“strength” is lost (i.e. the status quo bias is less resilient and easier to overcome). The implicit
assumption, therefore, is that Americans tap into a shared and underlying schema when
evaluating their federal and state constitutional charters. My findings provide further evidence
of the warmglow: federal constitutional institutional feelings, particularly on the SCOTUS and
President Trump, influence state constitutional loyalties. This is further exacerbated given the
limited engagement (and knowledge) that citizens have with their state charters; when
evaluating an unknown, we turn to familiar schemas for help. As my subjects demonstrated,
feelings on the federal Constitution and government provide a convenient proxy.
Periodic Conventions: Influencing Constitutional Approval
Periodic conventions also have a role to play here, albeit in unexpected ways. While
periodic conventions do not influence constitutional loyalty (a finding that is not entirely
unexpected given the theorized durability of diffuse support), they do influence one’s specific
support, or constitutional approval. However, this is a qualified support; those told that prior
conventions were rejected by voters had decreased approval scores relative those subjects told
that prior conventions had been approved. This stands contrary to Madison’s expectations in
Federalist 49 and are somewhat counter-intuitive, although it could be that informing voters that
prior conventions had been approved (the “positive prime”) activated their risk aversion and
constitutional status quo biases (i.e. the warmglow). More importantly, though, was how both
Michigan and federal constitutional approval were affected by these primes.
Collectively, my findings suggest that changes to our constitutional evaluative criteria can
occur at the state level and cascade into federal-level effects, a “reverse” warmglow. Since the
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federal Constitution has no history of periodic conventions, testing for convention effects at the
state level is the more realistic and appropriate option. Given the influence, though, of federallevel feelings on state constitutional loyalty (and constitutional support more generally), it is not
surprising that a state-level interaction would cause feedback. However, the relationship
between constitutional approval and loyalty raises concerns regarding this feedback loop; low
constitutional approval is correlated with low constitutional loyalty. In one respect, then,
Madison’s advice actually leads to reduced constitutional loyalty (and, in his eyes, veneration):
telling voters that prior conventions have been rejected overrides their constitutional status quo
biases, inducing support to amend/alter/replace a charter. At least one prominent constitutional
critic echoes this sentiment: Levinson (2018) calls for us to reflect “about whether our 18thcentury Constitution serves us well today.” His method of doing so? Noting how various
constitutional reforms (ones that many contemporary Americans ostensibly favor today) have
been rejected over the past 200 plus years.
Constitutional Ignorance: The Importance of Reading the Manual
Importantly, though, there is an “ignorance gap” when it comes to these findings. Those
unfamiliar with periodic conventions are the subjects more susceptible to the primes, and thus
driving the results. The same relationship holds for constitutional knowledge/familiarity: persons
more knowledgeable about a constitution express greater loyalty/approval/support towards it,
reflecting a “positivity bias” common in institutional support: to know it is to love it (see Gibson
and Caldeira 2009a). Thus, one way to generate constitutional loyalty – or counteract more
negative political aspects, including hyperpartisanship – is to teach constitutional processes (e.g.
periodic conventions) and about constitutions generally.
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Michigan constitutional loyalty illustrates the negative effects of constitutional ignorance.
Persons less familiar with Michigan’s periodic convention mechanism were the subjects
responding to the treatments; those already familiar did not differ in their mean constitutional
loyalties nor constitutional approval scores. There is also no evidence of a positivity bias at the
Michigan level, and is likely the result of the low level of Michigan constitutional knowledge
exhibited across the board. This is not unsurprising given that, generally, periodic conventions
are not taught even within states that utilize them, nor do state constitutions feature
prominently (if at all) in secondary and collegiate civics curricula (see Snider 2017). What is
surprising, though, is how pervasive this ignorance gap can be: if most Americans exhibit low
political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), then it stands to reason they also will display
low constitutional knowledge. The net effect is that constitutional support for most of the
population could be influenced quite easily (albeit over the long-term).
The efficacy of periodic conventions should also be considered suspect given these
observations. If voters are unaware of periodic conventions generally, then its utility as a citizens’
way of reviewing the political system’s design and structure is lost (especially in those states with
reoccurring periodic convention referenda, including Michigan). In short, Jefferson’s charge to
replace constitutions every generation does not seem plausible (or reasonable, for that matter)
if most citizens are not informed enough to even realize they can replace a constitution. Instead,
the better approach may be piecemeal; singular amendments presented as such rather than
general revisions. Then again, the latter approach does not achieve great success either: less than
half of all legislature-referred and popular initiative amendments to the Michigan constitution
since 1964 have been approved, indicating a “general unwillingness of Michigan voters to change
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their constitution” (Zink and Dawes 2016, 555). A further complication concerns how priming
voters about periodic conventions can lead to differing results, outcomes driven by the ignorant
among the citizenry. Here, both Madison and Jefferson would agree: when it comes to
constitutions and revisions, an informed citizenry is not only preferable but a prerequisite.
Future Research
Armed with these findings, additional avenues of research readily present themselves.
First, replication studies should explore whether the experimental results are generalizable to
the larger population of American adults. As mentioned before, some scholars (e.g. Druckman
and Kam 2011) note that framing/priming experiments do not present generalizability concerns
when using college student samples. There is no indication that college students systemically
vary in their responses to these primes relative adults (or vice versa). Nonetheless, there may be
generational differences that the experiment cannot detect; perhaps Millennials differ in their
constitutional support relative their parents and grandparents that may signal a profound shift
in how we describe constitutional support more generally. Any difference, therefore, would lead
to further questions about why young people differ in how they respond to constitutional primes.
Second, does partisan strength matter in teasing out how periodic conventions influence
constitutional loyalty and approval? In his examination of Michigan’s constitutional conventions,
Thomas (1968) found that partisanship was the deciding factor for voters when supporting
(opposing) the 1963 constitution. Similar to how those ignorant of periodic conventions
responded the most to the negative and positive primes, it could be that strong partisans may be
responding differently to the primes relative more moderate persons. Then again, the null
findings concerning partisanship on constitutional loyalty may offer evidence against
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partisanship’s influence generally. Future research should more fully control for this possible
confounder.
Relatedly, there are questions concerning how policy agreement with the substantive
framing of periodic conventions may influence underlying constitutional approval and loyalty
(and, ultimately, support for the convention itself). By substantive framing I mean the “purpose”
of the periodic convention, such as the revisions prioritized, the themes to discuss, and/or the
goals of the convention itself, among others. Put another way, how do proponents of a periodic
convention frame their arguments? Do these frames matter in adjudicating whether a
convention is approved or not? Do certain characterizations help to overcome entrenched
constitutional loyalty and/or approval? Why? My experiment here cannot speak to these
questions, but they are certainly pertinent to our greater understanding of the subject. The
general decline in periodic conventions described by Snider (2017), moreover, presupposes these
questions – what has changed since the 1960s and 70s to precipitate such a drastic decline? While
the periodic convention literature does speak to some of these possibilities (see Snider 2017 for
a review), none of them address how an individual’s underlying constitutional support is
influenced (if at all).
Third, the relationship between the SCOTUS’s institutional support and constitutional
loyalty is worthy of further elaboration. Do people proxy their constitutional attitudes and
feelings for how they feel about the Constitution’s “guardian?” Are college students different
from other Americans in this respect? Given the intricate relationship between courts and
constitutions generally, future scholarship may find that diffuse support measures for courts are
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more generally indicators of one’s constitutional loyalty. If not, are Americans sophisticated
enough to differentiate courts interpreted roles and opinions relative a constitution itself?
Finally, greater exploration into constitutional knowledge is clearly warranted, especially
where it concerns state constitutions. Both constitutional knowledge question batteries should
be considered first steps. For federal constitutional knowledge, the emphasis on “rights rhetoric”
(Glendon 1991) in U.S. Constitution curricula means that people are less familiar with structural
and institutional features than questions pertaining to the Bill of Rights. This is somewhat evident
in my study, given that the two highest scoring questions concerned the Bill of Rights (see Table
7). Thus, other studies (e.g. Green et al. 2011) focus on measuring respondents’ abilities to recall
factual info regarding the Bill of Rights when operationalizing constitutional knowledge. I
contend, though, that this yields an incomplete picture – noting full well that contemporary
constitutional curricula deliberately emphasize only certain aspects of the Constitution. Future
research should direct energies here to better tap the full extent of the constitutional knowledge
domain but also whether a standard question battery can be created (like the political knowledge
battery constructed by Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; see also Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993).
Measuring Michigan constitutional knowledge certainly requires greater elaboration. This
effort is complicated by the absence of the Michigan constitution from virtually all civics curricula
within the state, both secondary and collegiate. While I argue that my identification method is a
better way to ascertain a subject’s effective (and applied) familiarity with the Michigan state
charter, it certainly is incomplete (see Chapter 6). Future research needs to establish what the
content of Michigan constitutional knowledge ought to entail. Should it correspond with federal
themes? Should it be directed more at substantive policy provisions (e.g. positive rights found in
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most state constitutions; see Zackin 2013) rather than governmental design features? Or
something else entirely? Greater conceptualization is a necessary first step in better
operationalizing state constitutional knowledge.
Afterword: Wither Our Civic Creed?
What motivated this dissertation was a desire to adjudicate Madison’s and Jefferson’s
dueling contentions about periodic conventions and constitutional loyalty. The major takeaway
concerns not the qualifying of these contentions, but rather how constitutional loyalty can be
influenced by other institutional attitudes – and how federal constitutional loyalty serves as the
foundation for our state constitutional support. There is indeed a more complex relationship
concerning constitutional loyalty that extends beyond just a mere constitutional status quo bias.
Additionally, and given the role of constitutional approval in generating constitutional loyalty,
one wonders if hyperpartisanship and polarization are coloring feelings on our constitutional
charters.
The more interesting note, however, concerns the citizenry’s abysmal understanding of
our constitutional charters, especially the state variety. While my subjects had a relatively strong
grasp of federal constitutional knowledge, Michigan constitutional knowledge was virtually nonexistent. Moreover, the use of periodic conventions as a general revision mechanism – a citizen
“redo” button, if you will – becomes questionable if the public just does not have enough
familiarity to properly understand what a periodic convention is – never mind actually judging on
the merits whether the present charter ought to be replaced. There is a pressing need for
educating about state constitutional charters at the same rate as the federal Constitution.
Federal constitutional knowledge should not be neglected, either; the hyper-focus on the Bill of
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Rights neglects structural and institutional principles that should not be ignored. One wonders if
a majority of Americans favor fundamental changes to the “design and structure” of our
government (Pew Research Center 2018) because they simply do not understand how our
constitutional system actually operates.
If the U.S. Constitution is our national “civic creed” (Smith 1993), we neither fully
understand it nor do we really treat it like a creed. The same is even truer for our individual states’
constitutions. How can we question a faith that we do not fundamentally grasp? How can we
believe a credo without understanding it? Such blind loyalty and woefully inadequate
understanding raise the specter of citizens making fundamentally flawed decisions when it
concerns constitutional revision, as well as being easily manipulated by political elites and other
special interests. Periodic conventions become a hollow hope – as does the larger call for
discussing our constitutional design and system. The threat is perhaps bigger at the state level,
where federal constitutional attitudes mask genuine need for constitutional revisions – or saddle
the state with suboptimal modifications. Here, then, is the biggest takeaway: Our civic creed
withers without a renaissance in constitutional education.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Pre-test Instrumentation
Thank you for taking this voluntary survey. These questions examine how college students think about and
understand constitutional charters. All information will be kept completely confidential and anonymous.
First, we would like to ask you a few questions about your political orientations, behaviors, and feelings
on federal and state institutions.
1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent?
Strong
Democrat

Weak
Democrat





Independent
but lean
toward
Democrats

Independent





Independent
but lean
toward
Republicans



Weak
Republican

Strong
Republican

Don’t
Know/Unsure







2. When it comes to politics, how would you describe yourself in terms of liberal or conservative views?
Very liberal



Somewhat
liberal

Somewhat
conservative

Moderate



Very conservative

Don’t Know/Unsure








Almost
daily

2 or 3
times a
week

3 or 4
times a
month

A few
times a
year

Hardly
ever

Never

3. How closely do you follow NATIONAL
news?













4. How closely do you follow LOCAL news?













In general, how much do you approve of the way these FEDERAL officials and institutions are handling
their jobs?
Not at
all

A little

Some

A lot

A great
deal

Unsure

5. President Donald J. Trump













6. United States Congress













7. United States Supreme Court













Now consider the MICHIGAN STATE government. In general, how much do you approve of the way these
STATE officials and institutions are handling their jobs?
Not at
all

A little

Some

A lot

A great
deal

Unsure

8. Governor Rick Snyder













9. Michigan State Legislature













10. Michigan State Supreme Court













Go to next page, please.
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Next, we are interested in the extent to which you follow Michigan government. Please answer the
following true/false questions. Many people don’t know the answers to these questions, so if there are
some you don’t know, select “Don’t Know” and move on.
True

False

Don’t
Know/Unsure

1. Michigan has a state constitution.







2. Every 16 years, Michigan voters are asked if
they would like to hold a constitutional
convention.







3. The current Michigan state constitution, in
force since 1964, can be revised by a periodic
convention approved by voters.







Now we are interested in knowing your feelings on the U.S. FEDERAL Constitution. To what extent do you
agree with the following statements?
Strongly
agree

Agree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

4. It would not make much difference to me if the
FEDERAL constitution were rewritten or
amended.











5. The FEDERAL constitution favors some groups
more than others.











6. If the FEDERAL constitution continually
prevents decisions that the people agree with,
it might be better to do away with the
Constitution altogether.











7. The FEDERAL constitution is too controversial
to be useful today.











8. On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being “strongly approve”), how much do you approve of the FEDERAL constitution?
Please circle your answer.
1

2

3

4

5

Go to next page, please.
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Now we would like to know your feelings on the MICHIGAN STATE constitution. To what extent do you
agree with the following statements?
Strongly
agree

Agree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

1. It would not make much difference to me if the
MICHIGAN STATE constitution were rewritten
or amended.











2. The MICHIGAN STATE constitution favors some
groups more than others.











3. If the MICHIGAN STATE constitution
continually prevents decisions that the people
agree with, it might be better to do away with
the Constitution altogether.











4. The MICHIGAN STATE constitution is too
controversial to be useful today.











5. On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being “strongly approve”), how much do you approve of the MICHIGAN STATE
constitution? Please circle your answer.
1

2

3

4

5

Next, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself. Remember that your responses will be
anonymous and kept confidential.
6. Which best describes your gender?



Male



Female



Prefer to self-describe (please specify) _________________________________________________________



Prefer not to say

7. What is your current age (in years)? ____________________________________________________________
8. What race/ethnicity do you primarily identify as? Please select all that apply.
White/Caucasian
Black/African American
Asian American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
Hispanic/Latino
Other (please specify) ______________________________________________________________________

9. What do you consider your family’s socioeconomic background?
Working class

Middle class

Upper-middle class

Upper class








Go to next page, please.
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1. Are you a U.S. citizen?
Yes

No

Prefer not to answer







2. When you are not attending Wayne State University, do you reside in Michigan or live elsewhere?



I live in Michigan



I live in another state (please specify) __________________________________________________________



I live in another country

Go to next page, please.
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Experimental Treatments
[CONDITION 0, “control”]
We now want you to read through a news article on the 2010 Michigan general election. During this
election, Michigan voters were asked whether they wanted to hold a constitutional convention.

The Oakland County News
LANSING, MI – MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2010

Michigan 2010: State Con-Con Question
---------------------------------by PATRICIA SNYDER
---------------------------------

Every 16 years, Michigan voters
get to decide on whether to call for
a constitutional convention to
rewrite the state Constitution.
Opponents argue that the current
amendment process is adequate.
“Constitutional change can come
about amendment by amendment,”
argues the Michigan Chamber of

Commerce. “Although the present
Constitution is not perfect, it
contains no fatal flaw.”

state a starting point from which to
begin discussions on whether and
how Michigan’s Constitution
should be improved.”

Others argue now is the time for
significant changes. Citizens for
Michigan has proposed several
reforms, noting that “these
recommendations offer the entire

If approved, the process for a
constitutional convention would
start in early 2011.

1. Given what you have read, how likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the
MICHIGAN STATE constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely











2. How likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the FEDERAL constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely
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[CONDITION 1, “more information”]
We now want you to read through a news article on the 2010 Michigan general election. During this
election, Michigan voters were asked whether they wanted to hold a constitutional convention.

The Oakland County News
LANSING, MI – MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2010

Michigan 2010: State Con-Con Question
---------------------------------by PATRICIA SNYDER
---------------------------------

Every 16 years, Michigan voters
get to decide on whether to call for
a constitutional convention to
rewrite the state Constitution.
Opponents argue that the current
amendment process is adequate.
“Constitutional change can come
about amendment by amendment,”
argues the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce. “Although the present
Constitution is not perfect, it
contains no fatal flaw.”

Once a convention begins, there is
no limit to what delegates may
change. While voters must approve
any changes, significant rewrites
or even replacement of the present
1963 Constitution could happen.

Others argue now is the time for
significant changes. Citizens for
Michigan has proposed several
reforms, noting that “these
recommendations offer the entire
state a starting point from which to
begin discussions on whether and
how Michigan’s Constitution
should be improved.”

If approved, the process for a
constitutional convention would
start in early 2011.

1. Given what you have read, how likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the
MICHIGAN STATE constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely











2. How likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the FEDERAL constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely
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[CONDITION 2, “negative prime”]
We now want you to read through a news article on the 2010 Michigan general election. During this
election, Michigan voters were asked whether they wanted to hold a constitutional convention.

The Oakland County News
LANSING, MI – MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2010

Michigan 2010: State Con-Con Question
---------------------------------by PATRICIA SNYDER
---------------------------------

Every 16 years, Michigan voters
get to decide on whether to call for
a constitutional convention to
rewrite the state Constitution.
Opponents argue that the current
amendment process is adequate.
“Constitutional change can come
about amendment by amendment,”
argues the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce. “Although the present
Constitution is not perfect, it
contains no fatal flaw.”
Others argue now is the time for
significant changes. Citizens for

Michigan has proposed several
reforms, noting that “these
recommendations offer the entire
state a starting point from which to
begin discussions on whether and
how Michigan’s Constitution
should be improved.”

No constitutional convention has
been approved by voters since
1961. Sixteen years ago, voters
rejected a constitutional
convention by a 72 percent to 28
percent margin. Sixteen years
before that, in 1978, voters again
rejected the constitutional
convention ballot question by a
similar margin.

Once a convention begins, there is
no limit to what delegates may
change. While voters must approve
any changes, significant rewrites
or even replacement of the present
1963 Constitution could happen.

If approved, the process for a
constitutional convention would
start in early 2011.

1. Given what you have read, how likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the
MICHIGAN STATE constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely











2. How likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the FEDERAL constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely
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[CONDITION 3, “positive prime”]

We now want you to read through a news article on the 2010 Michigan general election. During this
election, Michigan voters were asked whether they wanted to hold a constitutional convention.

The Oakland County News
LANSING, MI – MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2010

Michigan 2010: State Con-Con Question
---------------------------------by PATRICIA SNYDER
---------------------------------

Every 16 years, Michigan voters
get to decide on whether to call for
a constitutional convention to
rewrite the state Constitution.
Opponents argue that the current
amendment process is adequate.
“Constitutional change can come
about amendment by amendment,”
argues the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce. “Although the present
Constitution is not perfect, it
contains no fatal flaw.”
Others argue now is the time for

significant changes. Citizens for
Michigan has proposed several
reforms, noting that “these
recommendations offer the entire
state a starting point from which to
begin discussions on whether and
how Michigan’s Constitution
should be improved.”

or even replacement of the present
1963 Constitution could happen.
Prior convention calls have been
approved by the public. Voters in
1866, 1906, and 1961 approved
constitutional conventions,
although only the 1906 and 1961
conventions resulted in new
constitutions.

Once a convention begins, there is
no limit to what delegates may
change. While voters must approve
any changes, significant rewrites

If approved, the process for a
constitutional convention would
start in early 2011.

1. Given what you have read, how likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the
MICHIGAN STATE constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely











2. How likely would you support a constitutional convention to revise or replace the FEDERAL constitution?
Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very unlikely
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Post-test Instrumentation

We are now going to ask you a few questions concerning your knowledge of the FEDERAL Constitution.
Many people don’t know the answers to these questions, so if there are some you don’t know, select
“Don’t Know” and move on.
1. How long is the term of a U.S. Senator?
2 years

4 years

6 years

8 years

Don’t Know











2. If Congress passes a law and the President vetoes it, Congress can enact it anyway with a two-thirds majority
vote of both houses.
True

False

Don’t Know







3. What are the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution called?
The Rights of Man
and the Citizen

The Bill of Rights

The Declaration of
Independence

The Preamble











Don’t Know

4. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not?
Congress

President

Supreme Court

Department of
Justice

Don’t Know











5. Among the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right to:
Free exercise of
religion

Keep and bear arms

Due process of law

A speedy and public
trial

Don’t Know











6. It is the President’s responsibility to nominate federal judges.
True

False

Don’t Know







Now we are going to ask you some questions about the MICHIGAN STATE constitution. For each provision,
please indicate whether you think this provision is a part of the MICHIGAN STATE constitution or not. If
you are unsure, select “Don’t Know” and move on.
IN the
Michigan
Constitution

NOT in the
Michigan
Constitution

Don’t
Know/Unsure

7. State judges and supreme court justices serve for life.







8. Members of the state legislature serve only a limited
number of terms in office before mandatory
retirement.







9. The death penalty is prohibited.







10. State government is required to provide free, public
primary and secondary (K-12) educational institutions
for all residents.







11. The state governor serves for a two-year term.







Go to next page, please.

173
Now we are interested in knowing your feelings on the U.S. FEDERAL Constitution. To what extent do you
agree with the following statements?
Strongly
agree

Agree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

1. It would not make much difference to me if the
FEDERAL constitution were rewritten or
amended.











2. The FEDERAL constitution favors some groups
more than others.











3. If the FEDERAL constitution continually
prevents decisions that the people agree with,
it might be better to do away with the
Constitution altogether.











4. The FEDERAL constitution is too controversial
to be useful today.











5. On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being “strongly approve”), how much do you approve of the FEDERAL constitution?
Please circle your answer.
1

2

3

4

5

Now we would like to know your feelings on the MICHIGAN STATE constitution. To what extent do you
agree with the following statements?
Strongly
agree

Agree

Neither
agree or
disagree

Disagree

Strongly
disagree

6. It would not make much difference to me if the
MICHIGAN STATE constitution were rewritten
or amended.











7. The MICHIGAN STATE constitution favors some
groups more than others.











8. If the MICHIGAN STATE constitution
continually prevents decisions that the people
agree with, it might be better to do away with
the Constitution altogether.











9. The MICHIGAN STATE constitution is too
controversial to be useful today.











10. On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being “strongly approve”), how much do you approve of the MICHIGAN STATE
constitution? Please circle your answer.
1

2

3

4

5

Thank you for completing this survey! Please be sure to submit your survey. If you have any questions or
concerns, please contact the Primary Investigator, Kevin Lorentz, or his advisor, Dr. Brady Baybeck, at
(313) 577-2630.
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APPENDIX B: WAVE 2
A second survey wave was administered during the Fall 2018 semester. These results are
not reported in the main analysis due to substantive departures from Wave 1. In this section I
discuss the “pooled results” (i.e. both survey waves analyzed together), noting differences from
Wave 1’s findings reported above, and possible explanations for the differences.
Predicting Constitutional Loyalty
For ease, I report the pooled data regarding the regression analysis using a dummy
“Wave” variable (a somewhat fixed-effects regression that notes when Wave 2 significantly
differs from Wave 1).
The comprehensive regression models (see Table B-1) from Chapter 6 are reported here.
These models include all variables for all four dimensions: demography, political affiliations,
institutional attitudes, and civic knowledge (i.e. news consumption habits and constitutional
knowledge), plus controls for specific support and survey wave. For federal constitutional loyalty,
Trump approval, SCOTUS approval, and federal constitutional knowledge are significant, as well
as federal constitutional approval. These findings mirror Wave 1, excepting that constitutional
knowledge falls from significance when controlling for federal constitutional approval.
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Table B-1.
Predictors of Constitutional Loyalty

Female
Age
African American
Other Minority
SES
Partisanship
Ideology
Executive Approval
Legislature Approval
Court Approval
Const. Knowledge
News Attentiveness
Const. Approval
Fed. Const. Loyalty
Wave dummy
Constant
N
Adjusted R2

Federal Loyalty
0.057
(0.077)
0.013
(0.01)
-0.099
(0.113)
-0.074
(0.088)
-0.065
(0.055)
0.021
(0.034)
-0.02
(0.046)
0.159***
(0.049)
-0.069
(0.055)
0.146**
(0.051)
0.083**
(0.029)
-0.024
(0.031)
0.355***
(0.047)

Michigan Loyalty
0.152^
(0.081)
0.026***
(0.007)
-0.053
(0.117)
-0.043
(0.089)
-0.025
(0.062)
0.004
(0.03)
0.091*
(0.042)
-0.038
(0.044)
0.006
(0.077)
0.119
(0.075)
0.031
(0.031)
-0.012
(0.033)
0.283***
(0.071)

0.158*
(0.077)
1.265***
(0.331)

0.099
(0.077)
1.224***
(0.321)

Michigan Loyalty v.2
0.109^
(0.066)
0.011^
(0.006)
0.098
(0.102)
0.041
(0.074)
0.005
(0.041)
-0.003
(0.023)
0.025
(0.035)
-0.049
(0.041)
0.033
(0.066)
0.059
(0.066)
0.021
(0.025)
0.005
(0.025)
0.198***
(0.049)
0.459***
(0.056)
0.05
(0.058)
0.489^
(0.251)

298
0.426

198
0.265

198
0.562

Note: Data taken from pre-test measures, excepting constitutional knowledge that was derived from the post-test.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ^ p < 0.10

This departure is reflected in the wave variable, which is significant and positive, denoting
that Wave 2 is influencing the results differently than Wave 1. I believe this is due to Wave 2’s
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constitutional knowledge base being significantly lower than Wave 1’s (p=0.01). 1 Consequently,
the pooled results differ on constitutional knowledge because of Wave 2’s inclusion.
For Michigan constitutional loyalty, three variables reach traditional levels of significance:
age, ideology, and Michigan constitutional approval. Subjects who are older, lean more
conservative, and express greater approval of the Michigan constitution all have higher mean
constitutional loyalty. These results differ from Wave 1’s only with ideology’s significance.
Importantly, the wave dummy is not significant in this model, noting that neither wave is
influencing the results differently. Overall, though, the Michigan model is largely devoid of
significant variables; inclusion of federal constitutional loyalty (p=.000) in the Michigan model
reflects the dissertation’s primary conclusion: Michigan constitutional loyalty is largely informed
by one’s federal constitutional feelings (the federal “warmglow”) given most subjects’ lack of
knowledge and awareness about the charter.
Overall, these pooled results do not substantially differ from Wave 1’s findings nor the
dissertation’s conclusions as they relate to predictors of Michigan constitutional loyalty (namely
that the federal “warmglow” is primarily at work). As for predicting federal constitutional loyalty,
the major departure is the continued influence of constitutional knowledge even after controlling
for specific support – which bolsters my conclusions of constitutional knowledge’s role. This is
likely due to the inclusion of Wave 2, but it does align with the larger literature’s findings about
positivity bias and institutional loyalty. Nonetheless, I conclude that constitutional knowledge did
matter given its role in generating specific support through positivity bias: to know more about

To determine significance, I ran a t-test between the waves on the mean number of correct responses on the
constitutional knowledge scale.
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an institution is to love it, generating greater approval and loyalty towards it. The pooled results
continue to reflect this conclusion.
Experimental Results
Wave 1 found that the experiment’s priming about periodic conventions affected
constitutional approval (specific support) rather than constitutional loyalty (diffuse support).
However, significant differences do exist when one controls for constitutional knowledge:
subjects with low constitutional knowledge were driving results. Conversely, the pooled analysis
indicates initial null findings across the board: the experimental treatment did not appear to
influence either constitutional loyalty or approval at either the federal or Michigan level (Chapter
5’s analysis). 2 However, after accounting for constitutional knowledge (Chapter 6’s analysis), the
pooled results indicate several differences.
I begin with Michigan constitutional support using Michigan constitutional knowledge as
a control. First, for likelihood of supporting a Michigan ConCon ballot question, subjects in the
high Michigan constitutional knowledge group (F(3, 179) = 2.78, p = 0.043) express less support
when exposed to the negative prime (y ̅ = 2.95, s = 0.84) than subjects encountering the positive
prime (y ̅ = 3.44, s = 0.96, p = .05). This is in the expected direction as hypothesized by Madison:
when priming one to think about constitutional integrity (or assaults upon it), subjects were less
likely to support changes – reflecting constitutional status quo bias (see Figure B-1). Conversely,
those primed to think that changes are permissible and have been done beforehand have less
opposition. That this is occurring among high knowledge subjects, though, is surprising, and not
in line with Wave 1’s findings that low knowledge persons were more susceptible to the primes.

2

This remains true after running one-way ANCOVAs controlling for wave. ANCOVA tables available upon request.
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Figure B-1.
Michigan ConCon Ballot Question Support by Constitutional Knowledge
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Higher dependent values indicate greater likelihood of supporting
ConCon ballot question. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Second, Michigan constitutional approval (F(3,297) = 2.91, p = 0.035) is influenced by the
negative and positive primes, and in the same manner as Wave 1: negatively primed subjects had
lower approval scores (y ̅ = 2.95, s = 0.82) than those positively primed (y ̅ = 3.36, s = 0.72, p =
0.02), and this occurred among subjects with low constitutional knowledge only (see Figure B-2).
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Figure B-2.
Michigan Constitutional Approval by Constitutional Knowledge

Mean Michigan Constitutional Approval
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval measured on five-point scale, with higher numbers
indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Third, Michigan constitutional loyalty (diffuse support) was influenced by the experiment
according to the pooled results. Interestingly, constitutional knowledge serves as an important
moderator in determining how the negative and positive primes influence persons. Low Michigan
constitutional knowledge subjects (F(3, 318) = 3.23, p = 0.023) were more susceptible to the
positive prime relative the control (y ̅ = 2.97, s = 0.61, p = 0.03). Put another way, low knowledge
subjects exposed to the positive prime had significantly lower mean constitutional loyalty than
the other conditions. Conversely, high knowledge subjects (F(3, 175) = 2.55, p = 0.05) responded
to the negative prime, expressing higher average diffuse support relative the more information
condition (y ̅ = 3.39, s = 0.63, p = 0.06) (see Figure B-3). Taken together, these results suggest that
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primes influence different persons: negative primes have a greater effect upon high knowledge
persons (who can likely understand what the implications of constitutional changes are), while
low knowledge persons are likely receptive to positive primes that make it seem like
constitutional change is “okay” given the optimistic tone. Consequently, Madison’s hypothesized
relationship receives some empirical backing (and this differs from Wave 1’s null finding).
Figure B-3.
Michigan Constitutional Loyalty by Constitutional Knowledge
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional loyalty measured on five-point scale, with higher numbers
indicating greater loyalty. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Finally, I explore the “reverse” warmglow noted in Chapter 5 (where the experimental
treatment influenced federal constitutional approval, albeit among only persons with low
Michigan constitutional knowledge). The pooled results reflect this “reverse” warmglow (see
Figure B-4): subjects with low Michigan constitutional knowledge (F(3, 291) = 3.27, p = 0.02)
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differed on mean federal constitutional approval. Specifically, subjects exposed to the negative
prime had significantly lower mean approval scores (y ̅ = 3.1, s = 0.85) than subjects in the positive
prime (y ̅ = 3.56, s = 0.85, p = 0.02). These results mirror those found in Wave 1.
Figure B-4.
Federal Constitutional Attitudes and the Reverse “Warmglow” Effect
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Note: Data based on post-test measures. Constitutional approval presented on a five-point scale, with higher
numbers indicating greater approval. Error bars represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Importantly, I re-run the above analyses using the pooled data using an ANCOVA (analysis
of covariance) estimation procedure. ANCOVA controls for pertinent confounders in the normal
one-way ANOVAs employed above. Consequently, I can determine whether one survey wave is
influencing results differently than the other. While I do not report the ANCOVA tables here, I
find that (1) the significant relationships above remain valid after controlling for wave and (2)
that the wave variable in these models did not reach statistical significance, suggesting that these
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pooled results’ substantive differences with Wave 1 are not being driven by Wave 2’s inclusion,
at least concerning the experimental treatments.
Discussion
Given these findings, there are three possible hypotheses that help explain the
differences from the dissertation’s primary wave. First, the differences may reflect temporal
issues and the role of civic education. Each wave was administered during a different
semester/academic year, although within the same calendar year (2018). Wave 1 was deployed
during the Winter 2018 semester (January-April 2018), while Wave 2 was administered during
the Fall 2018 semester (August-December 2018). The waves were also administered during
different periods of the semester that may not make them completely comparable: Wave 1 was
administered late in the Winter semester, during March and April (weeks 12-14). Wave 2,
meantime, was administered much earlier during the Fall semester in early October (weeks 6 and
7).
Consequently, it may be that the differences in waves (especially in federal constitutional
knowledge) could be explained by the effect of civic education. Wave 1’s higher constitutional
knowledge arguably may be contributed to students being much further along in the semester
(almost the end) and being exposed to more constitutional topics. Wave 2, meantime, likely had
minimal exposure and practice. Thus, the pooled results demonstrate the benefits of civics
(constitutional) instruction and how it mediates and possibly enhances the experiment’s
treatments depending on one’s familiarity with the charter.
It could also be that student-level differences are driving results, specifically in the kinds
of students taking courses between the semesters. The Fall 2018 semester (Wave 2) likely had a
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greater number of first-time freshmen enrolling in PS 1010 sections, while the Winter 2018
semester (Wave 1) likely did not. This may have somewhat impacted results due to differences
in students’ experiences, prior knowledge, skills, motivation, etc. There were some significantly
departures in terms of Wave 2 having greater institutional support (especially for Trump),
although this is likely attributable to Wave 2’s greater proportion of conservatives and Republican
partisans. (However, the patterns of support do not change between waves for these variables.
For example, Trump’s average approval score went from 0.6 to 1.0, a statistically significant but
inconsequential difference.) Moreover, balance checks indicate that, once randomly sorted into
experimental conditions, there were no significant differences between the groups across waves.
A third and final factor concerns the waves’ administrations during different times
politically, potentially impacting results. Wave 1 was deployed in the preliminary stages of the
federal midterms and Michigan state elections, including the prelude to the 2018 state
constitutional amendment ballot contests. Wave 2, on the other hand, was ran during the
midterms and state elections. Exposure to these events may have made an imprint during Wave
2 that explains some differences.
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In the U.S., popular support is widespread for both the federal and state constitutional
charters, although the former enjoys greater support than the latter. Such support is necessary
for maintaining a constitution’s legitimacy; popular support for the laws ensures continued
obedience to them. However, critics note that blind support, or excessive veneration, may have
negative consequences, including saddling a political community with suboptimal institutions.
Support must be balanced with the necessity of “periodic repairs,” allowing each generation to
review the prior’s work. In modern parlance, critics advocate for periodic constitutional
conventions, permitting constitutional revisions irrespective of tradition or presumed legal
permanence.
This dissertation explores the relationship between constitutional loyalty and periodic
conventions. Existing scholarship has focused heavily on a constitution’s specific support, or an
individual’s current satisfaction (approval) with the charter’s outputs, provisions, and/or
performance. Little research has explored the more fundamental feelings of constitutional
loyalty, or diffuse support, that forms the bedrock of a charter’s institutional legitimacy.
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Individuals who are willing to countenance revisions and/or replace a constitution are expressing
little loyalty towards it, permitting fundamental changes to the underlying constitutional and
political system. Since periodic conventions represent an existential threat to constitutions, do
primes about them influence an individual’s constitutional loyalty?
To test this question, I deploy a survey experiment that explores how a person’s
underlying constitutional loyalty is influenced by knowledge about periodic conventions. Using
Michigan’s 2010 periodic convention referendum, I expose subjects to various vignettes on the
convention using different primes. I also control for various confounders that generate
constitutional support, including demographic attributes, sociopolitical characteristics,
institutional attitudes, and constitutional knowledge. I find that while a subject’s constitutional
loyalty appears immune to the experimental treatment, her approval of the charter can be
altered depending on how she is primed to think about periodic conventions (e.g. whether prior
periodic conventions had been approved or not). My results also indicate that persons less
familiar with their constitutional charters are more receptive to the primes than persons more
knowledgeable, raising serious concerns about the effects of constitutional ignorance and our
political system’s legitimacy.
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